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This report was prepared by the audiovisual Think-tank set up by the
Commission last November as part of the preparations for its
Green Paper 'Strategy options to strengthen the European pro-
gramme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the
European Union
It was felt appropriate that contributions from representatives of
European professional organizations, those involved in the ad.
ministration of the MEDIA programme,l Member State authorities
and any other interested organizations, selected individual profes.
sionals with recognized status in the programme industry should
also be given the opportunity to make their views known through
their personal contributions to the analyses of the issues involved
and their recommendations for strategic solutions.
This Think-tank, chaired by Antonio Pedro Vasconcelos (film and
television producer, former coordinator of the National Secretariat
for Audiovisual Production in Lisbon) was composed of David Putt-
nam (film producer, director of Anglia TV and Enigma produc-
tions), Michele Cotta (journalist and television producer with
France 2, former president of 'Ia Haute Autorite de l'Audio-visuel'
and past head of news at TF1), Peter Fleischmann (film director
founder of the European Association of Film Directors, director of
Hallelujah films) and Enrique Balmaseda Arias-Davila (lawyer
former legal adviser to Spanish television and past director-general
of the Institute of Film Arts in Madrid.
The expertise of Gaetano Stucchi (RAI) in the field of new
technologies also provided valuable input.
The resulting Think-tank report, which it now seems appropriate to
make widely available, contains a wealth of analysis and pro-
posals. It does, however, only reflect the opinions of the authors and
is in no way an officially approved Commission document.
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GRAPHS AND TABLESDear friend,
You are no doubt aware of the importance the Commission
and I myself attach to the development of Community policy in the
audiovisual sector. At a time when technological developments are
making new types of communication possible, I am thoroughly con-
vinced that the sector should be rethinking its future and the Com-
mission should step up its support measures.
At the meeting of ministers in Mons on 4 and 5 October last
year, I informed the ministers of the 12 Member States of my inten-
tion to present to Parliament and the Council a Green Paper on the
audiovisual sector in order to stimulate debate on various options
for the future.
It is in this context that I am inviting you to chair the Think-
tank the Commission is setting up, in order to ensure the involve-
ment of several internationally renowned figures in the sector.
The Think-tank will bring together a small group of in.
dividuals who, such as yourself, have a certain authority in this sec-
tor. Its job will be to come up with suggestions for guidelines for
audiovisual policy in line with the conclusions reached at Mons and
in the context of preparing the ground for the Green Paper on the
audiovisual sector with a view to the Conference that is to follow its
publication. Its deliberations should lead to the production of a
report, which is to be the basis of the Commission s Green Paper.
In addition, each member will be called on to chair a thematic
group at the Conference itself.
In order to facilitate the Think-tonk' s proceedings, which are
to be conducted between 1 November 1993 and 30 May 1994, itwill come under the MEDIA Business School, since this is the struc-
tore in the Community programme most involved in carrying out
forward-looking research on audiovisual matters. Among the other
members of the Think-tonk will be David Puttnam and Enrique
Balmaseda. The rapporteur will be Gregory Paulger, Head of DG
S Audiovisual Policy Unit.
I look forward to working together with you.
7~0
Joao de Deus  PinheiroBrussels, 3 March 1994
Dear Commissioner,
I am pleased to submit to you the report of the Think.tank
which you were good enough to ask me to choir.
As chairman, I would first of all like to underline the con-
siderable efforts mode by the members of the Think-tonk, not only
in replying to your call within very tight deadlines but also to over-
come their inevitable and healthy divergencies on many issues. I .
was able to appreciate the eiforts they made and I am grateful to
them.
Indeed, with different professional and notional back-
grounds, it seemed at times difficult, if not impossible, for all the
members to reach agreement as much on the issues at stoke as on
the recommendations for action. At all events, the seriousness of
the situation, the urgent need to supply answers and the necessity
for strong political support for the effort our industry must make to
overcome its colossal deficit and its lock of competitiveness lead
each of us to stress the consensus items rather than those which re-
main problematical.
Therefore, although all the members of the Think-tank have
agreed on the text I am pleased to submit to you, this does not mean
that all the doubts in each of our minds have been lifted as regards
both the diagnosis and recommendations.
Moreover, as you yourself will see, we do not pretend to pro-
vide definitive answers to all the questions, nor ready-mode solu-
tions to all the problems. We would not presume to do so, even if
we had hod the time and the means.I am, however, convinced, and I believe the others share this
view, that what is important is to find the right questions and to put
them in the appropriate manner.
A lot of ground remains to be covered .at the conference you
have decided to convene in the wake of the publication of the Com-
mission s Green Paper. It will then be up to the practitioners and
their representative bodies, the politicians and, I would even soy,
public opinion to toke a position.
lastly, on behalf of my colleagues, I would like to thank you
for the trust you have placed in us, and which we have
endeavoured to deserve.
Yours sincerely
("  ~~~~
Antonio-Pedro Vasconcelos1 Guback, T.  Nan-market factors in the in-
ternational distributian of  American films.
Guback' s text is a decisive cantribution to
understanding the often overlooked im-
portance of constc:mt support from the
American Administration for their film and
television industry and especially the way
in which their diplomacy has always back-
ed the effort of the MPAA (Motion Pictures
Association of America) to ensure domina-
tion of the European and world markets.
The GATT negotiations highlighted the strategic importance
of the audiovisual sector. What has become just as obvious is that
the only two players that have remained in the competition are the
United States of America and the European Union.
For a few weeks, politicians and public opinion were
mobilized for a passionate debate where the rhetoric often hid the
real stakes. The Americans wonted to ensure continued domination
of the European market, which is today vital for the growth of a sec-
tor that is their second-largest source of earnings from exports. To
do this, the Americans were bent on eliminating, or at least putting
a freeze on, the fragile .structure of European regulatory and aid
systems, which were especially not to be extended to the new
mediums of cable and satellite.
The Europeans, on the other hand, were determined to re-
main totally free to regulate and support the audiovisual sector in
all its aspects and in all its areas.
And yet, the Americans spoke in the name of free competi-
tion (a system that in many countries has become distorted) and
demanded the liberalization of a market that they had, in the mean
time (as T. Guback explains very welP), ' shaped to ensure it would
play in their favour' while their market remains practically closed
to imports.
Europe, in contrast, staunchly defending its cultural identity,
gave reason to believe that the audiovisual sector was not of major
economic importance and especially could not be considered a
common activity, regulated by ruthless market rules: 'cinema is not
a product like the others
This subtlety, unquestionably right, was nevertheless the
historical source of a lot of misunderstanding. Andre Malraux, en-
ding his prophetic 'Sketch of cinema psychology , said, 'Moreover,
cinema is an industry.
Until the 1960s, this double nature offilms - work and pro-
duct - did not pose any serious problems in Europe for those who
made them: popular art, European cinema was concentrated in
two or three major production centres, the prestige of film stars
crossed borders, films enjoyed the public s favour, receipts largely
covered production costs and investors did well.2 There will never be enough said about
the historical importance of copyright ~
which still does not recognize directors as
the author of the film (the director s work
being considered as 'work made for hire
- in the consolidation of the American in-
dustrial system c:md which has been for the
producer one af the most powerfvl means
of control over his product and for the
banks a solid guarantee that the industrial
spirit prevpils over any vague artistic desire
on the part of the director.
This battle, which has been going on since
the 1920s, has not to date succeeded in
changing the system, despite the recent
canonization by Hollywood of its great
directors (with the grand tributes the
Academy made to Alfred Hitchcock, Billy
Wilder, John Huston, Frank Capra and
many others). It is being waged today at
the head oftheDirector s Guilds by peaple
as important as Spielberg and Lucas and
has the support of the Associations of Euro-
pean Directors. It should be add"d, in any
case, that the problem of American direc-
tors having control over their work has
almost disappepred. A director, in the
European sense of the word, like Martin
Scorsese admits that he has never had any
problems with his producer. It would,
moreover, be interesting to one day tell the
story of this battle of the great American
directors to ensure control over their
works: Manckiewickz, Preston Sturges and
Richard Brooks winning the battle to have
the right to write the screenplays to their
films themselves; John Ford going to shoot
westerns in Monum"nt Valley, far from the
watchful  eye  of the producer, and only film-
ing the shots absolutely necessary for
editing; Preminger filming sequence shots,
This Was.a time, not so long ago, when cinema was still prac-
tically alone on the audiovisual market, before the explosion of
video and the deregulation of the hertzian waves which brought in
its woke a whole multitude of private stations, and also before the
proliferation of satellite and coble and the announcement of digital
compression.
Hoving at the some time reached its full artistic maturity,
with its best directors (American and European, but also from other
continents like India and Japan) controlling the forms offilm narra-
tion, cinema could be said to have become finally that total art, that
universal language - the 'seventh art', which the visionary Canudo
spoke about at the beginning of the century.
This 'victory' of art over industrial constraints, artists over
businessmen encouraged new generations of directors
everywhere in Europe to fight for the definitive 'liberation' of
cinema from what they believed to be market constraints. toter we
see how and why this small revolution took place and to what extent
it contributed to making Europe, in the audiovisual field, a conti-
nent broken up into several small islands isolated from one another
without the ability either to finance themselves or to face the in-
vading domination ofthe American products thatthey thought they
were fighting.
An artistic activity, probably, to the extent that its consump-
tion is not material but spiritual (factory, but of dreamsL cinema
like the whole of audiovisual production, nevertheless obeys the
lows that regulate the entire industrial production. Even if it
manufactures prototypes, the film and audiovisual industry must
find the means in the market to finance them.
Forgetting this obvious fact, Europe over these post few
years has chosen what could be called on environmental approach
to its film and television production, acting as if it was a 'species on
the verge of extinction' that hod to be protected from industrial
predators.
It is not surprising, therefore, that intervention by the States
and the Community in the audiovisual sector too often favoured this
attitude, which today enables the Americans to accuse us so easily
of protectionism. Yet quotas, specifications, subsidies and taxes
have failed to stop the inexorable advance of American products
on our markets, which in 15 years have risen from 35 to 80% on
overage in cinemas while European products today only account
for 1% of the American market.
In the USA, after the crisis of the 1960s, marked by the
upheaval of industrial and business structures - due especially to
the advent of television - as well as corporatist demands and thewhich prevented any manipulation by the
producer; Hitchcock starring on the same
level as the actors ('actors are like cattle
Hawks including his signature in the credit
titles and becoming himself producer etc.
Demands today from the directors of the
American Guild are especially on the
moral right' thot enables directors to con-
sider themselves the authors of their works
and thus to forbid any abusive intervention
on their work once the copy has been
established, which becomes a problem of
major importance, especially with the
endless possibilities of manipulation
created by new technologies. In this sense
it is important to quote an extroct from the
speech by a producer-director as
prestigious as George Lucas ('Senate hear-
ing on Bern Treaty
): '
People who alter or
destroy works of art ond our cultural
heritage for profit or os an exercise of
power are barbarians, ond if the laws of
the United States continue to condone this
behaviour, history will surely clossify us os
a barbaric society. ... The corporotions
which hold many of the copyrights, are
usable entities. They are bought and sold,
ond corporate officers chonge on a
regular basis. ... Supporting the moral
rights clause is good business. ... Artists
need 0 sense that the work they are doing
is meaningful.and that what they are doing
will last, complete with all the subtle
nuances they have struggled so hard to
achieve.
3 If we do not take into account British
films which account for about 2% of the
American market, but which are often
financed with American money or
American films shot in the United
Kingdom.
proliferation of independent producers, worsened by the disap-
pearance of the lost generation of pioneers and the crisis of con-
fidence suffered by the notion after the traumatic defeat of Viet
Nom, the Americans regained their vitality.
They were once again on the offensive, with the strategy of
blockbusters, the rapid integration of new marketing channels
(video and television) andan increased concentration of the major
companies throughout the world, while Europe devoted its
energies to building a kind of Maginot line increasingly incapable
of containing.the advance of the Hollywood war machine.
And now on the eve of the end of the century, with Europe
groping around for a response to the technological challenge of
high definition, the Americans surprise us with a leap forward.
Stressing the development of research on the digital transposition
of images and developing interactive technology, they are capable
of covering the planet with their images through means that make
obsolete the traditional forms of their consumption.
Even if films continue to be their leading product and
cinemas the privileged place on which the other markets depend,
the combination of television, computer technology and telecom-
munications is going to totally change the forms and concept of
entertainment as well as the traditional organization of its opera.
tions, investment priorities and especially the relationship between
the consumer and the product.
Paradoxically, from on economic point of view, the model of
the cinema theatre, that is to soy the model of the direct exchange
(projection-ticket), remains profitable in the new reorganization of
telecommunications. All the most prominent market trends in the
development of the telematic and television product offering and
in audiovisual distribution show that at the centre of the system lies
the direct choice of the public, its desires and buying power, its
needs and the available money and time to satisfy them.
Rother than the institutional or advertising resources on
which television has lived for a long time, what counts is individual
spending, which tends to be growing and totally taking over the
financing of the audiovisual industry. This shows to what extent the
industry is once again dependent on the choice ofthe public, mean-
ing the individual, which some call the consumer and which we
prefer to coIl the citizen.
This is the new challenge. It has been calculated that in the
medium term (according to figures in the Commission s White
Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment) household
spending On audiovisual products is going to double. The problem
is determining whether this rise in consumption is going to further
worsen our deficit, that is to say whether it is going to mean more
profits for Americ::an products or, on the contrary, be on opportunity
for us to get bock in touch with the public.4 Commission White Paper ' Growth, com-
petitiveness employment The
challenges and ways forward into the 21st
century', 5 December 1993.
Only we have the answer, which is to modernize our
distribution structures, on which will depend, as stated below,
whether we have ' more  market for our products and  more  products
for the market'.  For this, we must first begin by creating solid com.
ponies structured according to the dimension and future energy of
the European market, adopting from the start a transnational and
multimedia strategy.
This restructuring of distribution networks is of capitol im-
portance, as important as the investment to be made directly in the
production of new titles, which will constitute the basis for the
machine to start up again and for new players to appear.
It is in the dysfunctioning of this interdependence that the
key to our deficit has resided for so long. Creating a new distribu-
tion network is also going to establish new kinds of demond
because this network will be obliged to invest in projects that are go-
ing to feed it. .In turn, the optimalization of .consumption that will
result from this, in terms of time and money, may also open up new
frontiers to the audiovisual market: more resources, more enter-
prises, more European industry.
This is an optimistic vision. It is in keeping, moreover, with the
conclusions of the White Paper. This market, which today employs
1 800 000 people in software alone, can increase .its resources if we
simply stop coming up with so many excuses. That is what the Com-
mission seems to do: ' If we begin with the principle that we have a
good chance of increasing our market share, if we devote the
necessary efforts to it, it is not absurd to hope that the sector of
audiovisual services can provide employment, directly or indirectly,
to 4 000 000 people.
But to do that we must not limit ourselves to gaining on
paper what others are gaining on the ground. Our systems of
regulation, including the 'television without frontiers' Directive
which is to dote the only tool at Community level, must be expanded
and improved with the sole aim that justifies them: helping create
a competitive industry where the European viewer recognizes
himself and which opens other markets to us.
If we wont to go on talking forever about the American
strategy, we must also accuse ourselves of a lock of strategy.
The situation has not miraculously changed after the
positive outcome of the GATT negotiations. Europe has only won
the first round, the Uruguay Round.
This first improvement nevertheless marks a decisive mo-
ment for Europe in the awareness of the strategic importance of the
audiovisual sector. But if this awakening is to contribute to develop-
ing a competitive industry, the trade balance between our two con-5 The purpoSe of this report is not to paint
a comprehensive and detailed . picture of
the situation of the audiovisual industry in
each country and the EU as a whole. For
this, publications such as the one by IDATE
(Marche  mondial  du cinema  et 
audiovisue/),  Cerica  (Statistiques  dlJ
cinema en Europe), London Economics
(ACE  market  modules)  as well as the infor-
mation sheets published regularly by
Screen Digest, among many others, are
largely sufficient, even if they do not
always coincide.
The sole purpose of this report is to outline
the major trends in the indlJstry and
audiovisual policy in Europe, and to focus
the debate on the question confronting all
those trying to find the answer: 'How can
the European Union create a programme-
making industry that is in keeping with its
market, its resources and its ambitions and
that meets and anticipates the demand of
the public in order to become competitive
on the international market?'
tinents must first be restored, which implies being able to overcome
quite a few contradictions and misunderstandings.
The Americans must be reminded that liberalism is not
synonymous with the low of the strongest and that it is precisely
because of strong protection from competition that their industry
has developed so well there.
Europeans must perhaps be reminded that Europe was only
great when it was able to speak for the largest number: Cervantes
like Shakespeare, Moliere like Mozart and Verdi like Picasso were
able to make their notional geniuses universal. That is the great
challenge facing our creators today. Europe must find its univer-
salist vocation again. Like the Americans, if we want to reach a
world audience, we must first recover our own public. If it were only
a question of protecting our film culture, soon all we would have left
would be the cinemas.
For Europe, recapturing access to its own market is a right
that .could be called natural. But Europe cannot wait for itto be sent
from heaven. It has to move from a position of cultural resistance
to one of industrial offensive if our culture is indeed to survive.
I n a nutshell, it is not a question of protecting ourselves from
the market but protecting the market.
Must we break down the barriers and let the market alone
toke core of restoring the balance and bring competition into play?
Certainly not. We have seen elsewhere and in other areas the
catastrophic results of this shock therapy.
What has become obvious after the Uruguay Round victory
is that defending Europe s cultural identity, forged over the cen.
turies by the rich mosaic of its many languages but whose common
trait has always been universality, is, in the case of the audiovisual
sector, inseparable from recapturing the European market and
therefore its audience. This implies consolidating on industry
capable of meeting and even anticipating demand, on industry
that has the political support and sufficient financial means to
become competitive on world markets.
In Europe, over the post 15 years, only the audiovisual sec-
tor of all the large industrial sectors has not acquired a transna-
tional outlook.
And yet Europe has talent, a market and sufficient money
to create this industry. But today, for lock of confidence and
strategy, all these assets are of less benefit to it than to the USA.
Analysing and understanding how this situation has been
possible and proposing the means to change it is the objective of
this report. 5
Antonio-Pedro VasconcelosA -- GLOBAL
APPROACH
1. ECONOMIC DIMENSION AND
IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT
TRENDS
The European Union is the
greatest developed audiovisual
market in the world in terms of
consumers and the second in
terms of value. As reported in the
Commission s White Paper on
growth competitiveness and
employment, the audiovisual
market of the EU today, including
the production and distribution of
programmes (software) and hard-
ware, is estimated at ECU 257
billion. The programmes industry
represents 54% of that global
market. US industry exports to
Europe have increased surprising-
ly in the last 10 years, from ECU
330 million in 1984 to ECU 3 600
million ill 1992. In 1991 60%ofUS
audiovisual programme exports
came to the European Union and
the EU trade deficit with the USA
stands at around ECU 3 500
million per year.
In the European Union the de-
mand for programmes has risen
from 200 000 hours in 1981 to
650 000 in 1992 (0 consequence
of the increase in the number of
television channels: 40 in 1981
and more than 100 today). The
demand for audiovisual produc-
tions in the EU will go up from ECU
23 billion today to ECU 45 billion
by the end of this century; the
number of channels will rise from
120 to over 500 and the number of
programme-hours from 650 000
to 3 500 000.
At least 1.8 million people today
are employed in the EU
audiovisual sector and it 
estimated that a further two
million jobs could be created in the
next 10 years if Europe makes
maximum use of the growth
potential of its domestic market
and of the outside European
markets. Most of these jobs will
demand high levels of skill.
2. SOCIOCULTURAL
IMPORTANCE
!tis estimated that people in in-
dustrialized countries dedicate an
average of three to four hours per
day, to watching television. In the
immediate future audiovisual
technology will also be fun-
damental to kinds of teaching,
education and occupational train-
ing sectors.
Humanity will to a large extent be
educated by audiovisual means.
Audiovisual practice will invade
everything in the coming decades,
but this does not mean it will have
to be worse; this depends on how
we do it. In all events, I do notthink
that any of the cultures in our con-
tinents, whether large or small,
will be able to develop normally
unless their roots are nurtured in
the European context: These are
the words of a European, the
Czech intellectual, Antonfn Lihen
which summarize to perfection 
it is impossible to say more with3. SECTOR OF CLEAR PRIORITY
AND STRATEGIC INTEREST AT
EU LEVEL
The declaration of priority and
strategic interest at EU level of a
given sector normally requires
the combination of three re-
quirements: the defence of
general interest targets; the im-
possibility of reaching them from
mere market play; and the targets
that cannot be reached by the sole
action of the Member States.
The audiovisual sector has enor-
mous potential to generate wealth
and create jobs, as well as being
essential to Europe s cultural life.
The European audiovisual in-
dustry cannot at present compete
under conditions of equality with
the world industry. To leave it in the
hands of the market would mean
purely and simply condemning it
to disappear rapidly.
The targets which are sought can-
not be obtained either from the
mere action of the Member States
because, as we will see later, the
central targets to be achieved are
precisely to promote the develop-
ment of the domestic audiovisual
market ofthe EU and to promote
the integration in Europe of the
national audiovisual industries.
The declaration of priority and
strategic interest at EU level
however, cannot lie in mere words.
On the contrary, it requires a
coherent reflection of this
strategic priority' in the political
action and in the assignment of
public resources which are tem-
porarily needed to reach the com.
mon-interest targets that .have
previously been determined.
4. DECLINE OF THE
EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL
INDUSTRY: STATE OF THE
SITUATION AND TENDENCIES
The overall volume of European
audiovisual production is high:
public television alone produces
more than 120 000 hours of pro-
grammes per year. The basic
problem is that the large majority
of these are fulJdamentally local in
terms of appeal and distribution.
Because of this, and especially
because of the absence 
transnational distribution net-
works, European audiovisual pro-
duction .is confined to its own na-
tional markets and the single EU
market only operates effectively
for the non-European, specifically
US industry.
Paradoxically, in the last 15 years
the European audiovisual industry
has been the only one among all
the major industries which has
retreated to national markets
rather than becoming more inter-
national in its orientation.
Over the last 10 years, European
films have lost 50% .of the Euro-
pean film market in favour of the
US industry. In 1968, box-office
takings for US films in Europe were
35% whereas European takings
represented 60%. At the end of
the 1970s this percentage was split
45% for the US industry and 50%
for the European industry. Today
the share of the American film
industry in the EU is on 80%
average  France is the only
significant exception  and
scarcely 20% for the European
cinema. This hegemony of the US
industry is even more apparent in
European countries which have a
weak audiovisual production
capacity.
The decline in regularfilm-goers in
Europe has only affected Euro"
pean films. The number of regular
film-goers in Europe in the last 15
years is down from 1 200 million to
550 million. US audiences,
however, have remained quite
stable at around 450 million,
while European audiences have
fallen in this same period from 600
million to 100 million.
If we consider that the average
number of cinema attendances in
the USA is 4 per year, whereas in
the EU it is 1.7, we can conclude
that if there is a market to be
recovered, it is the market for
European films. A reactivated
European industry might leave the
European market for American
films unaffected.
The weakness of transnational
distribution within Europe is evi.
dent from the data shown 
Graphs 1, 2 and 3.
The following conclusions can be
drawn from the above and also
the data contained in the tables
that follow:
(i) European audiovisual produc-
tion is basically local pro-
duction;
(ii) transnational dissemination of
European audiovisual produc-
tion is extremely weak and the
trend is downwards.5. MAIN REASONS ON WHICH
THIS .OECLINEIS BASED
There are without doubt many
reasons which have provoked this
situation. Among them, the actual
reality of the cultural and linguistic
diversity of our continent. This
diversity is an extraordinary
source of wealth which must
always be preserved. The non-
European industry, however,
clearly shows us to what extent the
worldwide dissemination of
audiovisual works, or rather cer-
tain audiovisual works, has no
cultural or linguistic frontiers.
(A) AUDIOVISUAL POLICY
The audiovisual policy in Europe
was, and still is, structured on a na-
tional and regional basis. Over
the lost 10 years the problems and
challenges, even fundamentally
transnational ones, have been
confronted from notional or
regional interests and pers-
pectives.
Consequently in Europe, national
or regional demands - that is to
say local ones - have more or less
been satisfied by the respective
local industries. However, Europe
has abandoned the markets and
the demands of the European
transnational audiences which the
non-European industry has been
able to occupy almost without
competition from the European
industry.
Although this was certainly not the
intention, the audiovisual policies
that were implemented in the last
decade at European level have
particularly favoured hardware
and had very little favourable ef-
fect on productive activities, the
programmes industry or software.
In recent years action has started
to be developed at EU level ~ the
Directive on television without
frontiers harmonization of
copyright, the MEDIA pro-
gramme, the Action Plan and, at
Council of Europe level, the Con-
vention on Transfrontier Television
and the Eurimages programme.
These programmes should be
favourably assessed, regardless
of any reorientations which may
be introduced in the future.
Policies of national or regional
scope will continue to 
necessary, but, as the recent GATT
negotiations have shown, the fun-
damental problems of the
audiovisual industry cannot be
approached in an isolated way at
State level.
(B) MARKET
Over the last 10 years, it has been
thought that the European
audiovisual industry was going to
benefit automatically from the ex-
traordinary increase in demand
for audiovisual productions as a
result of the disappearance of the
State monopolies for television
services and the opening of
markets to the private sector. This
proved not to be the case. The
European audiovisual production
industry was not in a condition to
compete with the transnational
markets, mainly because it lacked
and still locks ~ suitable
marketing and international
distribution structures.
The multiplication of the number
of channels has increased produc-
tion costs and the price of broad-
casting fees of the most attractive
programmes. It has fragmented
audiences and reduced advertis-
ing income and this has provoked
a reduction in radio broadcasters
production budgets. The search
for maximum audiences by all
television broadcasters, whether
public or private, has steered
radio broadcasting purchases
and production policies towards
low-cost national products and
towards US productions which
because of their amortization in
costs, first in the US home market
and then in the international
markets, offer better cost/au-
dience relations.
In the audiovisual sector, as in all
sectors of industry, it is not enough
to have good products. They must
also be marketed. We say 'also
but the correct word would really
be 'specially because the
distribution networks in the
audiovisual sector playa fun-
damental role not only in the pro-
motion and marketing of the pro-
duct, but in its financing, in the
diversification of risks, in pro-
moting economies of scale and in
maintaining a balance between
supply and demand.
Transnational distribution net.
works play an essential and ir-
replaceable role in the economy
of the audiovisual industry, to the
extent that it can be said that the
construction of a European inter-
national distribution network is an
absolute precondition to reaching
solid and sustained growth in the
European audiovisual industry.(C) EXTRA-EUROPEAN
COMPETITION
Finally, the European audiovisual
industry is today subject - and 
will be even more so in future - to
competition from the non-Euro-
pean industry, and more
specifically from the US indu.stry.
The latter is an industry which,
throughout the last 15 years has
fol.lowed a strategy which 
diametrically opposed to the
European strategy: production
with global ambitions; on ex.
tremely powerful and well-
organized international distribu-
tion structure; and firm support by
the US public powers for their
audiovisual production industry.
(D) IN SHORT
The weaknesses of the distribution
networks and political strategies
for a pan-European level have
provoked a deep decline in the
audiovisual industry of our conti"
nent and have prevented the in-
dustry from benefiting, over the
past 10 years, from the extraor-
dinary expansion of the European
market. A coherent political
strategy and a worldwide distri-
bution structure have allowed
the non-European industries,
especially the American industry,
to be the main beneficiaries of this
first expansion wave' of the
audiovisual markets. The same
thing will happen; with the 'sec-
ond expansion wave' unless ade-
quate measures are taken to avoid
it, except that in the latter case the
consequences will be far worse,
perhaps even lethal, for the future
of the audiovisual industry in our
continent.
6. SERIOUSNESS OF THE
SITUATION FROM A FUTURE
OUTLOOK
It is impossible to give a precise
definition of the future of the
audiovisual sector. However there
are certain contributing factors:
internationalization of markets
increase in outside European com-
petition; and the impossibility of
amortizing production costs, ex-
cept for low-quality productions
in the tight European notional
markets.
In response to these challenges,
there is the current European
reality: audiovisual production
which is mainly local, with local
promotion policies; and almost no
international distribution and
marketing networks; and the need
to compete with a non-European
industry which is extraordinarily
strong and well organized.
If the strict reality of the European
audiovisual industry is analysed
without prejudice, only one
diagnosis is possible: the future
outlook is extremely serious.
We must remember what is at
stake: it is not the right to play
video games, but, apart from ex-
traordinary economic power and
employment growth potential
which mayor may not capitalize
to the benefit of European in-
itiatives, what is really at stake, we
repeat, is the access to informa-
tion, to culture and knowledge of
the Europeans, as well as com-
munication between European
people (an essential condition to
reach a solid European Union).- CHRONOLOGY
OF THE CRISIS
The European market has
been among the fastest grow-
ing in the world with a current
market growth rate of 6% a
year in real terms, that is being
sustained even in today
recessionary climate. The 
has benefited most from
growth in Europe, increasing
its sales of programming in
Europe from USD 330 million in
1984 to USD 3. billion in
1992. In 1991, 77% of Ameri-
can exports of audiovisual pro-
grammes went to Europe, of
which nearly 60% to the EC,
this being the second-largest
US industrial sedor in export
terms, while the Europ.ean
Union s annual deficit with the
US in audiovisual trade
amounts to about USD 3.
billion.'
White Paper 'Growth com-
petitiveness and employment 
The challenges and ways  forward
into the  21st  century
The current picture of Europe
audiovisual industry in the 12
countries of the European Union 
is, as seen earlier, that of a situa-
tion that can be considered
catastrophic: structural weak-
nesses make it too vulnerable to
face the new challenges.
It can be characterized by a cer-
tain number of trends and symp-
toms that have accumulated 
more or less inexorable fashion
these past few years and that
should first be identified if we are
then to try and understand it and
more importantly to change it.
lOur analysis can nevertheless be ap-
plied, for the most part, to the other Euro-
pean countries, particularly the EFTA
countries, which essentially have the same
characteristics.
1. IN 10 YEARS EUROPEAN
FILMS HAVE LOST 50% OF THE
CINEMA THEATRE MARKET
AND TWO THIRDS OF THE
AUDIENCE
In the mid-1960s, an average 35%
of the box-office films in continen-
tal Europe2 were American while
60% were European (the remain-
ing 5% corresponding to the other
film industries). In the late 1970s,
this percentage stood at 44% for
the USA and 55% for Europe. To"
day, in most of the 12 EU countries
over 80% of the films shown are
American, and in some of these
countries that figure exceeds 90%
(Graphs 1, 2 and 3).
Therefore, in 10 years European
films lost 50% of their market
share in European dnemas, but
they also lost two thirds of their
public. If this trend is projected to '
the year 2000, there will be prac-
tically no more European films on
our screens, which means that the
European market threatens to be
a copy of the one in the USA (95%
American films compared with 3%
European, 2% of which are
English).
2 We do not have precise data for the
United Kingdom, not only because we do
not know the distribution of receipts be-
tween American and British films, but also
because most British films are in reality
financed by an American agent or are
American films shot in the UK.
2. THERE IS AN INCREASED
TENDENCY OF EUROPEAN
FILMS BEING CONFINED TO
THEIR NATIONAL MARKETS
This already terrifying percentage
does not tell it all. While the
American films that come out
everywhere and at the same time
in Europe are practically the same,
only about20% of European films
(therefore 4% of the total) are
shown beyond their national
borders, and only a very few of
these European films are
distributed throughout Europe, let
alone the world.
Also, if the market share of
American films is increasing, it is
not because the number 
viewers has increased but fun-
damentally because the number
of viewers of European films has
plunged. Since 1980, the au-
dience for American films has
practically remained the same (it
hCls gone from 425 million to 420
million) while the audience for
European films hCls fallen from
475 million to 120 million.
3. THE SINGLE MARKET ONLY
EXISTS FOR AMERICAN FILMS
The first conclusion that must be
arrived at is that the European
mClrket is increasingly leaning
towards a sort of bipolarization
(American films, on the one hand,
national films on the other), a
bipolarization that television and
especially video only intensify,
and that there is less and less a
common market for European
films: the single market only works
for American films.
3 The figures as well as the tables and
graphs of this chapter, I;!xcept when
specifically mentioned were  specially pro-
vided by Michel Gyory of Cerica (Centrl;!
europeen de recherche et d'information
sur Ie cinema et I'audiovisuel) for this
report.The argument that the mosaic of
languages and cultures forming
Europe prevent any attempt to
achieve a uniform public therefore
becomes an excuse. With the ex"
ception of the United Kingdom
and Ireland, in all the other coun-
tries of the EU, American films are
shown either dubbed (which
represents about 85% of the Con-
tinent) or subtitled, placing them
in the same situation as all the
other non-national films, where
the language of the film is also
foreign.
Moreover, the fact that American
products encounter the same suc-
cess in all European countries, as
well as in the rest of the world, for-
mally refutes this assertion. While
it is true that Coca-Cola and Mc-
Donalds have succeeded in stan-
dardizing the taste of new genera-
tions, it is also true that cham-
pagne and spaghetti are a part
not only of Europe s but the whole
world' s gastronomic heritage.
4. THE FALL IN ATTENDANCE
IN EUROPE HAS ONLY
AFFECTED EUROPEAN FILMS
The second conclusion is that the
drop in cinema attendance (which
has fallen in 10 years from 900
million viewers to 550 million) is
exclusively due to the loss of au"
dience for European films, that is
to say for non-American and non"
national films (Graphs 4a, 4b, 4c
5 and 6).
But if one considers that Euro"
peons go to the cinema 1.7 times a
year while Americans go on
average four times a year, it can
be concluded that if there is an au.
dience to be recovered it is
precisely the audience for Euro-
pean films, without affecting a
public that can be considered
faithful to American films. This
means that if with a recovery of the
European industry the Americans
risk losing market shares in per-
centage, they will probably not be
affected in their sales turnover.
5. THE COUNTRIES WITH A
SMALLER PRODUCTION
CAPACITY ARE MORE
VULNERABLE TO AMERICAN
DOMINATION
The fact that we observe that in
most countries 80% of the 
market is token by the Americans,
whereas the Europeans have only
managed to keep 20% of their
market, hides another reality,
much more dramatic and which
must be token into account. If in
the countries that have succeeded
in keeping an audiovisual industry
that resists, as is the case of France
(where a very effective system of
aid enables the recycling of money
from the market for the industry),
4 This point is extremely important for it
not to be used qs an argument in the
negotiations with the Americans that will
inevitably follow the Uruguay Round. In-
deed, recovering the qudience that 
wanted for European cinema will not
necessarily be to the detriment of the
Americans' sales turnover in Europe but
quite simply their share of the market. On
the contrary, if Europe can hope that
cinema-goers will see a film four times a
year, like the Americans, and that the Euro-
pean market is fairly divided up by our two
filrn-makingindustries, the Americans will
benefit in tUrn.
It is known, mareover, that the prosperity
of Europeqn cinema hqs alwqys benefited
the Americans, not only be(:ause it enables
retaining a group of healthy cinemas, but
also because the success of European
cinema has in the past enabled American
cinema to reach a level of quality c:md
sophistication that it is today losing (also
because of the culturol interbreeding that
the exodus of European film-mqkers to the
USA has accentuqted).
rican films do not account for
more than 55% of the market
share, in countries with a low pro-
duction capacity (or which have a
large production like Germany
and Spain but where the national
cinema no longer has an au-
dience) the figures for the division
of the market are disquieting.
This is the case of Portugal, Ireland
and Greece where the average
percentage of non-American films
does not exceed 5% and the case
of Germany and Spain where it
does not reach 10%.
This means that wherever national
production is weaker .or has
become detached from its au-
dience, domination of the market
by the films of the major American
film studios becomes stronger.
The first consequence is that these
markets, becoming increasingly
impenetrable to the products of
the other European countries, end
up affecting, indirectly, the in-
dustry of the large countries, even
those that are more capable of
resisting the American hegemony
and that have always been the
engines and mirror of European
production. Today, as in the case
of the 'small' countries, it becomes
increasingly difficult to make a
French or Italian film profitable on
the European market as a whole
with the consequence that its
dependence on public financing
increases.
6. IN 15 YEARS EUROPEAN
FILMS HAVE LARGELY BECOME
MONEYLOSERS
The 1980s were marked in
Europe s main producer countries
by a considerable increase in in-
vestment in the production of
films. Between 1980 and 1992, the
sums invested increased 4.5 times
in France and quadrupled in Italy.
Meanwhile, during this period at-
tendance fell sharply, primarily to
the detriment of European film-makers, and since 1985 in France
and 1986 in Italy, investment in
production has exceeded the total
gross receipts earned by the na-
tional films in notional cinemas.
The gap has grown considerably
over time, to the point that in
France the amount of investments
in production has exceeded that of
total cinema receipts since 1991
(Graphs 7 and 8). While this com-
parison is solely based on notional
earnings (which are  with TV
earnings for films that have not
been financed by a station - the
main source of income for a large
number of films), itis alsonecess-
ary to take into account the fact
that only a fraction of the cinema
receipts goes to production (in
general 10 to 20% depending on
the country; 25 to 30% in Italy).
7. THE BLOSSOMING OF
NATIONAL, AND EVEN
REGIONAL, FILM INDUSTRIES
AROUND THE lATE 19605
FURTHER DISPERSED
PRODUCTION CENTRES, UNTIL
THEN CONCENTRATED
AROUND THREE MAJOR
STUDIOS: PINEWOOD
BILLANCOURT AND CINECITTA
In the name of the right of cultural
and linguistic minorities to express
their identity, Europe, around the
end of the 1960s, stepped up the
centrifugal trend of an industry
whose economic rationale called
for concentration. This demand,
where political motivations were
predominant (e.g. the famous
Guevarrist theory that Godard
applied to cinema: 'there should
be one, two, three Viet Nams
contributed to the enthusiastic
springing-up of a multitude of no-
tional, indeed regional, film in-
dustries where directors were
rarely able to overcome in
dynamk: fashion the contradiction
between the entrenchment of the
testimony and the universality of
the message, that is to say be-
tween the location of the subject
and the necessary transnational-
ity of the audiences.
Without a market capable of
recouping the costs of increasingly
personal films, most governments
increased subsidies to cover the
loss .of market. The distorting ef-
fect ofthese kinds of policies is that
instead of giving directors the in-
centive to seek as large an au-
dience as possible, they encour-
aged them to remain exclusive.
European production become
dispersed on several small islands
which in many cases only com-
municated with one another
through 0 multitude of festivals,
which in turn fed a multitude of
critics who thus closed the small
circle of insiders who complacent-
ly replaced the paying public.
This system has for a long time
fovoured the emergence of self-
justifying ideologies according to
which only unsaleable films would
be entitled to the stamp of high
quality
5 Hans Gerd Prodoehl, expert for the
government of the  Land  of Narth Rhine-
Westphalia, in 'Film-making policy and aid
to the film industry in Germany: Diagnosis
of a crisis and defence for a change of
parameters . Prodoehl's study on what he
calls (quoting Wolf Donner) 'the waes of
German cinema' is a merciless analysis of
the atomization of aid systems in his coun-
try thrOlJgh the policies of the Lander and
their catastrophic results on the situation of
the film industry in Germany.
8. THE SCATTERING OF
PRODUCTION LED TO THE
ATOMIZATION OF
DISTRIBUTION, CONTRARY TO
WHAT OCCURED IN THE USA
The American Administration
political support of the MPAN
and the insensitivity, indeed the
lack of concern of most European
governments, and even of the
Commission to ensure the
rigorous enforcement of competi-
tion laws, enabled the major
Americ::an film studios to group
together in the mean time in
Europe. This was the case of UIP in
some countries/ but it is also the
case of other specific:: groupings
with strong horizontal and vertical
integration such as exists in Por-
tugol, Itoly, Greece, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands.
6 T. Guback, in  Non-market  factors  in the
international distribution  of  American films
provides an impressive quantity of
elements that prove the commitment of the
American Administration, with the
Western governments after the Second
World War, to support their industry.
It should not be forgotten either that the
MPAA was precisely created on 5 June
1945 under the auspices of the Webb-Pro-
merene Export Trade Act of 191B, which
enabled it to avoid any legal action for an-
ticompetitive practices, provided that its
activities  were  strictly limited to exporting.
7 UIP (Unitedlnternafional Pictures) is a
company operating under Dutch law that
groups together three major American film
studios (Universal, ParamotJnt and MGM)
and that operates throughotJtthe warld ex-
cept in the USA, Canada and Puerto Rico.
UIP was authorized by the Commission on
12 July 19B9, taking effect nevertheless on
27 July 19B8, and granted a derogation to
Article B5 of the Treaty of Rome a deroga-
tion that expired on 26 July 1993 and
whose extension the Commission has not
yet announced.
a Etude sur la politique de concurrence et
de distribution des films dans l'Union Eura-
peenne, by SCALE.The result of this concentration
strategy, linked to the worldwide
presence of the major studios, has
been the gradual weakening of in-
dependent distribution in Europe
and also the increasingly greater
difficulty for cinema operators to
keep their programming freedom.
Block booking and blind bidding
accompany the covering of the
European continent with block-
busters 10 whose timed release is
agreed between the major
studios.
9 Block booking is a very common practice
that is done in explicit or disguised fashion
by the major US companies and that has
been going on for along time: it consists 
making conditional the availability of
copies of some of the most successful titles
(generally blockblJsters) on the programm-
ing of a grOlJp of other titles whose market
value may be less certain.
Blind bidding consists in programming
films that the theatre operator has not seen
beforehand, thus having to trust the
prestige of the film s stars and the good
results already achieved on the American
market.
In both cases, it is precisely the strength of
the catalogues, due to the annual concen-
tration of the major studios' titles, which
allows these anticompetitive practices,
which c t the same time are very reassuring
for the distributors who represent the US
companies and for the operators who de-
pend 0) them.
10 Blockbusters are large-budget films in
terms of production and promotion
designed from the start by the major
studios to be successes and thus to serve as
engines for their catalogues.
It was in the mid-1970~ that films like  Jaws
and  Star  wars put Hollywood back on its
feet, beginning a series of super produc-
tions which each year beat the record of
receipts held for nearly 40 years by Gone
with the wind.
The word blockbuster is nevertheless
almost as old as cinema itself: it was Grif-
fith who, inspired by an Italian film Cabiria
made  The birth  of a nation in 1915 and
Intolerance  in 1916 which can be con-
sidered the first blockbusters in the history
of American cinema.
Since then, and each time the industry has
had difficulties especially since the
development of television, Hollywood has
continually tried to respond to the crisis
with super productions that have not
always been successful. A memorable ex-
ample of this was  Cleapatra  whose pro-
duction by 20th Century Fox lasted four
years and gobbled up USD 42 million, an
investment that the film s commercializa-
tion has still not recouped to this day. It was
not until the generation of Lucas and
These blockbusters rely on heavy
investment in promotion (which in
some cases approaches produc-
tion costs). This promotion, which
is at world level, begins well
before thousands of copies invade
the continent, making it increas-
ingly difficult, if not impossible, for
most European films to find the
best cinemas and the best dates
or the best contractual conditions
for their release. An example is
that ofthe United Kingdom where
about 45% of American films are
released simultaneously in over
100 cinemas.
The scattering of distribution
(which also accompanies that of
production, based in most in-
stances on a case-by-case policy)
considerably undermines the
Europeans ability to impose
products on the public. Whereas
there are seven major American
film studios (Disney/Buena Vista,
Paramount, Universal, Colum-
bia/Tristar, Warner Fox and
MGM), which therefore pro-
gramme their films simultaneously
for the entire world, there are
1 049 active distributors in the 12
countries of theEU, plus those of
the EFTA countries.11 It must 
added that, contrary to the major
American film studios, all these
distributors have remained na-
tional.
Spielberg that, through colossal in-
vestments in promotion and the perfecting
of marketing techniques, combined with
the covering of the planet with thousands
of copies, the blockbusters have became a
very sure indispensable element in the
strategy of the major studios.
11 MEDIA-Salles  European  cinema  year-
book: A statistical analysis (AuglJst 1993).
This figure does not include the Greek,
Icelandic Irish and Luxembourg
distributors (that can be estimated to be
about 10). Moreover, if we do not include
the major American companies directly
established or represented by national
distributors in each country, and of which
there are on average five, it can be said
that there are about 950 50-called 'in-
dependent' distributars in the 1B European
countries referred to.
9. THE DROP IN ATTENDANCE
AND THE STRATEGY OF THE
MAJOR FILM STUDIOS HAVE
LED TO  A GROWING
CONCENTRATION OF
ATTENDANCE ON A REDUCED
NUMBER OF TITLES
The result of this is that a growing
number offilms are not profitable
while a growing percentage of
receipts is concentrated in a small
number of titles, most of them
American. Thus, it is observed in
France (Europe s most successful
notional film industry) that the 10
highest earners in 1975 were nine
French titles and one American
title. In 1992, the 10 biggest box-
office takers were two French
titles, seven American titles and
one English title, whereas in 1991
the top-10 hits were American
films. In addition, whereas 18
French films were on the list of the
27 titles with more them one million
viewers in 1975, there were only 6
(out of 28) in 1992. As for
American films, where atten-
dance exceeded the one-million
mark, there were 6 in 1975 and 19
in 1992.
This trend is accompanied by a
redistribution of earnings to the
detriment of European films
whose share in receipts has drop-
ped dramatically in all European
countries (Graph 1).
Furthermore, this phenomenon of
concentration of receipts, which
has repercussions on the distribu-
tion and production sectors,
results, as shown above, in the
bipolarization of certain Euro-
pean markets (see, for example,
the Netherlands - Graph 3) and
constitutes a major obstacle to the
circulation of European films in
Europe.10. THIS PHENOMENON OF
CONCENTRATION OF
ATTENDANCE LEADS IN TURN
TO A REDUCTION IN THE FILM
SUPPLY
Because the market was designed
to serve the interests of the large
integrated groups with a strong
production and distribution
capacity, i.e. the major American
film studios, while European pro-
duction and distribution structures
were not suited for this new
organization of the market, Euro-
pean cinema operators became
more dependent on the major
American distributors, the only
ones capable of steadily pro-
viding these theatre owners with
the quantity of films necessary to
operate at a profit. In virtually all
countries, even those with large
national distribution structures,
these structures depend to a large
extent on the American films that
they distribute, as is the case, for
example, with Gaumontin France,
which distributes Disney/Buena
Vista films.
In Europe, the atomization of pro-
duction and distribution structures
excludes virtually all European
production companies from the
game of double compensation
which constitutes the foundation
of the balance and prosperity of
the major US studios.. A produc-
tion company whose film is not a
box-office hit generally is not able
to offset the loss suffered with pro-
fits from another film, whereas
films that are not successful at the
cinema do not sell at a high price
to the television stations and rarely
come out in video format. I n addi-
tion, even European films that are
a success in theatres do not have
the same results with video as do
American films which have had
comparable or even less
favourable box-office results.
11. IN ADDITION TO THE
HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION
OF DISTRIBUTION (GROUPING
OF MAJOR US STUDIOS), THE
VERTICAL CONCENTRATION OF
ACTIVITY (PURCHASE OF
CINEMAS BY THE MAJOR
STUDIOS), FORBIDDEN IN THE
USA IN THE NAME OF
COMPETITION, IS ALLOWED
IN EUROPE
The emptying-out of cinemas
caused by numerous factors - the
most important being the
development of television and
video - and the deterioration of
the fabric of cinemas threatened
with the drop in attendance, to af-
fect the American film industry
too, which had always relied in
Europe on the popularity of the
large national film industries (in
which American film companies
had invested for along time, tak-
ing advantage of local systems of
aid), especially in France, Italy
and the United Kingdom, to en-
sure the prestige and prosperity of
film entertainment.
The definitive capture of the Euro-
pean market by the Americans
beginning in the 1980s, can
therefore be explained toa large
extent by the general crisis in
cinema attendance in Europe
which, even if it especially affected
European films, invited the major
studios (one could even say, oblig-
ed them) to augment their power
in Europe by investing in the con-
struction of multiplex cinemas (see
the case of the United Kingdom
where attendance has doubled)
to stop the crisis of cinemas which
was endangering their own
earnings.
12. THE ABSENCE OF A
EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION
NETWORK DOOMS EUROPEAN
FILMS TO AN INCREASINGLY
DOMESTIC CAREER
After this decisive takeover of
distribution and management by
the Americans, Europe now finds
itself facing .a contradiction for
which apparently there is no solu-
tion. The cinemas no longer want
European films, because they
generally no longer have what
draws audiences to American
films: solid stories, popular stars,
production values, full-blown pro.
motion. But it is also because Euro-
pean films no longer have the
same easy access to cinema
theatres that they are less and less
able to compete with American
products.
Tom Hohen sums up the problem
when he says, 'It's a chicken and
egg problem. Only a large
distributor can offer substantial
finances to make large-budget
movies with mass-appeal, but a
major European distributor can
only emerge if there are plenty of
European films with mass-
appeaLIl2
13. THE CAREER OF
EUROPEAN FILMS IS
INCREASINGLY SACRIFICED TO
THE INTERESTS OF THE
MAJOR AMERICAN
DISTRIBUTORS
The crippling of independent
distribution, except in the large
countries where powerful groups
exist, has made access to the
cinemas very difficult, if not im.
possible, for European films (i.
those from a country other than
the one where the distributor is
established); and when these films
manage to find a distributor
(often in 'Art and Essay' distribu-
tion channels), it is difficult for
them to find the best theatres and
best dates.
12 Coopers & Lybrand.  The distribution
game: Can  Europe  even score?There have been cases when a
European film, even if successful,
has been token off the billing to
make room for an American film.
This was the case of  Indochine,  for
example, whose projection was
halted in a large cinema in Madrid
after two very successful weeks to
make room for an American film
that was a flop, forcing the theatre
operator to reschedule it a few
weeks later.
14.  EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTORS
HARDLY INVEST  ANY MORE IN
THE PRODUCTION OF
EUROPEAN FILMS
This atomization and the ensuing
weakening of national distribution
structures, when they do not de-
pend directly on the major 
c:ompanies, combined with the ex-
plosion of the video market and
the wholesale offering of films on
countless television stations (since
the 1980s, the two together ac-
count for 70% of the earnings of
American films) have led to
disinvestment by distributors in
local production and even more so
in products from other European
countries.
There has mainly been a
widespread disappearance of
distributor 'credit' or a reduction
to derisory percentages confined
to a few strong films, whereas until
the 1980s they were decisive for
the financial deal of productions.
As an example, distributor credit
which in France accounted for
about 30% of the financing of the
French film industry in 1980, today
barely represents 4% on average
and is exclusively concentrated on
a few titles.
13 'La distribution en salles des films de
cinema au sein de l'Union europeenne
(First impressions). Study by Unifrance for
MBS and SCALE (working process:
February 1994).
14 Cluzel, Jean-Paul and Cerutti
Guillaume. 'Mission de reflexion et de pro-
positions sur Ie cinema fran~ais , generally
referred to as the Cluzel report (December
1992).
On the other hand, it is rather
symptomatic that today most films
put box-office receipts as a 'token
entry' in their budget.
15. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A
EUROPEAN STAR SYSTEM IS
THE MAJOR CAUSE AND
CONSEQUENCE OF EUROPEAN
CINEMA'S UNPOPULARITY.
It should be adcJed thatdistributor
credit was given on the basis of a
solid' sc:ript and especially the
nome of the stars. For example, a
film like  Ruffian  by Jose Giovanni
was given FF 15 million worth of
distributor credit based on the
name of Uno Ventura for a budget
of FF 40 million.
This leads us to another dramatic
observation: there are no pan-
European distribution structures in
the face of the power of the major
US companies and also in the face
of growing internationalization of
the multimedia marketing chan-
nels, enjoyed almost exclusively
today by the American products.
This condemns European films to
further retreat to their national
markets and, as we have seen, to
depend more and more on public
aid and also television financing
(often publictoo).
The first consequence is the disap-
pearance of European stars, who
until the late 1970s were decisive
not only for the financial arrange-
ment of films in their country but
also to ensure their distribution on
most European markets and even
in the USA. Stars like Sofia loren,
Alain Delon, Romy Schneider
Jean-Paul Belmondo, Catherine
Deneuve, Marcello Mastroianni
Jeanne Moreau and a whole host
of others were at the time as well
known, if not more so, than a lot of
American stars, whereas today no
15 Jose Giovanni, in 'SlJnlight ou ...
lumiere' (copy of the debates organized by
ARP during the Beaune Conference of
1992).
European actor (except for
Gerard Depardieu, or Jeremy
Irons, who the public confuses
with an American actor) 
capable of mobilizing significant
investment upstream 
distributors.
And even the directors,
themselves stars in the 1960s, no
longer attract European finance,
except in a  few  cases (Almodovar,
Bertolucci, Frears, Wenders).
16. THE LEVEL  OF EUROPEAN
FILM EXPORTS IS AT AN
ALL-TIME LOW
The shrinking audience for Euro-
pean cinema, which is also
reflected in video, and the retreat
of films and TV produc:ts to their
national markets, has in turn led to
a gradual decline in exports. To-
day the market share held by
American products in European
countries stands at over 80%, with
the exception of France, while
European products acc:ount for a
mere 1% of the American market
(or 2% in the c:ase of British films.
At the end of the 1960s American
films held about 35% of the Euro-
pean market while European
films, in their best years, gained a
7 or 8% share of the US market.In addition, the fall in popularity
of European stars, closely linked
to the small circulation of films in-
side Europe, also makes their
penetration of the American
market difficult. Although never
significant, this represented a
steady audience in the 1950s and
1960s which European cinema
failed to exploit.
For example,  Ana  with Sylvana
Manganno in 1951 and  Et dieu
crea 10  femme with Brigitte Bardot
in 1956, the films that launched
the two new European sex sym-
bols, had careers in the USA (in
dubbed version) that today would
be unthinkable. lattuada s film re-
mained 14 months at the box of-
fice, taking in USD 4 million, the
same amount that Vadim s film
made five years later, despite the X
rating that doomed it to the 'hard'
circuit.
17. THE STORY DRAIN AFTER
THE TALENT DRAIN TO THE
USA WEAKENS FILM AND
TELEVISION PRODUCTION
The drain of European talent (ac-
tors, directors, photo directors
etc.) is not a recent phenomenon.
It is part of the story of the rela-
tions between the two continents
and has been a decisive contribu"
tion to the universalization of
Hollywood cinema.
What was not new nevertheless
became too .common a practice in
the 1980s. It is what could be call-
ed the 'story drain , that is to say
the purchase by the Americans of
scripts of films shot in Europe
which had difficulty entering the
US market because of the in-
dustry's resistance to dubbing,
which generally doomed them to
the limited network of original
versions.
That is why the Americans prefer
to buy the stories (the soul of the
film) and make new versions
themselves with stars known to the
public and then distribute them all
over the world through their
powerful distribution networks.
This phenomenon, which is always
one-way, obviously has negative
consequences on the economy of
the European film industry.
Ten remakes were made of French
films in the 1940s, 14 were made in
the 1980s.
18.  EUROPEAN INVESTMENT
IN AMERICAN CINEMA GREW
FROM THE tATE 19805
Today there is a new and rather
symptomatic phenomenon: Euro-
pean producers are deciding to
shoottheir films directlyin English
the only way, they believe, of
reaching the American market
while at the same time benefiting
from the advantage of the
language as a label of quality with
the European and world au-
dience. This is the case of  l'Amant
by Jean-Jacques Annaud or
Damage  by luis Malle.
16 Source:  Film Francais.
Wha would have th~wght that  Some like it
hot,  the masterpiece by Billy Wilder, a Ger-
rnan exiled in the USA in the 1930s, was in
reality the adaptation of a film by Richard
Pottier  Fanfare d'amour  shot in 1935? This
enqbles us to qualify somewhat our bitter
observation: it must be admitted that while
Ewrope often has good stories, it does not
always have the best scripts.
Other European groups go even
further and invest directly in
American cinema. This is the case
of Credit lyonnais which has in"
herited MGM and in which the
French State wants to inject FF 12
billion. It is also the case of Francis
Bouygues s Ciby 2000, Studio-
Canal +, Polygram (subsidiary of
Philips), Kirch's Neue Constantin,
Berlusconi' s de 10 Penta, and the
Berliner Bank which, through its
subsidiary in london, invests USD
100 million every year 
American films.
The lesson to be drawn from this
imbalance of power is that
American investments in Europe
are concentrated on distribution
networks (cinema and television),
thus creating outlets for their pro-
grammes while European in-
vestments in the USA are geared
towards production and thus con-
tribute to fuelling the crisis of our
programme-making industry.
19. THE ABSENCE OF A
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK FOR
EUROPEAN FILMS PUTS A HALT
TO ANY EFFORT TO CREATE AN
INDUSTRY
This gradual weakening of the
European film industry, which like
the cinemas remains the engine
and mirror of the entire pro-
gramme-making industry, has
resulted in its increasing
dependence on public funds
whose role is more to cover the
market deficit than to create con-
ditions to integrate it.Until now, support for production
has mobilized virtually all
available funding, without EU
Member States and especially the
Community thinking about in-
terveningin the market to create
conditions for a real circulation of
European films. This would imply,
on the one hand, a very firm at-
titude towards compliance with
competition lows, ond on the
other hdnd, the creation of incen-
tives to create a world distribution
network for European films, a sine
quo  non  condition to make an in-
dustry vioble.
Unlike the Europeans, the
Americans have long recognized
that the hazard of an industry
making one-off prototypes can be
minimized by concentrating pro-
duction on powerful compdnies
which enjoy real economies of
scale. Such companies can aquire
the criticol mass necessary to build
worldwide distribution networks and occumulate valuable
catalogues.
17 In April 196B, in the ' Symposium on the
Ways and Means of a Common Policy for
the Film Industry in the Common Market
organized by the Institute of Sociology of
the Free University of Brussels in conjunc-
tion with the European Commission, and at
a time when the European Economic Com-
munity only comprised six States, Jean-
Claude Batz presented a communication
where he developed t~e idea, visionary for
the time, that there had to be a leap 'from
the national scale to the European scale, a
correlative change in our objectives, that is
to say to focus our efforts now on organiz-
ing markets and developing structures.
We cannot resist quoting more lengthy ex-
tracts from the text by Jean-Claude Batz
since they appear so much like a premoni-
tion today:
The distribution strlJcture has been forgot-
ten and disregarded by national policies.
DistriblJtion is the "big missing element" in
the governments' film promotion systems.
This omission is less slJrprising than it seems
at first glance. It is explained by the fact
that distribution makes no obvious sense
and does not truly fulfil its role lJnless it is
structured on an international basis, or at
least on a multinational territorial basis:
(This explains why) 'the financial interven-
tion of governments has been confined to
supportihg production activities, short-liv-
ed by nature, and has refrained from seek-
ing to organize markets or develop perma-
nent distribution structures. What was the
20. EUROPEAN SUCCESSES
DO NOT BENEFIT THE
INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE
The increasingly rare successes
that manage to overcome these
limitations and achieve interna-
tional distribution within Europe
tend only to benefit their own pro-
ducers and directors. They do not
contribute to a more secure in-
dustry capable of taking risks in
further production or distribution.
Once agoin, the exceptions only
confirm the rule and if in some
countries, particularly France, in-
tegrated groups are beginning to
form with a coherent production
philosophy, they never exceed the
size of their national markets
where, poradoxically, they
sometimes find themselves in a
dominant, or even monopolistic,
position.
consequence? Well, when the decline in
the cinema-going public began some 10
years ago in Europe, to erode the
economic bases ofthe industry, when the
attendance crisis worsened - European
cinema lost some 45% of its audience over
the past 10 years - European distribution
companies, too weak, too fragmented, too
closely limited to the regional framework,
these companies therefore found
themselves prevented from supporting the
line of financial needs of production.
... '
Already for several years (the large
American companies) had been downsiz-
ing their own production activity to focus
on the financing and distribution of films
which it paid for from independent pro-
ducers who played the role of contractors
for their account:
... '
As for the strlJctures specific to ElJro-
pean distribution, eroded by the crisis, they
now continue to break apart under the ac-
tion of American competition.
... '
What is the meaning of this change?
Between the audience of our planet and
the various national productions offilms ...
gradually we are seeing the development
of an international distribution and financ-
ing structure under American control and
acquiring a world hegemonic power ac-
cording to the snawball cumulative-growth
process.
... '
The European Community provides the
territorial base on which an autonomous
21. THE SYSTEMS OF AID HAVE
TURNED OUT TO BE POWER-
LESS IN STOPPING THE CRISIS
Nationol assistance funds, never
hdving touched distribution .chan-
nels, have, for the most part
turned outto be powerless in stop-
ping the crisis.
Selective aid, based in generol on
considerations of on artistic
noture, introduces an element of
judgment outside the morket
which tends to protect the pro-
ducer s risk instead of encourag-
ing him ('there are producers who
make money from films that are
financiallosers
'18
Automatic aid, even if it rewards
success, does not deol with the
absence of a European distribu"
tion network able to intervene
upstream in the production of
films. Automatic aid acts
downstream  (we  could at least try
to adjust this type of aid,
distributing the benefits ofsuccess
between the producer, distributor
and the cinema operator).
network of distribution of European films
could rely, assuring in turn the stability of
national productions and the authenticity
of their works. This base, especially if it
were one day to be extended to Great Bri-
tain and some of the countries of the Free
Trade Area, reaches the critical size enabl-
ing the growth of companies adapted to
the new international competition.
Gradually, a European distribution net-
work could then gain a foothold in foreign
markets and engage in  cycle of
cumulative growth:
... '
It is recommended, now that the
markets are being departitioned and
assuming the continental dimehsion, that
priority in State intervention go to fostering
the development of a multinational net-
work offilm distribution, which should and
colJld be the cornerstone of a European
film industry:
This was written in 196B, apparently when
European cinema was doing well, when it
still had a majority of our markets and
when the United Kingdom and Spain,
among others, were not members of the
European Community!
Itcanbe added asa matter oFcuriositythat
Jean-Claude Batz is usually the producer
af Andre Delvaux films.
18 Dimitri Balachoff, Permanent Secretary
of the European Academy of Cinema and
Television (letter to Antonio-Pedro
Vasconcelos).22. DESPITE THE
UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF
AID, THE CRISIS OF EUROPE'
FILM INDUSTRY WORSENS DAY
BY DAY
In spite ofthe oid (Hans Gerd Pro-
doehl even goes so far as to say,
referring to the crisis of German
cinema, 'precisely because of it'),
the situation of European cinema
(ond the audiovisual sector, in
general) is worsening every yedr.
In 0 report commissioned by the
government of the German  Lond
of North Rhine-Westphalia, Pro-
doehl paints a catastrophic pic-
tureof the German film industry
and puts his finger on the .struc-
tural reasons for this crisis: a
system of aid atomized by the dif-
ferent funds of the 16  Lander,
where the economic imperotives
defined by the management and
attendance of dnemdS no longer
play an adjusting role indicating in
what direction to take action but
constitute 0 foreign factor, a
source of irritation
The result is that, between 1985
and 1991 nearly half of German
films did not make it to the box of-
fice; 90% of the films had an
attendonce of less than 130 000;
in 1998, outofo total of 1 994 pro-
duction companies, only 76 had
participated in the production of a
film released in the cinemas i.e.
8%; and most of the distributors
in Germany employ on average
7 people (and this figure in-
cludes the four largest subsidiaries
of the major US companies).
23. THE ATOMIZATION OF
EUROPEAN CINEMA IS
CONTRARY TO THE CREATION
OF THE SINGLE MARKET
The situation of the film industry in
Germany can be transposed for
the most part in the EU, with the
Lander  being replaced by
countries.
It is worth quoting another
paragraph from the Prodoehl
report which beautifully sums up
the negative effects of the
otomization of Europe s television
and cinema industry:
Film has a peculiar economic
aspect: its production costs are
largely independent of the pos-
sible proceeds from the sole, they
do not increase in proportion to
the scale of distribution. That is
why, once the level of profitobility
is reached (the break-even point),
profitability increases in exponen-
tial fashion with the increase in
sales turnover. This economic
peculiority explains why the na-
tional and international film
market will always remain the do.
main .of the major distributors. In
the film industry, more than in
other economic sectors, the rule is
that the power in the market and
therefore cultural hegemony are
variables of the quantity ond
dimension. Whoever only has an
atomized porcel with which to oct
will constantly be at the service of
the others.'
24. THE EXPLOSION OF VIDEO
HAS INTENSIFIED AMERICAN
DOMINATION
The 1980s witnessed an explosion
of the video market, which has to.
day become the leading source of
income for the major American
companies in the world market:
52% of the volume of total earn-
ings (cinema, video, television).
The combined effect of the drop in
cinema attendance for European
films and the disparity of power
between the numerous small Euro-
pean distributors and the major
American distributors, which
enables the latter to have power-
ful cotologues (whereas Euro-
pean films, as seen earlier, ore
generally distributed by different
small distributors and national
publishers), has meantthatthe ex-
plosion of video has had repercus-
sions on the .crisis of the cinemas
and instead of increasing film
receipts has further worsened the
deficit of European cinema.
Findlly, the box-office success of
films and the strength of their pro.
motion have a decisive leverage
effect for the hiring and sole of
videos (ond later for TV ou-
diences) which exponentially in-
crease the profitability of
American films: today, video
receipts for American films ac-
count for 47% of exports whereas
box-office receipts do not exceed
32%.25.  THE LIBERALIZATION OF
TELEVISION IN EUROPE HAS
WORSENED THE DEPENDENCE
OF THE STATIONS ON
AMERICAN PRODUCTION
Contrary to what occurred in the
USA, where three powerful net-
works and a market of syndica-
tions in the beginning established
a market logic for audiovisual pro-
duction, in Europe, television was
created in the shadow of the na-
tionol public services, dependent
on broadcasting fees.
With the introduction of advertis-
ing in the economy of the public
stations (with the exception of the
BBC) and the demond for the
liberalization of terrestrial broad-
casting, a private sector, more
often than not fragile, grew and in
turn weakened the public stations
and prevented the establishment
ofa real continental market for
European products.
Bernard Miyet very clearly ex"
plained the origin and effects of
this phenomenon:
The public stations initially block-
ed the rights of programmes that
they owned, in order to bor occess
to the new private competitors.
The lotter were consequently
faced with the double handicap
thot burdened any newcomer to
the market: the absence of a pre-
existing fabric of independent
producers and scarce financial
means.
To face the need to fill growing
time slots with programmes, all the
operators turned to Hollywood
which was the only one with
catalogues capable of satisfying
this demond. Blocked by the sta-
tions already established,
adapted to the sole needs ofthese
stations, frozen by the absence of
distribution structures, European
programmes were not able to take
advantage, of this trend.
'19
This phenomenon was accom-
panied by a massive consumption
of American products (films, and
also series, television films, situa-
tion comedies and soap operas)
which in the case of films,
benefited. from promotion in
cinemas .and, in the case of televi-
sion products, from prices thot in
certain instances could be con-
sidered dumping: with their cost
already recouped in the USA, the
American products were sold to
the stations often in botches and at
obsolutely unbeatoble prices.
19 Bernard Miyet, in ' Etude for the SEA'
(Societes d'etudes sur I'audiovisuel),
specially pnapared for this report.
We believe that it is interesting to quote
Bernqrd Miyet again on a problem that is
almost never brought up - the problem of
frequencies: 'The granting of broadcasting
lic~nces or the assignment offrequencies is
still th~ responsibility of the authorities of
each country, which naturolly tend to
favour purely national interests, despite
the apparent legal equal opportunity for
any national of th~ European Union.
B~cause of this, is it Q pure coincidence if
the major private operotors are contralled
by French entities in France, G~rman anes
in Germany, Italian ones in Italy or English
ones in Great Britain?'
... '
In this respect, it can b~ suppos~d that
if a broadcaster controlled stations in
s~veral countries, he cauld be more easily
tempted to take a risk on making program-
mes intended from the start for s~veral
markets .... Probably already difficult to
impl~ment in an environment that would
b~ totally deregulated, one can imagine
th~ additional handicaps of the institu-
tionalized frogmentation of European
markets and the regulatory constraints in-
tend~d to protect th~ purely national crea-
tion and production.
26.  COMPETITION BETWEEN
THE STATIONS CONTRIBUTED
TO INTENSIFYING THE
BIPOLARIZATION EFFECT
The liberalization of terrestrial
broadcasting without protecting
the resources needed to maintain
strong public services (which was
justified by the need to ensure
pluralism), therefore led the public
services to CI competitive logic
which reinforced, on the one
hand, the retreat to national
strategies, and on the other hand
their dependence on American
products.
The rise in the number of broad"
casters (and also the number of
broadcasting hours), while in-
creosing the demond for pro-
grammes, also increased produc-
tion and broadcasting costs (with
often fierce competition between
broadcasters for the best stars and
programmes). But this increase in
costs was not offset by higher
advertising revenue, which
resulted in lower production
budgets for the broadcasters
(public Clnd private).
20ln Portugal in 1991, the RTp, which runs
the two public service stations, bought a
batch of 500 films from the U I P represent-
ative (th~ Lusomundocompany), under the
pretext of buying titles before the arrival on
the market of two private stations. It must
be added that the U I P representative took
advantqge of this to get rid of his ~ntire col"
lection of titles, most of them of poor quali-
ty, under the cover of a few very attractive
titles like  ET,  for example.Moreover, the search for a max-
imum audience oriented the
broadcasters production and
purchase policy either to national
products or to American products
whose cost/audience perform-
ances are better (since costs ore
already recouped on their
domestic market) and easier to
obtain (because of a concentra-
tion of rights and catalogues) thon
the performances of non-national
European products.
27. THE COMBINED EFFECT
OF SATELLITE AND CABLE
WITH NEW BROADCASTING
TECHNOLOGIES THREATENS
TO MAKE THE PENETRATION
OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS
UNCONTROLLABLE
The slow but steady introduction
of satellite and cable in Europe
has increased the supply of
American productsj and the new
forms of consumption of television
progrommes (pay-television,
pay-per-view, video-on-demand)
threaten to intensify American
domination in the consumption of
households.
While it is possible to impose
quotos of European products in
the catalogues of broadcasters of
video-on-demand, the consumer
cannot be prevented from seeing
mostly or even exclusively
American products.
Once again, the weak perform-
ance of Europeon films, the
otomization of catalogues, and
the absence of a significant
number of dubbed films (dubbed
versions account for about 85% of
the receipts of American films in
continental Europe) deny them the
possibility of fully benefiting from
these new forms of consumption.
And yet, here too, Europe hos an
enviable but totally under utilized
potential. Between 1929 when
sound films began and today, it is
estimated that the 12 countries of
the European Union combined
produced about 30 000 films,
which is quite likely more than the
number of films produced in the
USA.
28.  THE TELEVISION WITHOUT
FRONTIERS DIRECTIVE RISKS
BEING INEFFECTIVE IF IT IS
NOT DEFINED IN MORE
SPECIFIC TERMS AND
REINFORCED
Born of a compromise between
the desire of certain countries to
liberalize the European
audiovisual area and a concern
for regulation on the port of coun-
tries afraid that free trade would
only serve to increase the massive
invasion of American pro-
grammes on Europeon channels,
the television without frontiers
(TWF) Directive, adopted in 1989
hos had different effects depend-
ing on whether the various
governments transposed it in their
national laws and enforced it in
practice with a certain amount of
rigour.
leaving too much room to
discriminatory interpretations,
such as the definition of a work,
the choice of time slots, ond even
the judgment on the possibility of
fully enforcing it (the expression
whenever possible' invites non-
compliance with Articles 4 and 5,
especially for new broodcasters),
the Directive does not explicitly
foresee its application to stations
that broadcast by cable and
satellite to theme stations or to
those that will use digital
technology and new delivery
systems (pay-television, pay-
per-view, video-on-demand).
Finally, despite positive results for
production in countries like France
where legislation .has defined and
reinforced its regulatory systems
the fact that quotas for European
products can be entirely filled by
national products has reinforced
the trend of bipolarization
(American products/national
products) which, as has been
repeated so many times, remains
one of the most negative symp-
toms of the .change in the
audiovisual market in the EU.
29.  EUROPEAN PROGRAMMES
AND FUNDS HAVE ALSO BEEN
POWERLESS TO STOP THE
CRISIS
Beginning in 1987, both the Com-
mission and the Council of Europe
began to worry about the
dramotic loss of competitiveness
of European products and the
consequent domination of the
market (cinema, video and televi-
sion) by American products.
In 1987, the MEDIA programme
was created in its pilot phase
followed in 1990 by the approval
of a five-yeor programme:
MEDIA-95.
In 1988, in Rhodes, President
Mitterrand launched the idea of
on audiovisual Eureka which, like
the technological Eureka, was to
provide new impetus to a real
competitive programme-making
industry on the world market.
From this idea came the
Audiovisual Conference which
was held in Paris in 1989.
21 It should nevertheless be recalled that in
1962 the Commission had already
prepared a memorandum relative to the
Community action programme for the
second phase (1962-65) where it was pro-
claimed that 'a common policy would be
adopted forthefilm industry with construc-
tive solutions at the CommtJnity level'Meanwhile, in April of the same
year, the Council of Europe
created a European co-produc,
tion fund, (;ounting on the volun-
tary participation of the different
member countries which today
number 24: Eurimages.
In 1993, an action plan to support
the creation of high-definition
television programmes and new
16/9 screens was approved and
allocated ECU 228 million in fund-
ing. These are, to dote, with the
TWF Directive, the only large-
scale European initiatives in the
audiovisual field.
22 It seems useful to recall the political
context in which the MEDIA programme
came about as well as the obstacles and
pitfalls encountered by its development in
order to draw the necessary lessons. The
goal is first to warn the Governments of the
Member States, then the Commission itself,
ond finally the professional circles, to avoid
repeating errors - born of political cir-
cumstances - which would sign away the
proposals made in the present report.
Actually, the programme is the result of
political failure: the rejection in 19B5 by the
Council of Culture Ministers of a proposal
by the Commission to create a Community
fund to support co"production. (Refused by
Germany, Denmark and the United
Kingdom, each acting for different
reasons, the idea and structure of this fund
were  to be taken up by France in the
framework of on intergovernmental
negotiation and give birth to Eurimages.
Nevertheless, in the course of the discus-
sion, some Ministers, particularly Martin
Bangemann, then Germon Minister for the
Economy, suggested that they could be
open to Commission proposols, in por-
ticulPr to encourage the movement of
works and to fovour multilingualism.
For the Commission, the limits  were  drawn,
if it wanted to begin 0 policy of support for
the programme-making industry:
(i) no direct aid for production; therefore
oction remained upstream and
downstream and on the environment of
production;
Nevertheless, even if one con-
siders that the MEDIA programme
was barred from intervening
directly in production;22 that its
annual budget (ECU 40 million) is
too limited to have any significant
effect on a usn 4-billion market;
that Eureka-audiovisual has re-
mained at the level of project
labelling; and that after much
hesitation to adopt the European
HD-Mac standard, Europe prac-
tically abandoned research in this
area to rally to the American
strategy of developing the
technology of image-transmission
digitalization: it has to be
acknowledged that all these pro-
jects have done nothing but gloss
over the crisis when they were sup-
posed to deal with it. They have
only 'cared for the sick person
when they were supposed to heal
him
(ii) no European support fund; therefore
autonomous structures, providing in-
centives to a series of octions deemed
priority by the professionals.
This latter optian could have laid the bases
of the structuring of a Europeon distribu-
tion network, butthatwos not the choice of
the professionals, who came together for
numerous sectoral meetings, during a con-
sultation phose launched in 19B7 by the
Commission, by virtue of its right of in-
itiative.
This consultation phase was therefore go-
ing to lead to a series of pilot experiments,
with relatively limited financial means, but
still making it possible to experiment on 0
small scole with the solutions recommend-
ed by the professionals.
In the minds of the MEDIA promoters, it
was only offer this pilot phase (which for
each project was to lastat least three yeors)
that conclusions could be drawn and be-
tween six ond ten priority actions recom-
mended, with adequate means, assessed.
Butthe movement was accelerated in 19B9
for two reasons: the Audiovisual Con-
ference, organized in Paris upon the pro-
posol of President Mitterrand to define an
audiovisuol Eureka based on the
technological Eureka overwhelmingly
came out in favour of the MEDIA pro-
gramme, indicating that it simply needed
to be given more financial meons.
The other reoson had to do with the posi-
tion of the UK and French Governments.
As for the Eurimages fund created
in 1989 by the Council of Europe,
its aim was to make up for theim,
possibility for MEDIA to intervene
directly in production. Yet this
initiative, despite its very positive
encouragement for alliances be-
tween European producers, has
not been able to solve the crucial
problem of the movement of films
inside Europe, aid for co-produ(;-
tion not being (;onditional on a
guaranteed minimum, ensuring
the release of films at least in the
countries of the co-production.
The fact that most of the films sup-
ported by Eurimages have disap-
peared without trace and that the
re(;overy of loans has been all but
impossible means that  full
analysis of its role must be under-
taken if it is to contribute to a
recovery of European film-making
in the future.
They shared the view that at the budgetary
level reached in 19B9 by MEDIA (ECU 10.
million), it could no longer fall under the
Commission s right of initiative but re-
quired a legal base. This resulted in 1990 in
the institutional negotiation to move on to
the so-called main phase of MEDIA and to
launch a five-year programme.
Because the Council's unanimity was
necessary to establish such a progromme,
the Commission was compelled to increase
the number of lines of action to satisfy the
specific demands of each of the Member
States.
It is in this way that political pressure led to
the adoption of specific measures, even
before a global strategy was clearly defin-
ed. It olso led the programme to repeot
because of the atomization of the projects
each having in the end insufficientfinancial
means, the fragmentation that negatively
characterizes the economy of Europe
audiovisual sector.
The merit of MEDIA, hindered by a small
and fragmented budget, will have been to
take stock - sometimes in a shallow man-
ner - of a certain number of problems, to
initiate pragmatic solutions, create net-
warks of relations between professionals of
the 12 countries, identify actors likely to
operate at European level and help in this
sense begin changing mentalities.
Whatever the programme s future, it will
have been the basis of a growing
awareness and mobilization indispensable
for Europe.30. THE SYMPTOMS OF THE
CRISIS WILL CONTINUE TO
WORSEN
All our programmes, funds and
regulations have failed to deal
with the disease that afflicts
Europe s audiovisual industries.
We seem to be unable to meet the
challenge of changing market
structures and of new technology
due to:
(i) the commercial deficit of
European products due to the
combined effect of their
inability to gain access to
cinemas, especially transna-
tional, and to their loss of
popularity, which in turn has
led to a fall in cinema attend-
ance with consequent knock-
on effects in video and
television;
(ii) the increased trend towards
bipolarization between
American products and na-
tional products, which has in-
tensified the autarkical spirit
of European production;
(iii) the fragmentation of ini-
tiatives, catalogues, markets
and decision-making centres;
(iv) the absence of integrated
pan-European groups suffi.
ciently powerful to be com-
petitive on the world market
(absence of critical mass and
economies of scale), par-
ticularly because of the non-
existence of a world network
of distribution for European
products.
31. IN SHORT
... Another reason for the
weakness of European producers
was the fragmentation ofthe large
European market into much
smaller national markets, which
eliminated the potential for
European market-product specia.
lization.
Ironically, market fragmentation
was encouraged by national
po~icies that discouraged coope-
ration between companies from
different European nations while
dt the same time encouraging
them to cooperation with
American firms. As a result, 
companies were able to operate
in most of the major European
countries, capturing benefits of
scale that were denied to their
European competitors.
(laura D'Andrea Tyson, President
of the Council of Economic Con-
sultants under the Clinton Ad-
ministration, on 'Managing trade
and competition in the semicon-
ductor industry , 1992.Any action to improve the
dramatic situation that has been
described must obey a very
precise objective and a clearly
defined strategy on which all
initiatives will be based.
The objective is that of creating an
audiovisual industry in Europe
that projects its imdge in the
world, embracing the largest
possible audience, which medns
creating a self-sustaining and
competitive industry in an interna-
tional market, acting in the new
framework of the digital and
interactive revolution.
The strategy must first take into ac-
count the structural imbalance
between Europe and the USA
which translates into an uhsus-
tainable trade deficit between our
two audiovisual powers. It must
also toke into account the provi-
sional outcome of the Uruguay
Round.
In order to rebalance these rela-
tions and be able to negotiate with
strength with the Americans to
gradually reduc:e, or even
eliminate, the structural obstacles
and advantages on both sides, it
will have to be made clear from
the start that protection measures
(quotas financial and tax
assistance, taxes, specifications,
regulations, etc.) are not only
necessary but legitimate.
The .audiovisual sector is the most powerful instrument  of culture of our
century.
It emerges from  the  discussions of  the Audiovisual Ministers  of  the  European
Community the unanimous  conviction  that Europe must  be able  to support and
develop the creation  of  the audiovisual industry:
But another aspect to be kept in
mind is that if these are notaccom-
panied very quickly by incentive
measures for the creation of pan.
European distribution companies
and products capable of taking
advantage of the single market
the former will risk creating a for-
tress which is empty on the inside.
As long ago as 1978, Rene Bonnell
reminded us that 'the impossibility
of breaking with the protectionist
model reinforces the Malthusian
behaviour of the profession and
increases its economic weak-
ness
If the competitive side of Euro.
pean production is not streng-
thened to meet the challenge and
sustain ambition, protection
measures will only serve to
weaken it, because protected
from the market, it will lose its
vitality and even its ability to resist.
That is why we say that we must
move from a policy of resistance to
a policy of success.
The final goal of any policy must
be to arrive at a stage where the
market, is self-sustaining to the ex-
tent that it meets the demand of
the widest possible audience.
1 Rene Bonnell in  Le cinema exploite  p. 2B2
(ed. Ramsay/poche/cinema).
Conclusions of the Presidency
(Mons October  1993)
The role of the public authorities
would then be, as in the USA ex-
clusively a regulatory, stimulating
and promotional one. As Vice-
President Gore said so well: (the
role of the State is to) 'promote
and protect competition
We must give ourselves time to
achieve this.
But in the mean time, we will have
to live with what we have. It is not
going to be possible overnight to
invent a number of films and other
programmes capable of drawing
the crowds into European cinemQs
or retaining the attention of every
kind of television and video au.
dience.
Nor can we create overnight stars
we do not hove, stories we have
not scripted, or produc:ers with the
means to regain the taste for risk.
But we must begin to think about
rewarding success.
That is why, in defining a new
policy, we must be able to answer
the question which is at the heart
of the strategic transformation we
propose: how is this transition to
be managed, that is to say how do
we go from a subsidized economy
to a self-sufficient economy?
let us state on obvious truth: no
profound change will be made by
laws alone. But without dny laws
there will be no change.
This means thatthepolitical role 
the Commission, which has to
mobilize the politicians, publicopinion and the professionals is
essential. It must create the legal
and institutional frameworks to
restore the confidence that
generates the energy and
stimulates investment, which 
turn restores confidence.
It is essential that the creators
themselves believe that a stronger
industry and a wealthier market
are not a threat. They mean more
opportunities and better working
conditions, not the contrary.
We have lived too long with the
idea that the director was not only
the centre of the creation but also
the only creator and the only
judge of his own talent. We have
forgotten that cinema is also an art
of collaboration where a lot of
elements contribute to the film
succ:;ess. It is vital that in cinema, as
in the other audiovisual industries
creative producers, inventive
scriptwriters and actors with stor.
potentiol take bock their place
and importance in the industry as
a whole.
European directors won the right
a long time ago to be recognized
as the authors ofthe film, like musi-
cians, painters and writers. It is a
victory thot the authors on the
other side of the Atlantic envy.
But we must at the same time give
up the idea that money is the
enemy of art and that the need to
make receipts , i.e. to reach the
public, is a shameful obstacle to
the freedom of authors) Racine
could not be suspected of betray-
ing his muse when he wrote in his
preface to  Berenice,  The main
rule is to please and to touch'
2 In a dialogue between Manoel 
Oliveira and Jean-Lu!: Godard, published
in  Liberation  of 4 and 5 September 1993,
we can read these extracts: J.-L. G.
: '
you know the definition that Jules Renard
gave of the critic? "The critic is a soldier in
an army put to rout, who deserts and goes
over to the enemy. And who is the enemy?
The audience." ... I think that films are
made for one or two people.' M. 0.
: '
But
that's enough' . J.L. G.
: '
Exactly
The Commission must therefore
design instruments to act.
Europe must invest strongly in
training- a war is not won with
old generals. But it is of no use
teaching the trade to new genera-
tions if there are no opportunities
to practise it.
It is of no use to encourage the
creation of a worldwide distribu-
tion network for European films if
at the same time a major effort is
not made to enforce c:;ompetition
laws that are today often ignored
by the major American companies
(or by their notional represen-
tatives) on our continent without
us thinking about intervening, or
we fail to invest in cinemas so that
the only way to keep film enter.
tainment alive in Europe is for the
Americans to build comfortable
and high-performing multiplex
cinemas.
Our actions must therefore be
coordinated in the same way that
protection measures must be
defined with incentive meosures
under the umbrella of strong and
determined institutional and
political interventions.
At present the protection
measures, which worry the
Americans, are centred on the
TWF Directive. It must be improv-
, made more flexible and effect-
ive, taking into account the
necessary coordination between
national interests and Community
policy, between the needs of
broadcasters and those of in-
dependent producers.
All this implies, legislative and
regulatory action, firm and flex-
ible monitoring, an ability to
adapt to the technological revolu-
tions that very quickly are going to
chonge the organization of the
audiovisual sector and its methods
of consumption. The American
Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) offers us a clear
example.
But at the same time, inc:;entive
measures must change too.
Firstly, they must gradually lose
theirfeoture of.subsidies: a type of
support, which has dominated the
last 20 years, at national and
Community levels and has made
us lazy and powerless. Today,
even the most prestigious directors
like Wim Wenders have
understood this: 'In Europe we
have fallen more and more into a
kind of" subsidy lethargy , whose
symptoms are frequently artistic
self-indulgence, indifference
towards the audience or disregard
of economic laws:3
Secondly, they must reinforce
more and more their European
nature. This does not mean that
the EO policy is going to replace
the policies of individual States
which have a crucial role in
defending language ond cultural
identity. Governments are free to
choose their own policy for the
development of the audiovisual
industry. They can decide to sup-
port an industry based on the
specific needs of their country ot
their regions while at the same
time encouraging the access of
their creators to the single market.
3 Wim Wenders, in  Felix  (January 1994).The Community policy is not
aimed either at uprooting artists
or creating European products
which, with the increased number
of co-producers become a
hotchpotch of initiatives and cul-
tures, devoid of originality.
On the contrary, if the originality
and ambition ofthese projects is to
be retained for the producers and
directors, it is imperative that they
have adequate means to finance
them. And this financing can only
come from energizing a Euro-
pean, indeed a world, market
which through a successful
distribution network enables
marketing our products and mak-
ing them profitable: the stories
can remain local, but not the au-
diences.
Finally, we must, as Giuseppe
Richeri states so well
, '
go from a
logic of the product toa logic of
the market'.4 This means that the
financial aid and other Commun-
ity incentives, instead of interven-
ing on a case-by-case basis, i.
film by film, product by product,
must seek to stimulate the creation
and consolidation of powerful
and integrated companies which,
through the quantity of their prod-
ucts and the extent of their ter-
ritorial and multimedia presence
can become in time the major
energizers of the audiovisual in-
dustry which Europe needs.
4 Giuseppe Richeri, in answer to the ques-
tionnaire. (see Annex 1)
The European funds necessary for
the development of such a
strategic industry which today ac-
counts for 1.8 million jobs in the
EU (and with the potential of aC-
counting for at least twice as
much), must be considered a pro-
fitable investment and not as sub-
sidies to cover an eternal deficit.
These funds must therefore pro-
mote financial responsibility while
at the same time creating more
favourable conditions for risk.
taking: tax advantages, system of
loan guarantees, low-interest
loans so as to enable companies
to increase the volume of produc.
tion and the spectrum of the
market that they occupy.
For this - and this is our central
recommendation  it is im-
perative to help create a distribu-
tion network for European prod-
ucts that provides new and better
opportunities for our creators.
Bernardo Bertolucci said it better
than anyone: 'One of ourfirst ma-
jor targets should be the iden-
tification and creation of a Euro-
pean distribution (system), which
could allow room for our many dif-
ferent cultural experiences.
5 Bernardo Bertolucci in  A dose  af  reality
The State of  European Cinema  (publish~
ed by the European Film Academy and
Screen I nternational).STRATEGY AND
COORDINATION
A strong coordination drive from
the centre will be indispensable in
order to successfully implement
the strategy outlined in this report.
The European Commissioner with
responsibility for audiovisual
policy and his administration
Directorate-General X, are uni-
quely placed to fulfil this coor-
dinating role.
The reinforcement of their power
and resources in all software-
related areas would permit the ef-
fective implementation of the
policy recommendations which
will be contained in the forthcom-
ing Green Paper. It will also allow
the other Directorates involved in
the policy (Internal Market Exter-
nal Trade Relations, International
Relations, new Technologies, In-
dustrial Policy, Regional Develop-
ment, Competition, etc
enhance the impact of their own
action in this field. The success of a
new audiovisual policy will rely
largely on the ability of the Com-
mission to coordinate all action in-
to a coherent whole.
(The Think-tank) will have the task  of  making  recommendations 
audiovisual policy guidelines, in keeping with the Mons cone/usions
and in the context  of  the preparation  of  the Green Paper on
audiovisual policy and the audiovisual conferences that will follow its
publication.
Joao de Deus Pinheiro
European Commissioner in charge of DG X
11.1993
Coordination could extend suc-
cessfully to relationships with the
Council of Europe (as encouraged
in the Maastricht Treaty) and EFTA
countries (which are signatories of
the European Economic Area
Treaty), and, in particular, with the
audiovisual support mechanisms
already in existence in those coun-
tries (such as the Nordisk fund in
Scandinavia).
Also, in order to toke full advan-
tage of the new opportunities that
the technological revolution will
bring, the coordination must be
extended to bodies such as the
European Structural Funds, the
European Investment Bank and
others. They too can help seize the
chance that the development of
new audiovisual services allied
with telecommunications will
bring in reducing chronic
unemployment, revitalizing areas
hit by industrial obsolescence and
odd to the rejuvenation of inner
cities and the tourist trade.
The EBRD (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Develop-
ment), which plays a vital role in
cooperation with the countries in
East and Central Europe, should
also play its part in the new policy.
THE LEGAL AND
REGULATORY
FRAM EWORK
The overall objective is to devise
incentive measures to create 
new market-place for audiovisual
products and new audiovisual
products for the market-place as
the indispensable tenets of a
strong audiovisual industry able to withstand competitive
pressures. In order to attain this
however, we must raise the issue of
what would be the most ap-
propriate regulation and legisla-
tion in support of those objectives.
A climate of trust favourable to
new investments cannot be
created if the legol framework is
both unclear and unfair. The ideal
framework should be flexible
enough to permanently accom-
modate new developments in the
environment. In order to be fully
effective, it should also be occom-
panied by monitoring and polic-
Ing measures.
It is therefore of crucial import-
ance, as preliminary to action, to
define the role and responsibilities
of DG X.
Stefano Rolando says: 'The grow-
ing economic complexity of the
sector makes it necessory to har-
monize regulation. Without it,
laws regulations and the
1 Letter addressed to the members of the
Think-tank.authorities which supervise and
implement them, will remain no.
tional. This means there will be no
legitimacy for a Europe-wide
initiative.
let us start byanalysing the fun!:-
tioning and current relevance of
the one regulatory instrument
under DG supervision  the
television without frontiers
Directive.
1. THE 'TELEVISION WITHOUT
FRONTIERS' DIRECTIVE
The EU Commission has started a
review of the Directive and though
its condusions are not known at
the time of writing,3 some critical
comments can be made based on
the experience to dote. We could
then propose some adjustments
and darifications as well as an
extension of the scope of the
Directive.
We propose to cover the following
issues:
. Implementation criteria;
. Programming quotas;
Definition of audiovisual
work'
2 Stefano Rolando, Head of Communica-
tion with the Presidentofthe Council of the
Italian Government in answer to the ques-
tionnaire (see Annex I).
Like many other people with whom we
spoke, Stefano Rolando suggests that ' the
time has come to form the "operational"
arm ofthe European institutions, atthe ser-
vice of this renovated policy, a tool
responsible not only for legal matters but
also for analyses of the international
market and for assistance and financing
proiects. This tool, he suggests, could be a
European Audiovisual and Communica-
tion Agency, whose modalities of im-
plementation and operating should be
studied.
Even if the suggestion seems to have its
supporters, we do  not  believe it ap~
propriate here to propose the instrument
or the instruments which the Commission
will provide to apply its new policy. We
think that it is more useful to clearly define
the areas of action and the concrete
measures that it must adopt to succeed in
its programme.
. Enlarging the scope
plementation;
. Applicable law;
Definition of
works
. Monitoring;
. Chain of exploitation.
of im.
European
As a preliminary, it must be em-
phasized that the Directive cur-
rently constitutes one of the key
elements of EUaudiovi.sual policy,
particularly with regard to quotas.
The review of the Directive is tak-
ing place against the ba!:kground
of the recent condusion of the
Uruguay Round. In the GATT con-
text, Europe managed to preserve
its freedom to regulate the
audiovisual sector in view of the
changes in the market-place.
Governments and professionals
alike are fully aware that, in order
to adequately address the threats
to the audiovisual industry, other
initiatives must be taken, in
parallel with regulatory ones,
such as 'television without
frontiers
3 Considering the often vague and not
very binding nature of the Directive, it is to
be wondered whether a real evaluation
will be possible.
Moreover, it is quite improbable that it will
be possible to determine, in the case where
there has been compliance with the Direc-
tive (and this depends a lat on how each
country has transposed it in its legislation
and the specifications imposed on the dif-
ferent  broadcasters), whether any success
of Articles 4 and 5 is due to its merits or to
the spontaneaus demand of the market.
New services will burst on to the
scene and new markets will be
created. These changes will
rendertraditional forms ofregula.
tion, particularly quotas, very dif-
ficult if not downright impossible
to apply. Increasingly, the con.
sumer will be in control of his own
choi!:e: the future of the combined
audiovi.sual and telecommunica.
tions industries will therefore
hinge on their ability to offer pro-
grammes at competitive rates car-
ried by efficient services.
We must therefore look at in how
for the Directive is compatible with
these objectives.
(A) IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA
The regulatory objective of the
Directive is frequently undermined
by the ambiguities of the drafting:
where, for instance, it reads
wherever practicable, Member
States have tended to interpret
that as a derogation rather than a
constraint, because of a lack of
definition as to method or proper
strategic guidance on imple-
mentation.
(B) DEFINITION OF 'WORK'
The absence of a definition of
work' in the Directive has allowed
broadca.ster.s to fulfil their quota
mostly by using low-cost pro-
grammes with no shelf-life. They
could therefore attract both the
public and advertisers, while
focusing their acquisition of
drama products on US imports, at
prices more competitive than that
of European drama.This model has reinforced the ex-
isting polarization between 
and national products, in a pat-
tern which resembles that of
cinema exhibition. This evolution
has hod two negative conse-
quences:
(i) the focus on acquiring US
drama has devalued the offer
of European drama and con-
sequently the purchase prices
for programmes bought by
one Member State from
another have decreased;
(ii) European programming has
been focused  particularly in
the smaller countries - on
works with no shelf-life:
because these works have no
secondary value in ancillary or
foreign markets, this focus has
contributed to the under-
capitalization of the industry.
Furthermore, a preference for
talk shows and studio-based pro-
grammes (which do not compete
head-on with US imports)4
penalizes those broadcasters in
Member States where they have
been obliged by regulation to sup-
port the creation of home-grown
drama.
This .effectis more pronounced in
the smaller countries which have
less capacity than the larger coun-
tries to fulfil their European quota
with shelf-life works. They are
therefore obliged to buy ' Euro-
pean' (despite the fact that ac-
quisition prices are not com-
petitive and that European im-
ports generally perform less well
with the audience), or to bypass
the .objectives of the Directive by
programming more home-grown
programmes with no shelf-life.
4 Often these studio programmes (game
shows, contests, tolk shows) or" adapta-
tions of American productions whose
licence the broadcasters buy and which
hav" the advantage of olready having
been tested on the American market.
We believe, therefore, that the
definition of 'work' must be
tightened. The definition should
put the emphasis on works with
shelf-life (i.e. those, like some
documentary drama, which retain
a 'value-added' or which pro-
mote cinema, TV production or
European culture in general.
We stress that the distinction be-
tween these types of work implies
no value judgment on our part as
to the relative merits of drama and
documentaries versus studio-
based programming. The latter
plays a vital role in building up au-
dience loyalty and attracting
advertisers. They are therefore
essential to the financial strength
of a channel: however, we are
convinced that the Directive, no
matter how stringently it is ap-
plied, will only have a marginal
impact on this type of pro-
gramming.
What is at stake with the Directive
is our collective ability to
strengthen a European pro-
gramme industry, to make it com-
petitive against the USA and
Japan and to help it regain control
over its own internal market-
place. To achieve this, Europe has
no other solution but to develop a
critical mass .of programmes with
secondary resale value. Only then
will it be able to take full advant-
age of the explosion in demand
that interactivity and other
technological innovations will
generate at the consumer end.
(C) THE QUOTAS
There are three problems sur-
rounding the issue:
(i) Theconcept ofthe quota must
be refined and specified in
relation to schedules.
A broadcaster s schedule is
divided into periods to which
different values are attached
according to the potential
audience, and the value  at.
tached by advertisers to
specific audiences.
Our first recommendation is
that it is absolutely necessary
to define the quotas in rela.
tion to those time periods in
the daily schedules. The
quota would be wasted en.
tirely if it simply allowed
broadcasters to show
American drama during the
prime-time and to dump
European material into the
more marginal segments of
the schedule.
(ii) The notion of ' European
work' must also be redefined
in relation to the quota to ac-
count for the need for na-
tional content.
We have just seen how the
ambiguity of the Directive in
another area accentuates the
polarization between US and
European programmes (the
latter often being dominated
by low-cost programming
with no shelf-life.
In the some way, we must
define, within the quota
system, a quota for national
works and one for non-na-
tional works, in order to strike
the right balance: it will
strengthen the European pro-
gramme industry by
stimulating the circulation of
programmes across national
borders, within the European
Union.However, a tighter definition
of the 'work' in relation to the
quota will generate an
automatic discrimination
against smaller countries
unless this effect is specifically
addressed: those countries
may find it difficult otherwise
to fulfil their notional quota,
because of their more limited
resources.
This represents a structural
imbalance by contrast with
the larger countries which
have no difficulty in fulfilling
their European quota with
home-grown programming.
The Directive therefore
already discriminates against
countries where the offer of
local programmes is more
limited; should the Directive
be applied more rigorously,
broadcasters in the smaller
countries would be forced to
import more programmes
from the larger countries in
order to comply.
Faced with no alternative
other than to increase their
acquisitions of European
works with shelf-life, the
economic equilibrium of
those smaller countries
broadcasters may be com-
promised, unless a set of
safeguards is adopted 
parallel.
Without such safeguards
bock-catalogues of Euro-
pean programmes with prices
which are often incompatible
with the purchasing power of
those smaller countries
broadcasters will be less com-
petitive than US imports and
low-cost domestic pro-
grammes with no shelf-life.
At present, bearing in mind
that programme costs are still
mostly amortized at national
level, the smaller countries
are not profitable for Euro-
pean sellers: prices paid
often barely cover the cost of
sales. By contrast, US owners
of large back-catalogues can
sell programmes profitably to
those markets, even at what
one might' consider, in effect,
to be dumping prices.
It is essential therefore that
compensatory measures be
implemented during a transi-
tion phose, to help the smaller
countries face the market
situation and adhere to the
quotas.
Another possible solution
would be to consider the
European majority propor-
tion quota not as a function of
the total volume of hours
broadcast (most works with
no shelf"life are mode na-
tionally), but as a function of
the hours of shelf-life works
scheduled by the broad-
caster.
Whatever the solution, com-
plementary measures of in-
dustrial development must
accompany the Directive.
These measures should aim to
generate a demand for Euro-
pean works with shelf-life at
prices which can compete
with those of US imports.
Creating new opportunities
for the production and cir-
culation of works with au-
dience appeal is the only way to make the Directive
substantial and consistent in
the long run.
(iii) At present broadcasters
have a choice between on in-
vestment quota or a quota of
broadcasting hours in rela-
tion to programmes made by
independent producers. This
option should be turned into
two complementary obliga-
tions progressively em-
phasizing the obligation to in-
vest in the production or pre.
purchase of European works.
This is a safer formula than a
quota based on broadcasting
hours, which .is far more dif-
ficult to apply and control
with new technologies, par-
ticularly video-on-demand.
It would also be advisable to
play on the principle of a
quota of notional works and
quota of non-national
works to encourage broad-
casters to invest (as co-pro-
duction or pre-purchase) in
non-notional European
work.
The obligation to focus a pro-
portion of the quota on non-
national works would
demonstrate to decision-
makers in Member S~ates
the advantages of opnning
their financial support
mechanisms to productions
originating from outside their
country: they need to under-
stand that by relinquishing
some of their exclusive
privilege, they will in turn gain
access to a vastEU market.
Investment in non-national
projects will have a beneficial
effect on the costs of notional
production and will increase
the competitiveness of na-
tional producers.(D) ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF
IMPlEMETATION OF THE
DIRECTIVE (TO ENCOMPASS
NEW SERVICES)
The issue of applying the Directive
to new broadcasting services must
be addressed.
It is a complex problem, which
cannot be covered exhaustively
here. Two factors should be con-
sidered:
(i) investment obligations are
easier to monitor and apply
than broadcasting quotas;
(ii) new services must be assessed
in relation to where their
resources come from (licence
fee, advertising, subscription,
etc.
) .
and the profile of the
broadcaster (specialist or
general entertainment).
(E) APPLICABLE lAW
The Directive establishes the prin-
ciple that the law of the Member
State in which the broadcaster is
established is the only one ap-
plicable.
This principle distorts the situation:
broadcasters established in coun-
tries which take a lenient ap"
proach to the Directive have com-
petitive advantages over those
which operate from countries with
a more stringent approach and
cultural policies (for instance
France forbids the broadcasting
of films on Saturdays).
This distortion is particularly
damaging in the context of our
worsening trade deficit with the
USA and the dumping practices of
some of the US distributors, which
makes their product as much as 10
times less expensive to acquire
than home-grown European pro-
gramming.
It contradicts the objective of rein-
forcing the European industry as a
competitive force in both Europe
and the rest of the world.
Another negative effect is that it
allows broadcasters to transfer
their operations to a Member
State where regulation is less
dernanding, to reach viewers out-
side that Member State.
The current definition of ap-
plicable law does not take into ac-
count the issue of cable relay, a
growth area of great significance;
nor does it address the issue of the
electronic 'superhighway . A legal
vacuum is being created which
leaves Europe vulnerable and
unable to regulate either the
market or the technological,
economic and social evolution of
the audiovisuol sector.
The Directive must be clarified.
Control and penalty procedures
must be established at national
level to help level the regulatory
playing field between Member
States, thereby reducing the ot-
tractiveness for broadcasters of
relocating to Member Stotes with
the most 'favourable' rules. The
Directive should also be sup-
ported by a system ollowing the
Member State in which the broad-
cast is received to take a case to
arbitration at Union level, in cases
where there is a flagrant breach .
regulatory obligations. The ar-
bitration procedure should be
able to lead to policing measures
including the temporary cancella-
tion of a licence to broadcast.
(F) DEFINITION OF 'EURO-
PEAN WORKS'
There is no point in enforcing corn-
pliance with the quota if European
works are not defined with preci-
sion. The points system used by the
Council of Europe within the Con-
vention on Tripartite Co-produc-
tions could serve as the basis for
this definition. Alternatively, the
definition could be bosed on the
number of jobs, with the creotive
ones having to be filled mostly by
European nationals (a limited
number of derogations would be
permitted).
The most important consideration
is that the definition of ' European
works' should notbe subjectto dif-
ferent interpretations. It must be
clear ond unequivocal. The in.
vestor must rest assured thot he
will be able to rely on financial
support and incentives prior to the
investment decision being made.
(G) MONITORING
It should not be necessary to ern-
phasi;ze the importance of
monitoring the Directive. Efficient
enforcement mechanisms should
be estoblished, with a ronge of
penolties and fines available to
the relevant authorities.
The role of the Commission in this
instonce should be reinforced.
Equally, national outhorities
should be able to quickly mobili;ze
the Commission or local tribunals
as soon as breaches of com-
pliance have been detected which
con be proven to have a distorting
effect on the market.(H) CHAIN OF EXPLOITATION
WINDOWS'
The traditional order in the chain
of exploitation of audiovisual soft-
ware is going through radical
change. Soon, the market will be
dictating new modes of ex-
ploitation.
The imposition of a (:hronological
order of use in the Diredive
stemmed from the lack of
coherence in the produdion and
distribution sedors in Europe:
rights on programmes are scat-
tered across many territories and
different medid. This situation ex-
plains why a regulated chrono-
logy of uses exists in Article 7.
However, new modes of exploita-
tion will upset this traditional
chronology and the concentration
of rights in the hands of one holder
- which is the solution we wish to
promote  will demand complete
freedom in this area.
As long asit is in the Diredive, Arti-
cle 7 must be interpreted as mean-
ing thatrevenues generated byex-
ploitation should be maximized
and not as an abstrad discipline
which may again be detrimental
to the industry.
2. TRANSPARENCIES AND
GUARANTEES
The monitoring of the Diredive
and the framework required to en-
sure its enforcement will be similar
to the regulation of industrial and
commercial policy in other areas
of industry: it must ensure the kind
of transparency which helps free
access to the market-place by all
the players (:oncerned.
5 Consumer rights must nevertheless be
taken into account with regard to certain
local cinemas that are less profitable and
for which distributors do not take the time
ta send copies, a practice that can be an in-
fringement of competition laws, because
they prefer to launch the product faster 
the video market.
Such transparency demands a
permanent market analysis
mechanism: this role may be ful-
filled adequately by the Eureka
Observotory. However, it must
be(:ome operational very soon so
as to be able to hdrmonize data
and provide credible information
to operators in the industry.
A public register of audiovisual
dnd cinema works should also be
set up, .as should an EU-wide
me(:hanism for the monitoring of
cinema box-office ticket sales ~ a
monitoring exercise whi(:h will also
largely benefit the US majors.
3. REGULATING THE
MARKET-PLACE
For the audiovisual industry to
conquer its own market anew ~ as
is mentioned in the introduction 
it must be able to consolidate and
respond to demand and eVen to
anticipate it. In order to do so, it
must be sufficiently well finan(:ed.
This is the only way it will maintain
d competitive edge.
This objective implies - as we ex-
plain later ~ devising incentives
for the formation of powerful and
integrated businesses able to sus-
tain a permanent production slate
and guarantee widespread
multimedia distribution.
In encouraging the emergence of
su(:h large componies, the Com-
mission must ensure that they
operate on a pan-European basis
rather than being allowed to build
up monopoly power in a single na-
tional market.
The Commission will also have to
regulate other aspects of the
modus operandi  of those consor-
tia: the field of activity of those
companies must be defined. In the
currenttransition, the Commission
must reconcile the creation of
larger pan-European operators
with the strict application of 
competition rules.
Problems may chiefly arise where
vertical integrotion between pro-
duction, distribution and mul.
timedia exploitation is occurring.
Can the historic decision by the US
Supreme Court in 1948 to prevent
the US studios from owning
cinema chains be applied to
Europe s current situation? In fact,
it would be counter-productive to
deny the new consortia we wish to
create from also hdving film ex-
hibition interests. What is needed
therefore are booking rules based
on the strict dPplication of com-
petition law in order to avoid the
generalizotion of US majors
practices such as tie-ins, blo(:k
booking and restricted access to
prints.
In considering the integrotion be-
tween production and broad-
casting (many advocote a separa.
tion of interests), we mustalso take
into account the different
historical circumstances in which
television started in the USA and
Europe.
6 The American example is often cited as
the model of separation between broad-
caster and producer and as the example to
be followed in Evrope, without taking into
account the specific historical and
economic aspects of this decision. In addi-
tion to the private nature of the American
networks and the dimension of their
market, this measure was aimed to com-
pensate the major companies for the ban
imposed on them to have cinemas, instead
enabling them to produce for television.Contrary to the USA European
television started life as a series of
national public service
monopolies.
It is important to establish a
charter defining the relationship
between independent producers
and terrestrial broadcasters. A
minimum investment obligation by
broadcasters in independent pro-
grammes should be implernented
(15% of turnover is the target
recommendedby some; in the UK
there is a quota of 25% of broad-
cast hours, excluding news and
news-related current affairs).
At the same time, the preservation
of some public service tradition in
Europe means that some in-house
broadcasting productions should
be maintained. These produc.
tions, particularly the higher cost
prestige drama (BBC or RAI are
two examples of such fine tradi-
tions), are today in a strong posi-
tion in bock-catalogues.
All these adjustments must not be
made to the detriment of cornpeti-
tion law. One of the weaker points
of European policy over the past
years has been the tendency with
which those lows have been ap-
plied particularly to the film
distribution sector and its relation-
ship with exhibitors. (We refer
here in particular to the deroga-
tion to Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome which allowed the forma-
tion of UIP.) Such complacency
has led, particularly in smaller
countries, to the atrophy of the in-
dependent production and distri-
bution sectors, with catastrophic
effects on the supply of national
films to local audiences.
This latter point isa delicate, albeit
highly important one. The Com-
mission would therefore be well
advised to commission extensive
research in this field, in order to in-
form its policy choices.
- A  MARKET FOR
PRODUCTS AND
PRODUCTS FOR
MARKETS
We arrive finally at what can be
considered the central point of our
recommendations: the creation of
a fund operating like a low-in-
terest rate lending system to help
establish pan-European distribu-
tion consortia.
Such an approach would not be
new in Europe. This type of loan
has already been granted to the
former mining regions, for exam-
ple, to help restructure their
economy and has been for a long
time now on effective instrument
of European policy to stimulate
private investment in the sector, at
levels several timeshigherthan the
value of the loon, which must be
reimbursed over a period of eight
years.
1. A MORE EFFECTIVE MARKET
FOR OUR PRODUCTS
We believe that the Commission
should give serious and urgent
consideration to a scheme offer-
ing publicly.funded soft-loan sup.
port to pan-European distribution
consortia.
Key features of this scheme would
be:
(i) a small number of consortia
would be chosen by com-
petitive bid;
(ii) each consortium could be
made up of existing distrib-
utors or new .entrants to the
field;
(iii) they would have access to
soft-loan finance in order to
promote the Europe-wide
distribution of European pro-
ducts (films, television and all
forms of software) and to
seek new markets outside
Europe;
(iv) they would be expected to
raise the overwhelming bulk
of their capital on the open
market;
(v) loan agreements would last
for 10 years.
(A) HOW WOULD THE SCHEME
WORK?
The agreements we propose
would be made with consortia on
the basis of competitive tenders
judged on a rigorous appraisal of
business plans.
Application for loans would be
open to all existing distributors,
exhibitors, production companies
and television companies, as well
as groups from any other market
sector, although the expectation
would be that groups representing
an already established range of
interests in the market would be
most likely to form a consortium to
bid for one of the agreements
bringing with them their existing
catalogues of European and non-
European products. This 'consor-
tium' approach would allow ex.
isting distribution and production
companies, no matter how small
to pool resources and expertise as
part of larger and more effective
pan-European groups. One ofthe
greatest benefits of this arrange-
ment would be the accumulation
of growing and varied catalogueswhich, over a period of 10 years,
would help to create in Europe the
kind of financiol security currently
enjoyed and exploited by the ma-
jor US studios. Application rules
would require consortia to be
multimedia and multimember
making it impossible for any con-
sortium to be dominated by one
existing company or group,
however powerful. It will, of
course, be importont to ensure
that the relatively small specialist
distributors who are vital to the
continued vitality and variety of
European film-making are .safe-
guarded by whatever regulatory
regime becomes appropriate
and, in this connection, we an-
ticipate that the Eurimages pro-
gramme will have on important,
ongoing role to play, The distribu~
tion consortia which we propose
would at last bring the power of
secure finance and high-quality
management to the service of in-
dependent producers in Europe.
Non-European holdings might be
limited to 2.0 to 30% of each con-
sortium.
Bidders for the loans would have
to submit detailed business plans
demonstrating how they would
use the publicly-funded loan
capitol to generate additional
private capital on the commercial
market. The business plans would
also need to set out clearly the
means by which bidders proposed
to increase the distribution of
European products in European
and global markets. We return to
this point in our section below en-
titled 'The cost of implementing
this strategy'. Successful bidders
would be offered lO-yearloan
agreements subject to regulation
by a body with powers to
periodically review and
necessary, terminote the loan
agreement before the expiry of
the 10-year period. A proportion
of the loon fund might only be
made available subject to the bid-
der s performance during a pro-
bationary period.
Rother than a single agreement
several might be drown up,
thereby creating the benefit of
competition between consortia
without losing .the advantage of
each of them having the capital
and management to he asignifi-
cant force within the European
and world markets.
A further advantage in limiting the
number of agreements would be
that while individual consortia
might be expected to build up
specialization in particular
markets or geographical areas
they would all be required to he
genuinely pan-European in their
operation.
(B) WHAT WOULD IT DO?
The fundamental requirement
placed upon successful bidders
would be:
(i) to promote and enhance
genuinely Europe-wide distri-
bution of films, television pro-
grammes and software, and
(ii) to promote the more effective
marketing and distribution of
films and other audiovisual
products in non-European
markets.
The fund would enable and en-
courage European producers to
plan - and budget for ~ their
productions from an early stage
with transnational markets in
mind, affording them a viable
means of raising their ambitions
beyond merely national markets.
Conditions of loans could be
altered, perhaps, for example by
giving preference to drama over
non-fiction work. We recognize
that it would not be commercially
realistic, in any sense, to promote
all products in all markets. Never.
theless, the thrust of the distribu-
tion system, and the conditions im-
posed on the loan fund, would
tend to maximize pan-European
distribution. A proportion of the
fund should be identified for in-
vestment in the exhibition sector,
perhaps by making soft loans
available with repayment benefits
tied to the proportion of European
products played.
loan capitol might also be made
available for the development of,
and training in, new technologies
if they were relevant to improving
distribution.It would be reasonable to expect
that by the end of the 10-yeor
period substantial ond potentially
valuable cotalogues would have
been built up by each consortium
ond that the distributors would
have achieved sufficient 'critical
mass' to trode commercially
without the benefit of further
public support.
Repoyment of the loan might be
effected by offering on equity in.
terest in the consortium (effective-
ly a share of the library of pro-
grammes and rights), by refinonc-
ing the consortium, by conversion
into preference shores in the con-
sortium or by other means.
(C) WHAT BENEFITS WOULD IT
BRING?
The creotion of substontiol and
valuoble pan-European cota-
logues
More Europeon products with
more internotional appeol
The opportunity to develop a
more competitive edge in major
markets such as the USA
More funding availoble for dubb-
ing ond internotional marketing of
European products
More varied and competitive pro-
gramming for independent cine-
mas
7 The multiplying effect of credit
guarantees is known. They make the real
entrepreneurs responsible  something
the European audiovisual sector vitally
needs - and encourage private capital to
become involved in the financing of
audiovis\.lal prod\.lctions. EMG is involved
precisely in this area, but until now the lack
of Financial credibility of the E\.Iropean
audiovisual industry, especially cinema
has not enabled it to attract the necessary
contributions to have the required means
that would enable it to have a real impact
on  the industry.
In any event, it is the start of an instrument
on which the new strategy can be based.
A portion of the loan fund being
specifically reserved to under-
write the refurbishment of Euro-
pean cinemas on commerciolly at-
tractive terms
More re-origination of products
for interactive use, giving software
creators larger markets and lower
unit costs while protecting existing
moral rights.
2. BETTER PRODUCTS FOR
OUR MARKET
Such a distribution system should
be complemented by a system of
direct production support oper-
ating with a maximum degree of
subsidiarity and would comple-
ment our European-level distribu-
tion proposals and make a
positive contribution to the
regeneration of a truly diverse
and creative industry.
Key features of this scheme would
be:
(i) it would be levy-bosed - in
effect the industry recycling
part of its revenue;
(ii) it would be operated with a
maximum degree of sub-
sidiarity;
(Hi) it would allow production
companies to develop pro.
jects adequately, or even to
consider a whole ' slate' of
projects;
(iv) it would encourage produc-
tion both for national and
niche markets, and produc-
tion with international and
multimedia distribution am-
bitions.
(A) HOW WOULD THE SCHEME
WORK?
The basis of the system would be
the roising of production and
development capital by me(:1ns of
levy on every sector of the
audiovisual industry, in effect
recycling part of the industry's
revenues as future capital. Most
European countries already have
or have hod in the past, such an
approach in a more or less
sophisticated form. Our proposal
would have the effect of develop-
ing and extending it, particularly
to the new media, making it the
recognized basis of support for
all European oudiovisual pro.
duction.
It would be the responsibility of
eoch government, in cooperation
with its domestic industry, to
resolve the means by which its
share ofthe European total should
be met, what its domestic priorities
should be and its method of
allocation. As already noted, we
recognize that in the shift from
cultural protection to a more
market-oriented approach there
will be casualties and national
governments will quite properly
wont to manage that transition in
a way most beneficial to their own
industry.
Our proposed distribution system
creates on opportunity for na-
tional policies to become more
commercially-oriented and itssuc-
cess would, to some extent, de-
pend on nationol governments
sharing and emphasizing this ap-
proach. Our proposals are unlike-
ly to be effective if the underlying
thrust of notional support policies
pulls in the opposite direction to
commercial policies implemented
at European level.
Our choice of a levy system is
deliberate. In the emerging en-
vironment of interactive com-
munications, the technologies of
encryption and disseminationupon which pay-television, video-
on-demand and all forms of in-
teractivity are based will rely prin-
cipally on billing systems in which
individual consumers pay for
what they use from the broadest
possible spectrum of choice. Such
a new market environment lends
itself naturally, and efficiently, to
the implementation of a levy
system.
levies are an essentially positive
spur to continuity of production
and employment sinc:e;
(i) they build on suc:cess; the
greater the revenue, the
greater the capital available;
(in they are flexible: money can be
drawn from every sector and
ploughed bac:k into every .sec-
tor, promoting a more balanc:-
ed industry in which produc-
tion, distribution, exhibition
training, research and
development can all be ac:-
corded a place. In addition
shifts in the balance of total
revenue can be organized '
reflect changes in the opera-
tion of the market.
(8) WHAT WOULD IT DO?
Our concern is that this support
system, in conjunction with our
distribution proposals should
help to create a more balanced
strategy for the whole audiovisual
industry. It would be important to
decide whether to complement in-
ve.stment by the distribution con-
sortia in the exhibition sector with
a proportion ofthe revenue raised
for production support. National-
ly allocated funds might be of par-
ticular benefit to smaller inde-
pendent exhibitors.
It would also be important to set
aside a proportion of the revenue
for investment in infrastructure,
especially training and research.
If, as the European Commi.ssion
White Paper on growth, com-
petitiveness and employment
argues, there is the prospect of up
to two million new jobs in the
audiovisual sector in the next 10
years, then significant investment
in training will be c:rudal, as we
argue in our section on training
below.
The balanc:e of the revenue raised
would then be put into 'production
c:redits , the bulk of which might be
specifically allocated for produc-
tionin the language or languages
of the country itself, whilst the
balance could be specifically
allocated to enc:ourage commer-
cial European joint ventures.8 We
firmly believe that the majority of
c:reative production will, and
should, remain nationally and
culturally specific. The point .is that
he more our production support
system can improve the quality of
such products, the more will be
available for the distribution
system to confidently promote in
transnational and global markets.
We would also argue that a signifi-
cant proportion of these produc:-
tion credits, perhaps 10%, should
be specifically allocated for invest-
ment in relatively high-risk pro-
jects  innovative and experi-
mental work, or projects being
developed by young and untried
talent. Such an approach would
greatly enhanc:e the cultural and
creative energy of the European
industry overall.
8 We have decided to make a dear
distinction here between 'Community pro-
duction' and co-production. We believe
that all productions in which different Euro-
pean partners who are EU nationals par-
ticipate should now be considered Com-
munity productions, and the expression co~
production should be retained for produc-
tions in which partners from outside the EU
participate.
(C) WHAT BENEFITS WOULD IT
BRING?
Such a system would begin to com-
bine the virtues of large-scale in-
dustrial strength with the flexibility
to allow, indeed encourage, in-
dividual States to develop par-
ticular and complementary
strategies for their audiovisual in-
dustries.
The system of production credits
would mean that any production
company of any nationality would
be entitled to receive a  pari-passu
share of subsequent earnings aris-
ing from that production, to be
spent solely on European produc-
tion, however defined. Such pro-
duction credits could include an
adequate element of develop.
ment costs, allowing production
companies a longer-term view of
their future with a level of
overhead permitting them to plan
projects, or even a slate of pro-
jects, over an extended period of
time. Combined with an im-
aginative system of tax write-offs
and other fiscal incentives, this
would help to create a radically
different climate for many Euro-
pean production companies. At
present too many of them are
overdependent on only one pro-
ject at a time, leaving them trap-
ped in a cycle of erratic cash.flow
and short-term planning horizons.
European television makes an
ever-increasing contribution to
cinema, by means of direct sup-
port for film production (often
statutorily sustained) and by ac-
ting as purchaser and exhibitor of
film products. This contribution
should be celebrated and
developed. We think it is logical
and positively beneficial that
television companies investing in
production would be as eligible as
any other producer. It would need
to be decided whether non-fiction
projects should be funded on a
par with fiction, but it is essential
that documentary and animationproducers should be fully eligible
for support. (The submission to the
Think-tank made by the MEDIA
project for the .creative documen-
tary suggests that support for non-
fiction documentary work would
be on important element of a
balanced programme to sustain
European television s range.
Investment channelled in this way
and on this scale should eventually
help in the establishment of
strong, vertically integrated pro.
duction and distribution com-
panies, with production (:entred in
the EU and with the EU targeted
as their home market, although of
course finan(:e could, and should
be attracted from anywhere in the
world, not just within theEU.
(D) THE COST OF IMPlEMEN-
TING THIS STRATEGY
Distribution support
Finance for the distribution ele-
ment of the strategy would
necessarily have to be made
available at the level of the EU and
overseen by .a regulatory body
operating at EU level. If the
distribution network is to provide
viable competition in the market
the consortia which we propose,
when fully developed, would need
to be capitalized at a level of
about ECU 1 billion each.
We would urge the Commission to
initiate a feasibility study with ap-
propriate finandal institutions to
determine the likely gearing effect
between the publicly available
loan capital and capital attracted
through the commercial market.
Assuming this would be of the
order of three to one, then, when
fully operational (a process that
might take some years and would
inevitably be linked to the success
ofthe production support system),
a small energetic group of pan"
European distributors might be
expected to require something
close to ECU 1 billion in soft loans
from the EU. At the end of the
lO-year period, the total amount
of the loan would be recoverable
either in cash, as a share of the
equity in the licensed companies
or as a share in the very con-
siderable library of rights and
films which would have been ac-
cumulated. The expectation
should be that at the end ofthe 10
years this accumulated library,
together with the expertise ac-
quired, and the stimulation of new
European production and sales
should have created the critical
mass necessary to allow the
system to become entirely self-
financing.
Production support
The other arm of our proposed
scheme is direct production sup-
port, made available within in-
dividual Member States, although
a significant proportion of such
support might find its way into
transnational joint ventures. We
propose that this scheme, too,
should have an assured life oflO
years - a sufficient period of time
in which to change the nature of
the production industry in Europe.
We propose a target for the whole
of the EU of ECU 1 billion a year
recognizing that this figure would
take time to achieve and would be
dependent on the commitment of
national governments to support
their domestic industry. To put this
figure in perspective, it would
more or less double the level of
public support, direct and in-
direct, currently going into pro-
duction. Given the growth poten-
tial of the sector, it is reasonable to
assume that some notional
governments would want to set
more ambitious targets of their
own. Indeed, on a pro rota basis
the French system of in(:entives
and support is already running at
a considerably higher rate. Each
Member State would be expected
to raise a proportion of that ECU
1 billion related to its share of the
European audiovisual market. To
base the figure on market share
rather than existing production
strength would have the advant-
age of generating money for ter-
ritories in which little or no produc-
tion currently takes place.
Elsewhere in this report we sug.
gest that the production support
system might be used for a variety
of production-related purposes
but it is worth noting that, devoted
entirely to production, the sum of
ECU 1 billion could greatly in-
crease the number of commerdal-
Iy significant feature films made in
Europe. In addition it could
finance the production of about
1 000 hours of high-quality televi-
sion drama.
This would generate the
equivalent of 8 000 to 10 000 full-
time jobs, produdng a net benefit
to the national exchequers of
Europe of about ECU 100 million
all of this before taking into ac-
count the significantly greater
levels of indirect employment that
would be generated.The essential feature of such a
twin-track system must be its abili.
ty to create commercially attrac-
tive avenues for the industry itself
to exploit rather than cumber-
some and elaborate mechanisms
of defence and control.
We see the production support
element of the scheme as the in-
dustry healing itself, directing part
of its own revenues to improve
production, exhibition, training
and marketing. We see the
distribution mechanism as part of
a larger structural reorientation of
the European economy which
should not be the direct respons-
ibility of the industry itself but
should be supported through
general taxation. Of course, the
support for distribution, being in
the form of loan capital, will be
recoverable and ultimately of no
cost to the public exchequer.
With a commitment of ECU 
billion of publicly-funded invest-
ment in distribution (stimulating
commercial investment of many
times that value) and of about
ECU 1 billion a year in production
support when the system is fully
developed, such a programme
would bring significant benefits to
Europe.
By far the most significant of these
benefits in terms of the overall
European economy would be the
creation of a large and growing
number of skilled jobs.
Other benefits would include:
(i) a reduction in the rapidly
growing USD 3.5 billion au-
diovisual trade deficit with the
USA;
(ii) the opening-up of world
markets to European soft-
ware; and
(iii) the stimulation of a more
dynamic audiovisual market
within Europe.
Identifying the exact level of in-
vestment appropriate to this
strategy could necessarily involve
an almost endless debate. What
, however, beyond debate.is that:
(i) the growth potential of the
audiovisual sector is un-
paralleled by any other Euro-
pean industry of a com-
parable size;
(ii) the sums referred to in this
report are the likely minimum
required if Europe is to ade-
quately compete in the global
market-place;
(Hi) when these sums are sub-
jected to an objective cost-
benefit analysis based on
either employment or econo-
mic potential, it becomes
clear that such an investment
probably represents the very
best opportunity that Europe
presently has to offer;
(iv) the bulk of the investment will
be in the creation of commer-
cial copyrights (analogous to
real estate and, as such, of a
quantifiable and ongoing
value);
(v) the strategic purpose of the
soft loans is to provide a rally-
ing point around which
dynamic European com-
munications companies and
financial institutions can at
last find a means of investing
in Europe s future.
To put this support programme in
perspective, it is worth noting that
the present value of the still-
emerging European pay-televi-
sion market alone is considerably
greater than ECU 2 billion. With
our collective experience in the in.
dustry we are emphatically
agreed that only an initiative on at
least this scale can begin to turn
the tide for Europe. The eco-
nomies of scale that pertain in the
audiovisual industry inevitably
make anything less mere
tinkering.
3. SUPPORT FOR CINEMAS
Even if in the future cinemas repre-
sent only a small part of the in.
dustry's earnings, they will con-
tinue to be of importance far
beyond their immediate commer.
cial value. Cinemas will continue
to remain for a long time the real
showcase of the product on which
the success of the other media
forms depends, in the same way
that feature films continue to be
the locomotive that drives the
whole industry.
Indeed, not only does 35-mm film
continue to be the only truly world
standard of audiovisual produc-
tion accepted on all markets and
has a remarkable capacity for in.
formation (1 picture frame =
4 500 lines), butfilms are what still
shape the collective imagination
and will go on doing so perhaps
for a long time.
Everyone saw how declining
cinema attendance lead to the
deterioration of the conditions of
projection and comfort in cinemas
and their closure at 
unbelievable rate in the 1980s.
Everyone also saw how the major
American companies decided to
invest in the construction of new
multiplex cinemas providing high
standards of comfort and projec-
tion as the only way to avoid a fur-ther foil in ottendance, which in
turn reinforced their power in
Europe.
This situation leads us to propose
that porticular attention be given
to the problem of cinemas, by
starting up an ambitious pro-
gramme to support theotre
management linked to the
distribution of Europeon films
and this in parallel to forms of in-
centive to create pan-Europeon
networks and to encourage pro-
duction as proposed obove.
This programme can act on three
levels:
(0) regulatory,
(b) financiol,
(c) promotional.
(0) At the regulatory level, the
French system could be ex-
tended to Europeon television
stotions. This system consists in
limiting the number of films
broodcost onnually ond con-
fining these films to certoin
days of the week ond certain
hours.
(b) At the finoncial level, par.
ticipotion in lowering rentol
rates, in particulorfor non-na-
tional European films, could
also be considered, while
direct or indirect support
measures such as fiscal
benefits or lower lending rates
could help with the modern-
ization of cinemas and the
construction of multiplexes, in
conjunction with programmes to develop less-favoured
regions.
This financial aid should be
closely tied to the condition of
showing a certain number of
European films.
(c) Finally, at the promotional
level, an effort should be
made, especially by the public
stotions (national or Euro-
pean), to promote Europeon
films. Support should go to
programmes on European
production intended to make
stars more popular (actors
and also directors and other
creative elements of the pro.
duction) as well as to a
substantial reduction in the
cost of trailers for European
films.
4. THE NEW MEDIA FORMS
The multimedia world is often
described as the product of a
technological revolution. The real
revolution however will lie not in
the technology itself but in its rate
of application in the market and in
the imoginative development of
software in all its forms. This report
seeks to make clear our belief that
the strategic shift in our industry
must focus not on technology but
on the product we make, not on
the hardware but on the software
and the means by which it is
distributed and, most important of
all, on the only truly essential
capital asset needed in the cre-
ation of software - human talent.
The market for innovative soft-
ware is great .and growing. The
possession of substantial cata.
logues, the ability to operate flex-
ibly in different media and dif-
ferent markets - to use the unique
qualities of multimedia to the full
will be the hallmark of suc-
cessful competitors in the market.
I n this apparently free-flowing
universe it may seem that our con-
cern with distribution as a key
component is old-fashioned and
misplaced. On the contrary, we
are conscious of the fact that in the
new media environment 'distribu-
tion' will mean less and less the
physical distribution of film and
videotape and will become more
and more a question of
disseminating electronic impulses
in a myriad of interactive con-
figurations through a variety of
cable and wireless systems.
What is clear is that the regulation
and ownership of encryption,
dissemination and billing techno-
logy will be a crucial factor in the
success or failure of the industry.
The European Union will need to
give serious and urgentconsidera-
tion to safeguarding open access
on the one hand, whilst simul-
taneously preventing the abuse of
the near monopoly powers which
such 'electronic gate-keepers' ore
likely to possess. Almost by defini-
tion, these gote-keepers will trans-
cend notional boundaries, mak-
ing it imperative that any form of
regulation is effective ot European
rather than merely nationollevel.
Europe is olready falling behind
the USA in developing a full
multimedia, interactive environ-
ment. US software manufacturers
enjoy 0 for larger domestic market
for their products in this area than
is the cose in Europe. The commit-
ment of the Clinton Administration
to the creation of a national in-
formation infrastructure and to
the unified regulotion of broad-
band operators removing
regulatory duplication and ensur-
ing non-discriminatory access for
service providers and consumers,
demonds on urgent response from
Europe.In addition to the economic con-
sequences, the cultural and social
consequences of open access
would be immense. As US Vice-
President AI Gore recently said,
This is not a matter of guarantee-
ing the right to play video-games.
It is a matter of guaranteeing ac-
cess to essential services.' We can-
not allow Europe to become a
society divided between those
with the economic power to be 'in-
formation-haves' and those who
become 'information-have nots
In the interactive environment it
may be that entertainment 
merely the tip of the iceberg. The
possibilities that already exist for
data-access, public information,
advertising and retailing are
great.
However, it is particularly in areas
such as education, training and
public information that the imag-
inative development of an open
access policy would have asignifi-
cant and potentially profitable
impact.
Schools, news services, local com-
munities, minority groups and
public service information agen-
cies will create new markets, not
only for transmitted programming
but for every form of software, in-
cluding electronic publishing, CD-
I and CD-ROM. We need bold
public policies to facilitate the pro-
cess. The opportunity for enhanc-
ing European cultural and social
values makes this a matter of par-
ticular significance for European
producers, including print-media
companies who are already at-
tracted to the cross-media oppor-
tunities which digitization offers
them. We think it important that
future consideration of cross-
media regulation within the 
should bear this in mind.
One thing is abundantly clear - if
European producers do not fill the
market, others will. .In the USA, for
example, the rapidly growing
base of installed hardware for CD-
ROM is creating a large marketfor
software, with some 1 000 titles
published in 1993. The conditions
are already in place for a repeat
of what has become a familiar
pattern with film .and television
production; namely the size,
homogeneity and vitality of the
US domestic market allows US
producers to amortize their pro-
duction costs at home and
therefore compete on cost with
devastating effect overseas. Only
by maximizing opportunities can
Europe offer adequate competi-
tion to the American industry.
The investment necessary to fully
exploit these opportunities will be
enormous. For example, British
Telecom estimate that to create a
full broadband fibre network (cur-
rently the most likely means of of-
fering full and genuine interact-
ivity and on-demand services),
would cost ECU 18 billion for the
UK alone. Information on such a
system will be by means of elec-
tronic servers, in effect very large
computers or networks of com-
puters, and it will be a matter of
great concern if the majority of
such servers are located outside
the EU. Such systems cannot be
commercially viable on a national
scale. They will require, at the
minimum, a truly European ap-
proach.
The scale of investment required,
and the nature of the technology,
mean that it only makes sense to
understand the whole field of new
media in international and Euro-
pean, rather than national or
regional terms, whether we come
to it as producers, consumers
advertisers or regulators. Already
the industry is organizing itself into
powerful, international and .even
global groups. We believe that the
EU must give serious considera-
tion to speeding up the process of
liberalization, creating open and
non-discriminatory access to net-
works for all users, ensuring fair
and open competition in the provi-
sion and supply of equipment,
programming, services and
delivery, offering full interconnec-
tion between .networks. Such an
approach, boldly pursued, would
maximize the market for products
while minimizing the cost to con-
sumers. It could, in other words,
work to the benefit both of con-
sumers and producers, although
we recogni:ze that the European
Commission may decide, in the in-
terests of social justice, that some
support systems would be
necessary to guarantee equal
benefits to the poorer and disad-
vantaged regions of the Union.
5. NEW SUPPLY, NEW
DEMAND: THE IMPORTANCE
OF CATALOGUES
Mass communication, it seems, is
now a thing of the past. The cur-
rent trend is now one of per-
sonalizing the television supply
and very individualized product
mixes. It is in this way that distribu-
tion can reach the most remote
potential viewer. It is in this way
too that consumption is optimized
as are therefore the procedures
for selling and commercializing
audiovisual products. The tele-
vision supply will have to start
seeking new formats. Instead of
looking for a product that is a mass
success on a national market,
there will be a move towardsextreme fragmentationlrestruc-
turing of the market and therefore
towards speciolized products oim-
ed at well-identified audience
niches on several national markets
whose consumption will be dif-
ficult to ovoid.
From the point of view of the
businessman, the profit-and-cost
ratio becomes more satisfactory, if
not maximized.
The high level of personalization
and dialogue between supply and
consumption leads to the ideo of
interactivity. The viewer can deter-
mine what he wonts to consume.
The individual act of consuming
thus ends up structuring the supply
itself and therefore determining
production at leastto some extent.
The notion of productive con-
sumption thus includes in its
strategy the creation of supply,
with the consumer choosing what
he wants, and how and when he
wants it, among the almost
endless possibilities of an almost
unlimited catalogue.
In this way, the overall number of
television consumers is increased.
The  ma;or  catalogues  of  audio-
visual products
By onalysing the audiovisual sec-
tor from the point of view of
technological innovations, it is
even easier to understand the
chollenges awaiting the Europeon
audiovisual industry.
New technologies are one of the
mairi factors that determine, in the
short-to-medium term the
strategic importance of title pro-
duction. In the general market
situotion that we have ottempted
to foresee for the next few years,
the winner is without any doubt
the information provider or the
programme provider. Among the
audiovisual companies, only
those with extensive catalogues
will be successful.
Naturally, this implies knowing
how to actively use the 'historic
catalogue' and to invest con-
tinually in the redistribution of
already existing products
precisely the some way as the
traditional publisher 'on paper
In Europe, there ore net large
catalogues, except for a few
specialized publishers such as
Rainer Moritz and the public
television services such as RAI
BBC, ARD-ZDF, France Television
TVE, etc. All the other large com-
panies - in general privote com-
panies  stockpile titles that they
buy on the other markets, and
especially from the mojor
American firms which remain in
this way in a dominant position on
our continent and at world level.
This is a major problem that must
be dealt with as quickly as possible
if this immense capital which is the
European audiovisual heritage is
not to be lost.
In the case of television, the bonks
of this heritage are exceptionally
rich. Considering their quality,
diversity, content and number of
hours, they ore probably the
richest at world level, because for
years all European public televi-
sion stations had a very active
policy of producing their own pro-
grammes of all kinds (fiction
news, art, sciences and human-
ities, sports, music, variety enter-
tainment, documentaries, etc.) to
the point that European TV pro.
duction banks are .estimated at
about 1 500 000 hours.
As for the cinema, European pro-
duction represents from the begin-
ning of sound films about 30 000
feoture films whereas it 
estimoted that American produc-
tion does not reach this figure.
This heritage remoins for the most
port unknown, since it has rarely
been shown outside national
borders.
Yet this immense wealth has many
drawbacks. Not only are there no
catalogues (once again we are
faced with a dispersal of titles,
copyrights and negatives among
several countries and among
severo I beneficiaries of copy-
rights), but the quality of the
medium of most of the TV products
makes them short-lived (contrary
to what has occurred in the USA
where since the 1950s, 70% of
prime-time production has been
shot in 35 mm). And finally, most
titles do not have dubbed ver-
sions, because, as observed, the
European products that go
beyond their borders are increas-
ingly rare and are generally
shown in ' art-house' cinemas,
which makes it difficult to obtain
maximum use from them in the
new circuits.To this must be added the lack of
works of a truly international
nature, considering the quantity
of exclusively nationol products
made these past few years. The
moinly low-budget shows that
have been produced recently in
Europe, compared with the high-
value productions which account
for most of the American produc-
tion, reduce their market value.
In contrast, what European pro-
ducts have going for them are the
number, variety and olso the fact
that they have been used so little.
But another danger is awaiting
these potential catalogues. The
profits from what can be on ex-
traordinary source of wealth risks
being capitalized by non-Euro-
pean companies. And this for the
following three reasons:
(i) lack of European companies
with morketing structures and
the necessary resources to
compete with non-European
componies for the acquisition
of rights to use Europe
audiovisual heritage for in-
ternational markets. In other
words, one of the moin risks
for the European audiovisual
market is that non-European
competition not only rein-
forces its capture of European
markets through productions
of non-European origin, but it
also commercializes and uses
the most profitable bonks of
the heritage of European
audiovisual production;
(ii) control by non-European
componies of the main
distribution and production
networks of pre-recorded
audiovisual mediums;
(iii) problems related to the legal
system of intellectual pro"
perty and copyright.
It seems to us therefore that im.
plementation of specific actions
with the aim of saving ond max-
imizing the potential of Europe
audiovisual heritage is extremely
urgent. These actions include:
(i) creating an integrated net-
work and updating invent-
ories of Europe s audiovisual
heritage indicating the
holders of iritellectuol proper-
ty rights;
(ii) promoting concerted action
toiointly utilize catalogues of
audiovisual banks;
(Hi) tax advantages to favour the
conservotion and recovery of
Europe audiovisual heri-
tage;
(iv) classifying the European
audiovisual heritage, or at
least works of special interest,
as part of the historical or ar-
tistic heritage, so that their
protection can benefit from
aid or fiscal benefits. These
works can thus constitute an
exceptional capital asset
which may be reproduced
and used in new catalogues
as is the case today with the
classics of literature, music
and painting. limiting the ex-
patriation of originals of
audiovisual works of an ob-
vious cultural interest should
also be considered;
(v) implementing specific voca-
tionol training programmes
involving two aspects: con-
servation and restoration of
the audiovisual heritage and
optimization of its use and
profitability;
(vi) implementing 0 specific pro-
gramme in this area for Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.
6. COPYRIGHT AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Recognizing and protecting
copyright both moral and
patrimonial, oS well as the other
intellectual property rights, con-
stitute one of the main contribu-
tions of Europeon civilizotion, this
being on essential tool to social
progress and an incentive for ar-
tistic and intellectual creativity.
Effective protection of these rights
and the encouragement of a
powerful audiovisual industry
copable of producing and distri~
buting work which reflects Euro-
pean culture on a universal scale
ore complementary rather than
contradictory goals.
It is a well-known fact that the
development of satellite broad-
casting and cable tronsmission on
a transnational scale had to over-
come serious problems of a legal
nature, particularly in Europe.
These problems had to do with
copyright, or in particular the
non-existence of 0 legal organiza-
tion ofthese broadcasting systems
on a transnational scale, and with
the various ways to tackle the mat-
ter through national legislation.The development of new audio-
visual technologies can lead to a
similar phenomenon, thus wor-
sening the situation of competition
from the industry outside Europe
which will be greater than in the
past. In short, if problems of a
legal nature prevent the distribu-
tion of Europe audiovisual
heritage via the new media forms
it is the non-European cornpetition
that is going to reap the primary
benefit, namely the American
competitors.
Probably most of the problems
resulting from the application of
new technologies will be resolved
according to the general prin-
cipleslaid down by the interna-
tional conventions and legislation
on copyright already adopted by
the EU and the Member States.
Nevertheless, it will probably be
necessary or at least appropriate
to adapt, on the European scale
and with regard to the impact of
the new technologies, not only
legislation but also the contractual
or conventional practices and uses
(e.g. the management of rights by
collective establishments) which
are currently structured on a na-
tional scale according to the tradi-
tional systems of audiovisual cre-
ation, production and broad-
casting.
Our objective should be to en-
courage the distribution of
Europe s audiovisual heritage via
the new technologies in accor-
dance with the fundamental prin-
ciples of European legal
traditions.
7. TRAINING
The most evident paradox con-
fronting the European audiovisual
industry concerns the quality and
quantity of its workforce which
can be summed up as 'too many
and not enough'; - too many
talented technicians with skills.and
working practices which have
been marginalized or simply
bYP9ssed by the pace of
technological change, and too
few writers, directors and pro-
ducers with a so.und instinct for the
needs of the market-place.
Throughout this century superb
skills have been developed in
Europe, in fact some 50% of 
post-war Oscars have been won
by European artists and techni-
cians. However, with the decline
and fragmentation of Europe
film and television industry, this
traditional skills base is looking
seriously inadequate, certainly in
respect of its ability to respond to
the opportunities afforded by the
new technologies and the very dif.
ferent market.place they open up.
In this connection, we believe the
European Commission should
consider ways of bringing
together film and television
schools in the EU with represent-
atives from industry to jointly plan
ways in which the schools might
better serve an industry with such
rapidly changing needs.
The key to a demand-led industry
of the sort we advocate in this
report is a constant supply of
creative and sensitive profes-
sionals with access to training op-
portunities throughout their work-
ing careers. The broader the
talent base within the industry, the
more cost-effective and efficient it
becomes; good training has as
great an impact on costs as it has
on quality and, of course, on the
job satisfaction of those who
benefit from the training. If the
European market creates the
potential for at least a million new
jobs in the audiovisual sector in the
foreseeable future, then we must
recognize that the training im-
plications are vast. A commitment
to growth cannot be taken serious-
ly without a comparable commit-
mentto training. In our proposals.
for production support we suggest
that a significant proportion of our
proposed support package be set
aside specifically for training.
8. EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY
In a peculiar sense, Europe has
allowed itselfto become fixated by
its apparent failure to compete
with the USA in the relatively
restricted province of the feature
film. We all too easily ignore the
fact that European television
(thanks in part to regulatory pro-
tection) remains in relatively good
health. Common sense dictates
that when competing in a growing
market the weaker force should
atternpt to outthink and out-
manoeuvre the opposition rather
than attempt to compete head-on
in the very area where the
discrepancy is greatest.
With this in mind, the global future
for the audiovisual industry con-
tains several sectors which are
remarkably underdeveloped yet
contain a potential for growth
which could come to dwarf the
feature film industry. It is worth
noting that video-games alone
already constitute a bigger gross-
ing industry than feature films.If Europe s education systems
decided to take the possibilities of
audiovisual technology seriously
as a teaching tool they could,
almost overnight, create an inter-
nal market of enormous size, with
the potential to establish a world
lead in one of the largest and most
reliable growth industries of all.
Interactivity offers the prospect of
personally tailored teaching by
means of on-line data services
and by means of CD-I and CD-
ROM to any students, at home as
well as at school, however remote
their geographical location and
however advanced or obscure
their interest. The possibilities this
creates to revolutionize learning,
and teaching, are almost in-
calculable.
In a Europe in which regional
identity and regional culture is felt
to be under some threat partly
because of the globalization of
the audiovisual market the
possibilities of using the strength
and sophistication of that market
to enhance cultural diversity and
wealth should not be ignored.
9. EXTERNAL MARKETS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF
PROMOTION
Just as the expression co-produc-
tion must be retained exclusively
for works where non-European
producers participate, the word
export should not be used unless a
European product goes beyond
the borders of the single market.
This distinction is not simply of a
political nature; it must also have
on operative aspect.
A distinction will now have to be
made between three types of
markets:
(i) the internal market;
(ii) the rest of the European
market in the geographical
and historical sense, i.e. all
the EFTA countries and those
of Central and Eastern
Europe;
(iii) the external markets, from
the richest to the poorest.
To each of these markets must cor-
respond a different strategy.
The role and position of the Cen-
tral and East European countries
for example, which are port of the
some cultural sphere as ours, must
be given particular attention.
The collapse of the Iron Curtain
has enlarged the potential of the
European market. But it has also
weakened the production and
distribution structures in these
countries. The situation being seen
today inside our borders is being
repeated there on a greater scale.
For example, the number of
viewers in Bulgaria plunged from
2 174 000 in 1990 to about
235 000 in 1992. Another exam-
ple is the former Czechoslovakia,
where the bipolarization found in
countries of the EU is even
stronger. In 1991-92, of the 10
films that earned the most, six
were Czech-made, of which two
were at the top of the box-office
list, and four came from the USA.
But a closer look reveals that of
the 40 leading films, 34 were
American films compared with the
same Czech films. And of the 100
top box-office films, there were
only six European films (four
Italian and two French films, in-
cluding  Nikita  which was in 100th
position).
Another example is that of
Hungary where, of the 190 films
distributed there in 1991, 96 were
American, 63 European and 25
notional. Nevertheless, the atten.
dance figures for these films gave
the following results: 84.8% for
the American films; 10.5% for
European films and 2.2% for
Hungarian films. As for box-office
receipts, American films ac-
counted for 90%.
These figures lifted from the
scarce data available, paint a suf-
ficiently vivid picture of the cap-
ture ofthese markets by American
products. Furtherin this report, we
will look at a very important
aspect in a market occupation
strategy whose commercial value
is derisory. In the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe,
distributors have access to
American subproductions for
ridiculous sums. These come from
pirated copies bought for USD
2 000 in Hong Kong or sold at a
cut-rate by American exporters
themselves for less than USD
10 000'
Despite the rampant piracy in
these countries, Europe will
therefore have to think strotegical- .
Iy about occupying these markets
too. This is what Giuseppe Richeri
quite rightly underlines in the text
quoted above when he draws at-
tention to the 'importance ofoccu-
pying systematically all the ac-
cessible market spaces with one
own products, taking into account
the economic volue of each
market but also its geographical
value. The United States has
adapted the selling prices of its
products according to the buying
power of each buyer, with the aim
of being present on each market,
9 Source: ' Donnees generales sur
Europe de I'est', a document prepared by
the SEA containing proposals from Euro
Media (EMG) I:md Societe d'investissement
dans I'audiovisuel (SEI) for a Community
intervention in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.however rich or poor, and cashing
in on what each situation had to
offer
That is what Richeri calls '
strategy of encirclement: if the
American market remains im-
penetrable foro certain time, ef-
forts will go to consolidating posi-
tions on the "easiest" markets,
even if less profitable
. 10
This aspect is too important to 
overlooked. There will therefore
have to be a voluntarist policy to
help European producers and
distributors export their products
to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (which at the mo-
ment only France seems to do)
combined with a cooperation
plan for these countries, taking
advantage, as stated earlier, of
thePHARE and TACIS program-
mes, in order not only to occupy
their markets but also to help their
film-making industries to become
integrated in the community of
Europe which is their natural,
cultural and historical area. Their
infrastructures, experiences and
talents as well as their immense
catalogues and archives truly
deserve this effort of solidarity,
which in the future will have a con-
siderable market value.
10 Giuseppe Richeri (member of the
governing board of the Institute of the
Economy of Medias of Milan and professor
at Unesco with the Autonomous University
of Barcelona) draws our attention to the
fact that the Americans 'have always
adapted the selling prices of their products
according to the buying power of each
broadcaster, with the aim of being present
on each market, however rich orpaor, and
to cash in on what each situation has to of-
fer: they therefore sold an episode of
Oaf/as  at the same time in Italy for USD
50 000 and in Albania for USD 150'
(answer to the questionnaire).
In contrast, capturing the US
market is perhaps the greatest
challenge facing the European in-
dustry. It is not sufficient to say that
this immense market is closed to
European products under the sim-
ple pretext that American au-
diences do not like dubbing or
subtitles. It is certoinly a structural
advantage due to the one
language of their market. But it 
our belief that developing a strong
audiovisual industry in Europe will
sooner or later open the doors of
their markets.
In both the case of the USA and
the case of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, a heavy in-
vestment in dubbing is necessary,
even if it requires different  (we
could even say opposite)
strategies, if we are to reach a
popular audience. With respect to
this, it would be useful to recall, on
the one hand, that about 85% of
the box-office attendance for
American films in Europe (with the
exception of the United Kingdom
and Ireland) corresponds to
dubbed versions 11 and on the
other hand, that in the 1950s and
1960s, some European films and
stars were enormously successful
in the USA.
11 Regarding this, two important points
should be underlined.
1. The Americans have always been very
careful and spent a lot for the dubbing of
their films. For the most important ones,
European directors sometimes are respon-
sible for the dubbing and, in all countries
there are actors under exclusive contract to
dub the main stars.
ln contrast, in most of the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, dubbing (?) is
often by an off-vaice, often alone male
voice. Sometimes for important films, they
use a female and male voice. Multivoice
dubbing is expensive: abovt ECU 3 000
(source: general data on Eastern Europe).
This means that an effort to finance quality
dubbed versions for some of these coun-
tries, for films with a strong commercial
potential, could make European cinema
popular and open these markets.
This leads us to underscore the
importance of promotion ina
strategy to capture markets. A fine
example of this is the lobbying
force which represents the power.
ful MPAA. It could be seen in ac-
tion recently during the GATT
negotiations.
The European industry must
therefore think about organizing
itself also in corporate and lobby-
ing terms. An association .of Euro-
pean producers, receiving strong
backing and playing the role that
the major American companies
play, could serve as an instrument
for the promotion of European
production throughout the world,
which Europe needs to establish its
image and impose its products.
10. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC
SERVICE BROADCASTING
In the rapidly changing
audiovisual environment national
public service broadcasters, until
recently the dominant force in
European television and radio
feel under threat as potentially
underfinanced and marginalized
players. In comparison with the
new commercial cable and
satellite operators their future as
conventional terrestrial broad-
casters seems bleak. However, it is
perhaps too easy to be alarmist. If
we look to the USA, we see a
market in which, despite relatively
long-established cable and
satellite systems, the big terrestrial
networks retain the major share of
the audience (55%) and it 
equally clear that national ter-
restrial networks, many of them
operated by public service broad-
casters, will be a vital part of the
European audiovisual environ-
ment for many years to come.We see the continued health of the
public sector as vital to the range
diversity and quality of the broad"
casting environment as a whole.
We consider there are two fun-
damental issues which must be ad-
dressed in the immediate future if
that prospect is to be fulfilled.
Firstly, the broadcasting market is
becoming increasingly interna-
tional in terms of audiences,
marketing and finance. In the
same way that commercial
operators see their future in inter-
national alliances and networks,
so the public service broadcasters
of Europe must give urgent con-
sideration to pooling their
resources and coordinating their
strengths at European level.
Secondly, as is stated at a number
of points in this report, entertain-
ment is only one, albeit crucial,
part of the emerging audiovisual
world. The possibilities for public
service broadcasters to develop
new and imaginative forms of
genuinely public service in terms
of information, news, education
and leisure interests, and to reach
new audiences through satellite
and cable channels, are vast.
However, they must be allowed a
more entrepreneurial stance and
adequate access to finance 
there are to realize such oppor-
tunities. In this .connection it is
worth noting that many of the
public service broadcasters have
substantial and valuable cata-
logues which are inadequately ex-
ploited either directly in the com-
mercial market, or as an attractive
inducementto alliances with other
producers and distributors.
11.  NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
SYSTEMS OF AID
(A) NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF AID
Throughout this report it has been
seen how too often national
systems of aid have perverted
their objectives and wasted their
resources. Instead of promoting
the image of their countries and
their regions, public funds have in-
stead shut up their production in a
cultural logic that has accentuated
its autarkical aspect, depriving
them of any possibilities of con-
tributing to their underlying ob-
jectives.
The result of this was that their best
creators hod to go into exile in
other neighbouring markets or
left directly for the USA. Those
who remained more often than
not had to content themselves with
mediocre careers where any
talent was not always used to its
full. As Prodoehl said, in the study
quoted above, when referring to
the policy of the  Lander  but that
can very easily be transposed on a
national scale, 'a policy of aid for
cinema designed and practised on
a regional level according to self-
interested calculations must
necessarily remain inefficient and
powerless in face of structures and
problems that have an interna-
tional dimension:
In this perspective, the proper
functioning ofthe principle ofsub-
sidiarity should be ensured in
order to ovoid the often perverse
effects of irrecoverable subsidies
in the case of aid to the industry.
As stated earlier, each State will be
responsible for making its choices
and determining the amount of
national aid that it plans to devote
to discover .and cultivate new
talent, to support the production
that it wants to favour to assert its
national or regional identity or to
fulfil objectives that are particular
and specific to it.
But it will have everything to gain
if a large part of its efforts focuses
on participating in the creation of
real European companies that will
be able to help create a world net.
work of multimedia distribution
that ensures the widest dissemina-
tion for the different national
products.
The States will thus contribute to
renewing the inspiration of the
European creation, preserving its
roots which will ensure the
originality.
12 Until now, the principle of subsidiarity
has been reduced to the.status of a positive
norm. The governments have used this  too
often to take the authority to decide in their
own favour and to limit the Commission
scope of intervention.
A global strategy for the audiovisual sector
requires a more complex and more
dynamic concept of this principle. It must
no longer be limited to defining roles but
also to defining the division of tasks.
If, from the point of view of positive law, the
principle of subsidiarity acts on the roles,
the definition of strategic objectives implies
a definition of the programming tasks and
priorities, in contrast to this positive and
neutral concept.
This principle must especially be used in a
dynamic manner to continue program~
ming objectives and be an instrument to
optimalize the division of functions rather
than a passive cost of the division oflabour.The pooled European public aid
must also adopt renewed forms
and mechanisms that favour a real
market economy and that are
adapted to the nature and si:ze of
the pon-European networks.
These in dude tax incentives, soft
loans or credit guarantees with
financial backers (bonks, capitol.
risk funds, etc. covering a
reasonable share of the investors
risks. 13
(B) THE EUROPEAN PROGRAM-
MES AND FUNDS
In addition to the TWF Directive
Europe has three other in-
struments for its audiovisual
policy: the MEDIA programme
and the Action Plan, which are
initiatives of the Commission, ond
the Council of Europe s Eurimages
fund.
If there is real political will, the
rapid development of program-
mes like Eurimages and MEDIA
to accompany the necessary
strategic chonges should not raise
major objections.
13 See footnote 7.
. The  Eurimages  fund
In the case of Eurimages, if the
goal to be achieved is to support
productions that should reach the
market, it seems reasonable to
foresee the replacement of the
rule of three co-producers with the
possibility of one or even two of
the partners being distributors
covering different territories. The
percentage of aid that would be
granted to him or them (50% of
the 'credit' for ~xample) would co-
finance the production but in the
form of a 'guaranteed minimum
security for the supported film
projection in dnemas.
In addition to the advantage of
ensuring from the beginning the
distribution of films on several
markets (which is not the case to-
day), this logic would enable the
producers to retain as much as
possible the originality and ambi.
tion of their projects, resorting to
European financing without
necessarily having to go through
the cumbersome agreements of
co-productions  which pushes
up the cost price of the products
and increases the division of
rights. It is indispensable for the
producer and the director (who
together form an inseparable
whole) to be able to choose freely
the people with whom they want
to work, regardless of their coun-
try of origin, instead of being
obliged to take them there where
the logic specific to the co-produc-
tion imposes them.
. The  MEDIA  programme
likewise, the MEDIA programme
would have to dearly decide
whether it wants to remain the
ambulance programme
whether it wants to assert its role
as an instrument of industrial
policy, without that requiring the
long procedure of amending the
decision of the Council of
Ministers.
The programme could then go
beyond its centre of gravity
towards the creation of pan-Euro-
pean networks of distribution and
commercialization capable of in-
tervening upstream in production.
It could also accentuate a trend
already demonstrated by several
of its projects, of giving priority to
the structural reinforcement of
companies and the conditions of
their rational management so as
to favour on their part a more in-
tegrated activity, instead of pro.
ductions on a case-by-case basis.Strategically, MEDIA could
prepare the ground for the im-
plementation . of the new policy
that should be devised now to
coordinate the actions of the ex-
isting 19 projects in the sense of the
new strategy proposed. It would in
this way be the ideal instrument '
manage the transition
In particular, greater attention
could go to reinforcing semi-bonk.
ing practices by specifying in a
more demanding mannerthe con-
ditions for the repayment of loans
and advances on receipts, using
also in a more .systematic manner
credit guorantees. These reduce
ovaiIable funds while making the
beneficiary of the guarantee
responsible in a more effective
manner ond involving the private
financial sector more in the financ-
ing of audiovisual productions.
As for training actions, they could
take into greater account the
value-added' to the industrial ac-
tivity of the beneficiaries.
The Action Plan
Finally, there is, at the European
level, a third progromme of aid for
the audiovisual sector that has a
higher budget than the first two
mentioned: ECU 228 million. This
is the Action Plan for the Introduc-
tion of Advanced Television laun-
ched in 1993.
It is of course too eorly to assess.its
impact. Nevertheless, it can
already be noted that it has en-
abled breoking the political taboo
which existed for a long time and
which said that the Community
must not directly provide aid for
the production of programmes.
It will also be noted that the
objectives that justified this direct
intervention by the Community
are essentially of an industrial
nature. It remains to be hoped thot
the aid of the Action Plan will ac-
tuallybeused in order to help en-
sure the continuation of European
catalogues by .significantly .sup-
porting the production of 'stock'
programmes ond not only the pro-
duction of ' flow' programmes
which are necessarily more
transient.Cinema was born in Europe 100
years ago. In the course of this
century, our countries put their
creative talent and capacity of in-
vention to the service of the mo-
tion picture industry. Currently,
with 350 million inhabitants, the
European Union has the largest
audiovisual market in the world in
terms of consumers and ranks se-
cond in terms of sales turnover. If
we add that it is a market whose
consumption, between hardware
and software, according to the
projections of the White Paper is
going to double by the end of the
century, increasing from ECU 23
billion to ECU 45 billion, one can
see the size of what is at stake if
these two words are successfully
combined: Europe and audio-
visual.
Yet our film production is in crisis
our television stations in a state of
confusion and our telecom-
munications companies are com-
plaining that they cannot begin
competing as they would like with
an expanding world market. How
could this apparently paradoxical
situation have come about? And,
what is even more important, how
can it be remedied?
(On the eve  of  the first centennial  of cinematography)
The authors of this report, profes-
sionals working directly or in-
directly in the European film and
television industries, were asked
by Commissioner Joco de Deus
Pinheiro to ' make recommenda-
tions on the audiovisual policy
guidelines ... that can foster the
debate on a few options for the
future
We agree on one point: it is our
firm belief that the European
policy that has been followed has
not succeeded in detaching itself
sufficiently from national policies
that have tended to place more
emphasis on supply rather than
demand, on producers re-
quirements and not enough 
what the consumer wonts, instead
of adopting, as was proclaimed in
1962 in a memorandum on the
Community action programme for
the second phase, 'a common
policy containing constructive
solutions at the Community level'
Our industry has become defen-
sive and inward looking whereas it
should have shown itself confi-
dent, innovative and open. If we
learn to consider it as an invest-
ment vital for the future  both
from the economic and cultural
point of view  it can become a
gratifying source of success.
We have taken as the subject of
analysis the audiovisual industries
as a whole. We are convinced that
it is only by adopting this global
approach that we will be able to
find solutions adopted to the new
challenges. It has become obvious
over the past few years and
according to the experience of
other markets, that in terms of
industrial logic and consumer de.
mand, the film must adapt and
integrate the power of television,
and in turn, television must adapt
and integrate the power of the
telecommunications and com-
puter industries.
In this report, we have tried to
establish a global strategy in
order to better link these new com-
ponents in the future. For this, the
art of images and sounds must no
longer be exclusively linked to the
cinema, in the same way that the
film is no longer exclusively linked
to the cinema theatre. For this, we
must see the creation of powerful
companies, based in Europe and
no longer isolated inside their na-
tional borders, capable of in-
tegrating the various components
at the level of production and
marketing, the only way for them
to be able to adapt with success to
the formidable revolutions loom-
ing on the horizon.
Without this European dimension
that is lacking, our millions of small
companies will be at the mercy of
the major upheavals that are to
come: weak and fragmented, theywill not be able to meet the
planetary challenge of com-
munication.
We are proposing here a series of
measures to be implemented 
the course of the next 10 years to
arrive at a strategic transforma-
tion of the European industry. The
dimension of the investment re-
quired is considerable, but the
consequences will be even more
so. What is at stake is the potential
value of a dynamic industry
c:apable of providing a new range
of services and creating a large
number of highly qualified jobs on
a continent that is suffering from
profound structurol unemploy.
ment. What is also at stake is one
of the most powerful rneans to
reinforce our cultural identity,
made up of a rich linguistic variety.
We believe that this unique com-
bination of economic and cultural
imperatives makes the audiovisual
sector one of the rnostimportant
of our time. We believe that the
free expression of European talent
and its energy can bring aboutthe
rebirth of an industry whose
market potential will make it a
world leader and enhance the im-
mense diversity of European
culture.
We sustain the view .in this report
that our industry must undergo a
strategic tronsformation to make it
more competitive and above all
more attentive to consumer ex-
pectations. But we also believe
that the European Commission
also needs to change its approach
to the audiovisual industries, giv-
ing rnore attention to the changes
needed at the fiscatlegislative
and regulatory level to encourage
its development. We are convey-
ing in this report our observations
on the present and future role of
DG X in this respect, but we
rec:ognize that by asking us to
analyse the entire audiovisual sec:-
tor, and particularly its potential
for the creation of new jobs, the
Commission recognizes, following
the White Paper, that it is also
aware of the need forthis strategic
transformation.
The decision to prepare a Green
Paper on the audiovisual sector
which will serve as a basis for
widespread consultation of Euro-
pean professionals and agents,
coming offer the GATT negotia-
tions and the Mons declaration
gives us hope.
In spite of this, we note that
despite itsimportanc:e as a major
industry which is capable of
employing two million people in
the European Union until the year
2000 - ond which according to
the White Poper con easily double
this figure 'provided that growth
translates into jobs in Europe and
not into financial transfer from
Europe to other continents - the
audiovisual sector has until now
only deserved very little attention
in terms of public sector invest-
ment policies.
Analysed nevertheless in the light
of costs and benefits and par-
ticulorly in terms of impact, it of-
fers a lot more possibilities than
other industries, such 
ogriculture or automobiles, and it
has a much greater potential for
growth. Furthermore, our sector
is undergoing rapid structural
changes and being reoriented ot
both the cornrnerciallevel and at
the level of research, and even
more important at the level of
vocational training and retraining
of its manpower.
We have therefore assigned
ourselves the task of suggesting
woys for the Europeon
audiovisual industry to go from a
policy of resistance to a policy of
suc:cess. And according to this
analysis, it becomes clear that:
(i) the nature, kind and quality
of production will chonge in
the new world of multimedia;
and
(ii) the means of distribution will
change too.
In the immediate future, two
strategies are needed. These are:
(i) to make more commercially
successful products and in
particular, with a power of
pan-European and interna-
tional attraction;
(ii) to facilitate their distribution.
A two-dimension proposal, the
result of our debates, is nec:essary:
a system of incentives for the cre-
ation of distribution networks
which, in practice would help put
more European productions on
the market, a system that would
go hand in hand with a system of
direct support for production to
help put new products on the
market. Our intention is to res-
pond to a vital need of any in-
dustry: more market for our pro-
ducts ond more products for our
markets.
One of the great weaknesses of
film and television produc:tion in
Europe results, as already stated
repeatedly, from the fact that of
the 500 films produced eac:h year
only a small percentage is com-
petitiveon the European market
and virtually does not exist outside
Europe. Nevertheless, with its 350
million inhobitants, Europe is the
largest market in the industrialized
world. An industry that succeeds
in generoting a production going
beyond national borders andreaching at least 350 million
viewers transforms the dimension
of its own economy. Further, in a
market currently dominated by
American productions, the conse-
quences atthe cultural level would
be immense: if today only the
American products have succeed.
ed - and that is the greatest
paradox  in bringing together
the European audience (with
cinema, it can be said that if
Europe has a common film culture
it is that of Americcm films), one
can imagine to what extent the
audiovisual sector could become
the ideal instrument to consolidate
the process of European integra-
tion.
In a year s time, more precisely on
28 December 1995, cinema will
be celebrating its first centennial.
It was in Paris that the lumiere
brothers for the first time showed
an amazed audience the re-
production of the moving world.
This invention, which they called
cinematography', and which they
predicted would be short-lived
hos become a century later, with
the folly of a Melies or a Griffith
the most wonderful machine man
has ever invented to tell stories. It
has made generations dream for
a century on all continents.
Between that day long ago ond
the world of today where inter-
activity and 'virtual reality' make
possible all Utopias, it is never-
theless the same desire that
presides over the manufacture of
images: to tell stories, to take whot
is imaginary for reality.
Europe has excelled in this for cen-
turies, but todoy it looks like it has
lost its energy and ability to creote
myths and share them.
The first centennial of cinema has
a challenge for us: it is up to us to
decide whether we are sadly go-
ing to relegate it to the museum or
whether, on the contrary, we are
going to celebrate the rebirth of
an art thot, though it has changed
means, has not change its nature.MICHELE COTTA
In a brief presentation below are a
few ideas which I believe are the
most important in the inquiry that
we conducted into.thefuture ohhe
audiovisual industry and the cir-
culation of works in Europe. These
ideas are all found in the joint text
that we prepared. The differences
between .us are apparently subtle.
1. Television and cinema are in-
dustries, even if the directors,
creators, the ideas people, their
trade unions and their defence
groupings do not want to take this
dimension of the problem into
account.
The fact remains that while this
aspect is given priority in the USA
Australia and South America and
while Europe refuses to accept this
elementary phenomenon, Europe
is losing out and perhaps faster
.than it thinks.
2. Aid for the film industry and
production is not a substitute for
everything. It does not give talent
to a creator who has none. And it
sometimes leads to the opposite
goal sought, namely by keeping
some producers artificially alive or
by increasing the shortcomings of
a local film or television produc-
tion, without universality and
therefore incapable of reaching a
transnational audience. It has
sometimes encouraged a disper-
sal of production, the self-cen-
tredness of creators and an
atomization of distribution, thus
creating or reinforcing an addi-
tional difficulty of circulation.
3. What I believe is most impor-
tant in the TWF Directive is to
organize the effect of any profits
from the different channels
(general, specific, coded, hert-
zian, cable or satellite as well as
future pay-per-view or video-
on-demand channels) on produc-
tion. For this, it seems necessary to
define a minimum proportion of
the station s sales turnover, or, if
one prefers, the station s pro-
gramming budget, for investment
in production. Compared with
these vital and necessary obliga-
tions of fresh production, it seems
to me that setting broadcasting
quotas is no longer relevant,
although it may be preferable to
leave them for an interim period.
In my view, instead of bending
over backwards to enforce a
regulation which the broadcasters
go out of their way to disobey, the
different regulatory authorities in
Europe should mainly concern
themselves with compelling the
different operators to produce.
The problem of prime-time televi-
sion would virtually be solved if
this were done. The broadcasters
would quite naturally programme
during the most important viewing
hours the productions that have
cost them the most. This is the case
in France where production
obligations have in a way played
the role of regulating prime time.
4. Generally speaking, I believe
that our text examines the pro-
blems posed by audiovisual pro-
duction and its dis.tribution in
Europe, which is normal because
that is what our group of experts
was asked to do. But these pro-
blemsare never, or almost never,
addressed from the viewpoint of
the broadcaster. Yet broadcasters
are the ones responsible for
preparing the programmes,
balancing budgets, managing
countless production and pro-
gramming constraints, and they
do all this with a view to satisfying
television viewers, which is after
all their main purpose. Were an
audiovisual conference to 
organized between the report and
the publication of the Green
Paper, it would not be a bad idea
to find out the point of view of
some of these broadcasters
without considering that they are
against regulation.ENRIQUE BALMASEDA
In addition to personal talent, the
history of European culture is the
result of the balance between the
market or free competition and
encouragement by the State.
That the non-European audio-
visual industry has .a dominant
position in the transnational
distribution sector in this conti-
nent, and throughout the world, is
indisputable. And a dominant
position implicitly carries the risk
of that dominant position being
abused. The European Commis-
sion and the Member States
should certainly pay special atten-
tion and vigilance to the defence
of competition in the oudiovisual
sector. However, defining the
specific cases of action and con-
duct thot should be prohibited is
the job of the organizations or
bodies that are legally responsible
for that purpose, and I therefore
do not consider myself qualified to
give general opinions that might
prejudge actions or conduct con-
trary to free competition by
specific sectors or companies.
At the same time, much of the best
in the history of cinema
throughout the world is the result
of cooperation between the film-
makers and industries on both
sides of the Atlantic; it produces
the interrelation between their dif-
ferent cultures. Recovering and
strengthening that long and fruit-
ful tradition should be a priority
objectiveforthe immediate future.
But the European Union and its
Member States must not under
any circumstances reject one of
the most unmistakable European
signs of identity; making available
without imposing externallimita-
tions the public resources and
means necessary to encourage
equality of opportunity in terms of
access to culture and education
for all their citizens, in order to en-
courage social integration and
communication between their
peoples, and, at this historic time,
to consolidate the process of
building a united Europe. And we
should not forget that the
audiovisual sector is today, and in
the future will be even more, a fun-
damental means of achieving
these ends, which are so obviously
of common interest.
GAETANO STUCCHI
The only industry that does not
tend to the future is one that has no
future.
But that is not the case of the film
industry and television, which on
the contrary have a great future in
common, at the heart of this
universe of communication which
technological innovation is going
to revolutionize in the years
ahead.
The numerical networks that are
going to cover the plonet (the
mythical 'information highways
bring us closer every day to
Utopian science-fiction stories;
human beings will live increas-
ingly less in a physical celestial
body and increasingly more in a
virtual double of earth where the
natural environment will be com-
munication, language, represen-
tation and whose matter will be
the infinite circulation of messages
in numerical form.
The quantity and quality of each
individual' s symbolic consump-
tion will be regulated by the
availability of time, money, needs
and temptations. But at the centre
of this new personalized and
perhaps interactive communica-
tion are the image and imagina-
tion which are going to retain their
role: one as a basic unit of the
planet's only real universal
language (what Pasolini called
real language ), the other as the
superb and unique machine of
dreams and knowledge which
takes us beyond the limits of
physical experience.The apocalypse will be the day
when on the virtual globe
highways' only anonymous bits
and functional inputs travel; but
this kind of nightmare still appears
far off, like the silence of the im-
aginary world or the death of
poets.
I believe rather in the industrial
and political protagonists of this
future when they talk about the
competitive edge of the product,
content, software, and therefore
of the players (over the gate-
keepers) who have the carriers of
bits and images, on the one hand,
and (over the service-provider)
the organizers of the supply of
products and services, on the
other.
Audiovisual works and those who
know how to invent and manufac-
ture them (creatures and en-
trepreneurs, the last jobs that will
remain for people in the third
millenium) will have everything to
gain from the establishment of a
real audiovisual industry at world
level such as in our European
market. 'ihe magic word 
market', but there are no markets
without companies, the main
players and factors of any market.
What we need in Europe are
audiovisual companies capable
of stimulating the movement of
European works . at continental
level, in all the profitable distri-
bution channels possible (net-
works and mediums), and in all
communication formats and
technological standards (services
and products), for a maximum
number of recipients and income.
It is of the utmost importance
therefore, that the image people
tend to the future. New
technologies are our chance and
challenge.
PETER FLEISCHMANN
Unlike the Europeans, the
Americans have never forgotten
that the feature film is the heart
and motor of the audiovisual pro.
gramme industry. Without the
training machine of cinema, a
country can neither reach the top
form of its pr~grammeindustry
nor the constant innovation that is
also necessary. It is only in the film
industry that myths are created
which become collective dreams
and enter into the history of a
people. When we have solved the
problems of the feature film, the
rest of the problems dogging the
audiovisual programme industry
will resolve themselves almost on
their own.
As European films in recent years
did not have a large enough ex-
ploitation market, European film
production was only possible on
the basis of subsidies. We agree
with the economic incentive finan-
cing  in the form of complemen-
tary measures - with the goal 
creating a pan-European market
for our projects and thereby
gradually cutting back on the sub-
sidies.
The European market became,
potentially, the largest film market
in the world after the fall of the
Iron Curtain. The markets of other
continents will also have to open
for us if we are to win this market
back for our films.
The members of the Think-tank
have shown a great deal of com-
mitment in their search for
possibilities to get the flagging
European film industry up and go-
ing again.
Personally, I believe that the
measures proposed by the report
of the Think-tank require an addi-
tional element if they are to be
realized in order to help all of
those who can or will not par-
ticipate in the planned consortia.
Measures to increase the market
share of European films in the
cinemas and television channels
of the Community is an Appendix
to the report.DAVID PUTTNAM
This independent Think-tank,
established by the European Com-
mission, has offered a unique op-
portunity to sketch out a strategy
for the future of Europe
audiovisual industry. To have the
privilege of being one of its
members has been to gain a new
perspective on the challenges that
face us. At our first meeting we
agreed that our task was to point
the way forward from 'cultural
defence to industrial success
I n that context we have attempted
to set out a .series of coherent,
mutually supportive proposals
which might, over a 10-year
period, achieve fundamental
shifts in our industry.
We want to see:
(i) An industry driven by an ob-
jective commercial logic, free
from what Wim Wenders
calls the 'lethargy of subsidy';
(ii) an industry which is genuinely
responsive to the choices
made by European con-
sumers, and which they feel
reflects their lives, their ex-
perience and their aspira-
tions;
(Hi) an industry which can
challenge .and inspire the
creative ambitions of those
who work in it; and
(iv) finally, and most importantly,
the audiovisual sector must
be placed, once and for all,
at the very heart of the Euro-
pean economy - recognized
as a key industry of the future
as well as a priceless cultural
asset - a source of millions of
skilled jobs and of substantial
earnings, both within Europe
and in wider markets beyond.
We have gone some way in on at-
tempt to sketch that picture of the
future and only time will tell with
what degree of success. The
report now passes out of our
hands and into the hands of the
European governments and of the
industry itself.
We have concluded that we have
a gpod story to tell. But doe.s our
script do justice to it? Perhaps the
plot is not as clear as it might be.
Possibly the narrative lacks
energy: the conclusion may not be
strong or clear enough to suffi-
ciently inspire and excite our au-
dience. Perhaps we have been in.
sufficiently rigorous in identifying
exactly who that audience should
be, and have failed to give the
marketing and presentation ofthe
project the priority it so desperate-
ly needs.
All of these concerns are painfully
familiar to the European film-
makers.
Have we created something which
will only play to a minority au-
dience on the fringe circuits of
Europe or have we a story which
will reach the audience we need to
attract if we are to achieve real
success? I n addition to the power-
ful multinationals that control
much of Europe existing
audiovisual industry, that au-
dience necessarily includes the
bankers and financiers who
already invest heavily in the
American industry but not 
Europe. It would be ridiculous not
to take account of the telecom-
munications companies with the
investment potential to wield in-
creasing influence in the
audiovisual markets of the future.
We must also reach those
Hollywood majors who already
dominate many sectors of our in-
dustry and have the power to at-
tract the best talent that Europe
has to offer. It goes without saying
that our audience must include the
governments of Europe. last but
not least, we have to convince
those who work in our industry.
Perhaps we have been guilty of
allowing ourselves to fall back into
our old habits examining the
reasons for past failure, in
preference to the challenging op-
portunities for future success.
What is clear is that those oppor-
tunities exist and so too do prac-
tical policies which can help us to
make the most of them.
Here, at least is a workable draft
script. It is a script which in 20
years timesorneone will take out
of a dusty drawer and say, 'Why
didn t we do something with this?
Maybe it could have changed
everything.
Or is it a scriptthat Europe has the
commitment and confidence to
put into production now?ANT6NIO-PEDRO
VASCONCELOS
In 1968, following the Langlois af-
fair in which Andre Malraux (who
in the m~an time had become
Minister for Culture under 
Gaulle) had opposed the
manag~ment of the found~r ofth~
Cinematheque franc;:aise, Truf.
faut, Godard, l~louch and many
oth~rs boycotted the Cann~s
Festival which they accused of.ser-
ving the industry and not the
directors.
In May 1968, the Viet Nom war
protest Gu~varrism and the
Cultural Revolution were in the air
and the film industry also seemed
to hav~ chosen the road of
freedom by identifying the enemy
in American imperialism.
That same year, Jean-Claude
Batz, in a symposium organized in
Brussels, ~xplained the European
deficit with American cinema
which he attributed to the dif-
ferenc~s in our distribution
systems, with a concentrated and
planetary system in the USA and a
dispersed and local system in
Europe. He went on to say that
that was where the Community
(which at thattime was made up of
six member countries) had to
focus its efforts and means.
Heproposed, that national aid for
production in the form of subsidies
gradually be phased out and
replaced by a system of credit
guarantees which instead would
play an inc~ntive role.
Batz was wrong to be right too
soon. Thetimewasnotrip~forthis
kind of reformist talk. Today one
realiz~s that by identifying the
universal message of American
films with its imperialist model of
domination, the film-makers who
had come from all parts of the
world to demonstrate in favour of
Langlois at the Palais de Chaillot,
refusing to hand over their films to
anyone but him~ had found a fam-
ily. But, by wanting to break the
American model, preventing it
from being applied to his future
works, they threw out the baby
with the bathwater.
I belong to that generation and
for a long time shared his illusions.
Yet, a quarter of a century later, I
must recognize that the events
show that Batz was right. What is
most important is that today we
see that his proposal was the one
that would have given creators the
most opportunities.
It is my profound belief that only
by contributing tothe.creation of a
multiple network of transnational
and multimedia distribution for
our products will we be able to
turn around the catastrophic
situation of our industry and put
an end to the growing unpopular-
ity of our audiovisual production.
Being by definition transnational
whereas production must remain
the domain of individuals and
preserve its cultural references,
distribution must b~ the priority of
public investm~nt by th~ EU:
distribution of all kinds of
audiovisual products on all kinds
of m~diums and on all kinds ofter-
ritories, even if films and cinemas
remain th~engine that arouses all
th~imaginations and opens all th~
markets. A European distribution
network is the only way for the in-
dustry to achieve the necessary
critical mass and economies of
scale indispensable for becoming
comp~titive and for European
creators to have an int~rnational
marketing instrument that can
mak~ their messages universal.
The Americans did it better than
we did, to the point of taking ad-
vantag(i;, of it. However, it is not
by making them the eternal
scapegoats of our powerlessness
and our frustration but by r~ward-
ing talent, merit, risk and success
that European cinema will once
again regain its energy potential
and wealth of creativity.ANNEX 1
QUESTIONNAIRE
Aware of the extent of the prob-
lems confronting the European
audiovisual industry at the end of
this century, Commissioner Pin-
heiro has decided to prepare a
Green Paper on the crisis currently
facing this sector. A lorge-scale
consultation of those concerned
by this situotion will also be
organized.
A working group hos been ap.
pointed to droft the document. Its
members include David Puttnam,
Enrique Balmoseda, Peter Fleisch-
mann, Michele Cotta, Gaetano
Stucchi ond myself os President.
The group tosk will be to
diagnose the crisis and propose a
new strategy of intervention by the
European Union in this area that
restores the confidence of the sec-
tor s economic agents ond allows
them to ochieve all their potentiol
in the prospect of the single
market.
The first phose of work will consist
in toking stock of the key problems
which enable the identificotion of
the oudiovisual sector s areas of
chronic weakness.
It is for this purpose thot we would
like to set forth a few elements of
onolysis and ask you a certain
number of questions. Your con-
tribution and your opinions ore
very importontto us, regordless of
the guidelines olreody laid down
by the working group.
1. Nobody will contest the fact
thot Europe needs to project its
own image, which means creating
self-sustoined audiovisual in-
dustry that is popular and com-
petitive.
With its morket of 350 million in-
hobitants, 0 production volume
larger than that of the world'
lorgest film"making power, the
USA, a long trodition of non-
documentory films ond a great
wealth of talent, Europe enjoys in-
calculable potential for the cre-
ation of 0 powerful and com-
petitive oudiovisual industry.
Nevertheless the European
public is consuming more and
more Americon products, with the
commerciol system inevitably nor-
rowing its freedom of choice
becouse of the inobility to imple-
ment on adequate common policy
and an industriol strategy copoble
of responding to the dispropor-
tionote growth of demond for
products which followed the policy
of deregulotion, and which will
grow even more with the increose
in the number of television
stations.
In fact, the lack of economic ra-
tionolity ofthe Europeon system of
production and distribution,
which is too spreod out and pro-
tected from the market instead of
being integrated in it, leods
economic agents  producers,
distributors, cinema operators,
broadcasters - to prefer investing
in American production or in the
purchose of its products.
This flight of copital, but also of
ideas (the sale of scripts replocing
film exports) and talent worsens
the trade deficit with the USA,
which has today become
unbearable.
What concrete  measures ~
financiat  fiscat  reg.ulatory 
do  you suggest to  establish 
coherent system  at  European
level that has  stimulating ef-
fect  for  the development  of 
audiovisual industry that 
rationally organized that
satisfies public demand .and
that  is  again competitive 
world  level (making it possible
to  keep  our  talent and  restore
investor confidence)?
2. The non-existence of 0 Euro-
pean production industry of world
dimension prevents the creation of
pon-Europeon distribution net-
works. But in turn, the absence of
transnotional marketing channels
makes the large-scole ap"
pearonce of products for the inter-
nationol morket difficult, increas-
ing fragmentotion and further
weakening the Europeon audio-
visuol industry, 0 prisoner .of this
vicious circle.In this context, what conditions
must  be  satisfied and what
measures  have to  be  adopted at
national and Community level to
strengthen the European com.
panies and encourage them .to
develop pan-European strategies
of  production and  commer-
cialization?
3. Despite the public, national or
Community systems of financial
assistance, Europe has shown
itself to be incapable of fighting
the crisis and stopping the .decline
of the European film industry with
the public. These systems of aid
have until now mainly been used
to offset market deficits and as a
substitute for private capital in-
stead of focusing on the develop-
ment, by companies, of pan-Euro-
pean structures and encouraging
the improved competitiveness of
European audiovisual works.
However, the European audio-
visual industry will not be viable
until it is able to sustain itself
which is along way off at the mo-
ment. The problem facing the
public authorities therefore seems
to be that of redefining their in-
tervention: how can a system of
assistance be replaced by a system
of support for growth and
regulation?
What.do you think are the main
side-effects positive or
negative  of the current
systems of support, whether na-
tional or European, in light of
the unification of the European
market and what  measures
need  to  be taken  to  boost the
ability of companies in the
audiovisual sector  to  compete?
4. The European audiovisual
landscape is characterized, as
seen above, by a lack of large
marketing channels which
therefore makes it very difficult for
audiovisual companies to define
integrated strategies to recoup the
cost of audiovisual works through
different markets and the various
mediums of distribution.
In this context, the companies are
strategically unable to consider
the 'European market', and not
the ' national market', as their 'in-
ternal market, thus reducing their
ability to recoup costs 'domestic-
ally' and therefore to export
audiovisual products.
When the products manage to
cross borders, this strategicinabil-
ity generally leads them to
marginal distribution channels of
art and testing, thus preventing
them from reaching the large dub-
bing markets which can
guarantee them greater
distribution.
(a)  What conditions do  you
think would enable Euro-
pean production and
distribution companies to
consider  at  the strategic
level the European market
and noT national markets 
the domestic  market?
(b) What  measures  should be
taken now  to  encourage
European companies 
want  to  capture inter-
national markets, especial.
Iy American and Asian?
(c)  Considering the fact that the
countries of Central and
Eastern Europe are more or
less inevitably going to
become  part of the Euro-
pean audiovisual area
what forms of collaboration
or economic cooperation
must there be  to  assimilate
their markets and also  to  in-
tegrate the creative capa-
city, the industrial and pro-
fessional structures and the
experiences of these  coun-
tries into the European
audiovisual industry?
5. The behaviour and attitudes
towards the diversity of languages
and cultures in Europe have more
been factors of resistance and
consolidation of the fortress men-
tality of national, and even
regional, identities than factors of
enrichment for the creation of a
single market.
Whereas American production
has standardized the European
public, European products are in-
creasingly confined to their own
national markets. This results in a
further trend towards bipolariz-
ation of the European market be-
tween national products and
American products.
In terms of distribution, language
is not an obstacle to the univer-
salizationof consumption. In face
of a market divided by the large
number of languages spoken
American products are released
either dubbed (especially in the
so-called 'large' countries) or sub-
titled in the national languages.What  measures do you  recom-
mend  so that  languages and
nationo/ indeed regional
cultures  stop  being elements 
resistance  to  the development
of a  European industry  that  in-
corporates  all the cultures but
focuses  on the universality  of  the
creation?
6. The television without frontiers
(TWF) Diredive hos posed a cer-
tain number of problems, which
mainly have to do with the dif-
ficulties the Europeans themselves
have in applying the legislation
(resistance on the part of non-
Europeons is rather understand-
able). Europe s public and private
stotions have shown difficulties in
meeting the prescribed levels of
broodcosting of Europeon works
ond of supply of progrommes with
independent producers.
These difficulties are dromatically
indicative of the problems facing
European countries in defining
policies aimed at strengthening
the audiovisual industry on the
European level. The current crisis
seems to fovour centrifugal
behaviour where economic
agents, with a short-sighted view
to survival, prefer playing the card
of Americon produds and
Joponesecortoon films, which are
more profitoble in the short term
but suicidal in the long term for
their independence.
How would you assess the TWF
Directive and what regulating
measures do you recommend
to  better coordinate the in-
terests  of  the various sectors 
the European audiovisual in-
dustry  public and private
broadcasters independent
producers, multimedia groups
and even the interests 
distributors, video publishers
ond box-office circuits com-
pared with the chronology 
the distribution?
7. In the fromework of the trade
rules concerning the integration of
audiovisual adivities, one of the
main problems focing the politicol
ond regulotory bodies is com.
pliance with the fundioning of the
various economic areas ond the
ottention given to the effects of
distortion on trade through the
practices of economic agents with
so-called 'dominant' market
positions.
Sofeguording competition, which
implies the balance of morket
forces and the ability of operators
to ad with outonomy, is thus one
of the objedives of the European
oudiovisual areo. This holance
concerns the relationship of in-
dependence of independent pro-
ducers with the forge economic
groups ond broadcasters, on the
one hand, and cooperotion bet-
ween national companies and
multinational componies, on the
other.
(a)  What regulatory measures
do you consider urgent 
ensure the autonomy 
operators on the markets
and the rational coordin.
ation of  their activities with
regard to:
the function  of  producer
and broadcaster?
the status  of  distributor and
programmer  of cinemas?
multimedia groups and in-
dependent produce~?
the 'European champions
of  the electronic industry
and SMEs throughout
Europe (raw materials re-
cruitment  of  skilfed labou~
subcontracting, localiza-
tion)?
(b) Whot do  you  think are the
economic  or  structural
obstacles  to  the  emergence
of pan-European  com-
panies  acting  in the global
market?
(c) What  kinds  of  alliances 
incompatibilities do you
believe should  be  promoted
or  ordered between the
various sectors in order 
prevent horizontal  or  ver-
ticol concentrations to  in-
crease competition  in  the
single market and  to  favour
the ba/onced development
of  competitive European
conglomerates  at  world
level?
8. New technologies playa major
strategic role in the contemporory
industrial system. They first of all
help mointoin high levels of
employment, especially for the
highest performing ond best poid
jobs. They have very significant
collateral effects in the other sec-
tors and thus contribute to what is
considered the ' welfare of no-
tions . New technologies in the
eledronic industry are going to
impose a revolutionary change on
the industriol system, determining
the obsolescence of today
materiols, the new industriol
policies ond constituting the
essential fador of employment in
the coming years.To the extent that it directly
responds to the critical alteration
in hardware, the audiovisual in-
dustry is one of the ' strategic sec-
tors , closely linked to the develop-
ment of new technologies. The
audiovisual industry will thus play
a determining role in the services
industries for employment and
added-value activities.
Already magnetic tape and op.
tical fibres transformed the
audiovisual economy in the 1970s
and  1980Si  today, they are going
to lead to a new revolutionary
deregulation in this sector, with
pay-per-view, video-on-demand
and interactivity.
Nevertheless, while this tech-
nological progress increases
supply and improves the quality of
distribution, it threatens to worsen
the dependence of European pro-
duction on the outside instead of
representing new possibilities
because of the lack of production
and marketing strategies incor-
porating atthe European level the
various distribution mediums.
(a)  What do you think are the
main consequences  of  the
technological transformations
that are affecting the services
industry in the audiovisual
field?
(b) One  of  the concerns  of  the
Commission  being 'to manage
the social effects  of  the
technological transformation
(see  Document  15/88, Oc-
tober  1988),  how do you  see
the changes in the European
audiovisual industry with
regard to the current
technological revolution and
what kind  of  regulatory
measures do you propose to
ensure the so-called' manage-
ment  of  its social effects
Antonio-Pedro Vasconcelos
Lisbon December  1993ANNEX 2
Measvres to increase the
market share of Evropean films
in the cinemas and on the televi-
sion channels of the Commvnity
European films' market share of
the revenue from cinemas of the
European Union has almost con-
tinuously declined in all of the
Member States over the last 
years, with the market share of
non-national European films faIl-
ing even more rapidly than that of
indigenous films (see Table 1).
Over the last decade, the States of
the European Union had all tried
to protect their national industries
through support measures, with
the result that today, almost ex-
clusively, only indigenous and
American productions are pro-
grammedin the countries of the
European Union. The market
share of non-national European
films is minute in the European
market. (The 22.5% share of non-
national European films in Spain is
an exception brought about
through rigorous legislation. In
the .other countries of the Union
the share of non-national Euro-
pean films amounts, on average,
to 4.5%.
At the same time, the market of a
single European State has become
too small to recoup the increasing
costs of making a film. As a suffi-
ciently large home market (which
can only consist of the market of
several European countries) is ab-
sent, the financing of European
films has become extremely dif-
ficult without reliance on sub-
sidies.
We must therefore carefully
develop well-thought-out strat-
egies to create a pan-European
market.
These strategies should stimulate
the development of trans-Euro-
pean distribution structures for
European films as well as an im.
provement of the inadequate
financing structures for European
film production; they should also
envisage measures for a better ex-
ploitation of European films in
European cinemas. Apart from
the frequent absence of popular
appeal, the poor showing of Euro-
pean films in European cinemas
can be explained, among other
things, by:
(i) the block-booking system to
which the major American com-
panies have made European
cinemas agree;
(ii) the ever-increasing number of
release prints with which the ma-
jor companies launch their films;
(iii) the lack of a marketing con-
cept and inadequate budget for
the promotion of European films;
(iv) a lack of information for the
exhibitors and audience about
film-making in neighbouring
European countries.
Admittedly, there are a whole
series of cinemas that show
40-50% European films (in Ger-
many, this is approximately 100
out of 3 600 screens), but these
screens are mainly in the worst-
equipped cinemas that show
European programmes in a kind
of market niche as they cannot get
the top American films.Table I
OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET SHARES OF EUROPEAN FilMS (NON-NATIONAL PLUS INDIGENOUS)
IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE UNION
(see 1993  Media Salles European Cinema  yearbook)
It should be noted when looking at
these statistics that a few suc-
cessful home-market films (mostly
unexportdble local comedies)
make up a considerable percen-
tage of the indigenous market
share.
The following proposals stem from
three theses:
(1) The proposed measures are
incentive finandng.
As European films do not have a
large enough market, European
film production is only possible on
the basis of subsidies. We agree
with the Americans that this must
chdnge and thus drgue for a con.
centrated economic incentive
financing in the form of com-
plementary measures - with the
aim of creating a pan-European
market for our projects and
thereby gradually reducing the
subsidies.
(2) Our efforts will concentrate
initially on the European
market.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain
Europe became, potentially, the
largest film market in the world.
We need to export our films to
other continents if we want to
widen the market for our films.
(3) Our efforts are concen-
trated largely on the feature
film.
Unlike Europeans, the Americans
have never forgotten that the
feature film is the heart and driv-
ing force of the audiovisual pro-
gramme industry. Without the
training mechanism of cinema, a
country could neither reach the
summit of its programme industry
nor achieve the constant innova-
tion thdt is also necessary. It is only
in the film industry that myths are
created which become collective
dreams and enter into history.
When we have solved the prob-
lems of the feature film, the rest of
the problems dogging the
audiovisual programme industry
will sort themselves almost on their
own.THE PROPOSED
MEASURES
1. INCENTIVES FOR
DISTRIBUTION GUARANTEES
ON A EUROPEAN LEVEL
As a transnational European
distributor for European films has
not existed until now, the following
measures are proposed to
stimulote the formotion of a group
of national European distributors:
1. If at least four distribution
companies from different Euro.
peon countries (including at least
two countries with alorge produc-
tion capacity) ore prepared to
give distribution guarantees for a
Europeon film project, the Euro-
pean Union will double these
distribution guorantees.
1.2. The Union will olso give a
gront for prints and advertising to
the distribution componies for the
films' supported under Section 1.
in each cose this will amount to
25% ofthe distribution guorantee
provided by them (35% for non-
notional European films), but no
more than 30% ofthe octual prints
and advertising costs (50% for
non-notionol European films).
3. The distribution companies
should acquire the rights for
theatricol and video production in
their countries. The distribution
com ponies should commit
themselves to launching the sup-
ported films in their country of
origin at the some time. They are
also required to coordinate pro-
motional meosures to the greatest
possible extent so that the film
receives a unified ' imoge' (joint
front-of-house stills, joint press
stills, posters, trailers, etc.). The
distribution guarontees (private
ond public) will be covered from
the box-office revenues (the
degree to which the privote
distribution guorantee share will
have priority in recoupmentwould
have to be discussed with the
distributor). The video revenue
would be used to cover
unrecouped guarontee takings.
1.4. Packages consisting of several
film projects, in addition to in-
dividual projects, con also be
funded.
5. After two years, the minimum
involvement of countries pro.
viding distribution guarantees
should be raised from four coun-
tries to five; after four years to six
countries. This should encourage
lorger national distributors to ex-
tend their activities to several
European countries or to join with
other national distributors.
2. REDUCTION OF FILM
RENTAL CHARGES FOR
EUROPEAN FILMS
1. Both film projects and com-
pleted European films should be
presented ot previews for Euro-
pean exhibitors, with the costs
being shored by the Union.
2. National distributors should
attemptto obtain ploy guorantees
from their territory s cinemas for
European projects before produc-
tion commences.
3. The European Union would
stimulate such agreements by
enabling the reduction of the film
rental chorges for these films in the
form of incentive financing. The
distributors .could then hire these
films out at a rate that is 7% below
the usual percentage goal (9% for
non-national European films). The
difference would be met by 
coordination office of the Euro.
pean Union.
2.4. Producers of the projects
presented at previews should at-
tempt to interest public and
private TV stations in their territory
in a pre-sale of the broadcast
rights. The European TV stations
ore called upon by their govern-
ments to participate in this
measure to strengthen the Euro.
pean cinema to the best of their
ability.
In order to stimulote such pre-
sales the Union is prepared to dis-
count these contracts until the
broadcast of the film by the TV sta-
tion. The producer would bear the
financing costs until the pro-
gramme material is delivered.
Then the Union will bear the costs.
The contracts must be honoured
by the television stations two
months before the premiere, and
ot leost 30 months after delivery of
the progromme material.
N B: Distributors, who have paid 0
minimum guarantee for a film pro-
ject, should possibly have the
chance to ocquire the broodcost
rights instead of a TV station, os a
forced division of rights could
hove a negative effect.
In this cose, however, there should
be a fixing of minimum percen-
tages  related to the project' budget for distribution
guarantees ond TV pre-soles.5. An orgcmization .such as Euro
Media Garantie (EMG) must be
equipped with the necessary
means to be .able to provide:
(a) interim financing of existing
contracts;
(b) remaining financing in the
form of 0 minimum guorantee for
pending wodd rights;
(c) the conclusion of a delivery
guarontee which is adapted to
European financing structures.
3. CREATION OF A NETWORK
OF EUROPEAN CINEMAS
1. All Europeon cinemos can
become members of this Euro-
pean cinema network.
A condition is that the exhibitor
commits himself to progromming
at least 35% European films (in-
cluding at least one third non-
notionol European films within the
next five years).
This will be calculated occording
to the number of screenings in a
cinema (the screenings in 011
screens will be calculoted for a
cinemo with several screens).
Another condition is the obligo-
tion to join a Europeon computer~
elided informotion and accounts
system for the purpose of greater
transparency.
2. The cinemas will be members
of the 'Stars of Europe' network os
long os the cinemos meet their
obligotions each yeor.
3. The members of the 'Stars of
Europe' network will be provided
with computer terminols for the
computer-elided information ond
accounts system free of charge by
the coordinotion office for as long
as they are part of the network.
Table II
FINANCING MODEl
Exomple: A film with a budget of ECU 6 million % of  budget
3.4. In addition, the members of
the network can opply for credit
for the modernization of their
premises. This credit will be
granted in porticular, for the
following investments:
of screen and . renovotion
seating;
. renovation of projection ond
sound syst~rn;
.renovotion of heoting/air condi-
tioning;
lobby ond . renovation of
sanitary facilities;
. installation of subtitling or dub-
bing system;
. installation of computer-elided
box-office;
. installation of new technologies
in the film sector.
The credit will be granted after the
applicotion has been accepted by
the coordination office. The level
of support must not exceed 70% of
the total volume ond must not be
greater than ECU 100 000. The
applicotion should contaIn the
following information:
. description of the present stote
of the cinema;
. description of the plonned in-
vestment;
. costs/finance plan;
. declaration of ogreement with
the following conditions for the
repoyment of the credit:
the credit will be granted ot a
fovourable rate of interest and is
to be paid bock within three years;
the payment of interest will be
suspended for eoch year the ex-
hibitor meets his obligotion (35%
European programming);
where the cinemo con provide
evidence after four yeors of an
overage progromme share of
40% Europeon films, it will be
relieved of the requirement to
repay the outstanding credit.
NB: The criteria drafted by the
Council of Europe serve here for
the definition of 0 European film.5. A fund should be established
for larger investments or for new
building projects. Experts from the
coordination office should check
the investment plans on the spot
and advise those responsible for
the fund. The credit, which can be
granted in this case, should not be
restricted but should not exceed
70% of the volume of investment.
The granting of the credit should
be dependent, among other
things, on the level and duration of
commitment which the investors
are prepared to undertake for the
showing of European program-
mes (Le. credits for 10 years for a
commitment to 35% European
programme share; interest ex-
emption for the years where the
commitment is met).
When deciding to grant credit
special emphasis should be given
to the use of new technologies
(e.g. interactive cinema, etc.
New constructions or total
renovations of cinemas in the
economically weaker regions of
Europe could possibly be under-
taken with support from the Euro-
pean Regionol Development Fund
(ERDF).
6. Members of the network can
take port in a campaign for
customer services.
Those coming to the cinemas in the
network should be ohle to collect
discounts each quarter in the
same way that the big airlines
reward foithful customers via the
Miles & More' campaigns.
At the beginning of each quarter,
the cinemo-goers receive a pro-
gramme card ot the box-offices of
these cinemas with the names of
the Europeon films showing in the
region. The card will be date-
stamped by the cinema each time
they go to one of these films. If
they have seen at least eight Euro-
pean films by the end of the
quarter, they will then receive a
membership card to the ' Stars of
Europe' club, which will entitle
them to 0 reduction of 25% on the
price of a cinema ticket. Then, if
they see at least eight European
films in the next quorter they will
receive a silver club card with a
35% discount and then a gold club
cord with a 35% discount for the
cordholder and companion.
The club cards are chipcards
which give the owner a discount
for the next eight performances
and allow the cinemas linked to
the coordinating office to invoice it
for the discount.
7. The members of the ' Stars of
Europe' network receive regular
information from the coordination
office via their terminals about the
range of European films on offer
about the programming and per-
formance of European films in the
vorious countries, and about
events, festivols, etc.
8. The members of the ' Stars of
Europe' network con also fake
part in previews of European films
that are specially orgonized for
them.
4. MEASURES TO SUPPORT
PROGRAMME VARIETY IN
EUROPEAN CINEMAS
4.1. These measures include the
restriction of the number of prints
for theatrical release in the
cinemas of the Union.
An upper limit should be put on
the number of prints per film and
per country so that the screen
capacity is not blocked by a  few
large films.
In Germany, two yeors ago, the
distributors promised to introduce
a self-imposed restriction not to
strike more than 250 prints per
film, but to date this has not
materialized.
The Think-Tonk therefore proposes
that the Union sets upper limits for
each Member State, e.g. 250
prints per film for both Germany
ondFrance, and correspondingly
less for the other States.
2. The financial support granted
by France ond Germony to
cinemas in small communities
(20 000 inhabitonts and less) by
subsidizing the release prints for
small communities should be
maintained. The Think-Tank even
proposes thot the other Member
States should follow France and
Germany example to keep
cinemas in small communities
alive.
It is true that a large proportion 
these prints will be struck for
American films, butthis should not
be 0 major obstacle since the
American films are also required
to pay cinema and television
levies.
The subsidized release prints for
small communities are not part of
the restricted number of prints.
However, it must be guaranteed
thot these prints are used ex-
clusivelyforthe intended purpose.3. The cinemas in small com-
munities can receive grants for
local promotion (advertising
hoarding above the cinema,
advertising material for the foyer,
adverts in the local press, advertis-
ing on local radio stations, invita-
tions to directors and actors, etc.
A fund with ECU 4 million annual-
ly, i.e. ECU 20 million in five years,
should be made available for this.
404. The possibilities of financing
new construction or reconstruc-
tion of cinemas in the poorer
regions of the Union with the aid
of the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) should
be explored.
5. IMPLEMENTATION .OF THE
MEASURES
5.1. Since, in recent years, a large
proportion of the offices of the
European film organization has
proved to be both inefficient and
costly, the implementation of the
outlined measures should be con-
centrated in two institutions.
2. A cinema coordination office
will be responsible for the com-
puternetwork, the previews, the
modernization of cinemas, in-
cluding new construction projects,
the club cord system and the pro-
motion costs for cinemas in small
communities.
3. A film finance service could
assume responsibility for all other
measures as they have an
automatic character: increase in
the distribution guarantees, pro-
motion grants, reduction in film
rentals, interim financing of ex-
isting contracts, delivery
guarantee and world rights
guarantee.
SA. In addition, an information
office (possibly within DG X) could
collect and evaluate the data on
all the supported films and pro-
duce a common professional press
service providing information
about the supported projects and
their results.
5. This information office
should, moreover, help with the
creation and financing of a TV
magazine programme that will
report regularly about European
cinema and be broadcast
throughout Europe by European
TV stations (see Appendix 1: the
Cinemagazine' project of the
European Audiovisual Centre
Babelsberg).
6. OTHER MEASURES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
1. In addition to the measures
proposed here, funds should he
made available for:
(i) the inclusion of Central and
Eastern Europe in the pan-Euro-
pean film market (see Appendix
2);
(ii) the development of program-
mes for the new audiovisual
technologies (see Appendix 3).
7. NATIONAL MEASURES FOR
THE SUPPORT OF
PRODUCTION/HAR MON I ZATION
OF HOLDBACK PERIODS
1. The European governments
are requested to introduce the
French system of support funding
which has an automatic
character and has proved to be ef-
ficient  throughout the Union.
Moreover, the film levy which the
French Government imposed on
Canal Plus should apply to all pay-
TV stations in the Union.
2. Regional and national fund-
ing as well as funding from the
Union can be spent throughout
the Union.
3. The term 'co-production' will
no longer he applied within the
Union. If several producers pro-
duce a film jointly within the
Union, it will be known as a joint
European production, regardless
of whether the producers are from
one or several countries.
7 A. The holdback periods for the
individual forms of outlet (cinema
pay-TV, video, TV, satellite, etc.
must be standardized throughout
Europe.
8. THE COST OF THESE
MEASURES
1. INCENTIVES FOR THE
GRANTING OF DISTRIBUTION
GUARANTEES
To support approximately 80 films
per year with an average budget
of ECU 7.5 million would give a
production volume of ECU 600
million per annum.
If we assume that distributors from
several European countries will
each give a minimum guarantee,
and that these minimum
guarantees together cover .ap-
proximately 25% of a film
budget, then the European Union
would double these minimum
guarantees. Thus, 50% ofthe pro-
duction costs would be covered in
return for theatrical and video
rights in approximately four Euro-
pean countries.25% of 0 production volume of
ECU 600 million gives a totol of
ECU 150 million. Estimated losses
of 40% of this total would give an-
nual costs amounting to ECU 60
million, i.e. for five years a total of
5 x ECU 60 million.
2. COSTS FOR PRINTS AND
ADVERTISING GRANTS
30% of ECU 300 million:
ECU 90 million
3. REDUCTION OF FILM
RENTALS
The box-office revenue of 011 Euro-
peon films is currently about ECU
600 million. Approximotely 12%
of the films produced in the Union
find 0 distributor in several Euro-
peon countries. Assuming that this
percentoge will increose to 30%
thanks to the proposed measures,
the Union would be faced with
costs amounting to 8% of ECU 180
million, i.e. ECU 14.4 million per
annum or, within the period of five
yeors, a total ofECU 72 million.
8.4. INTERIM FINANCING OF
PRE-SALES BY TELEVISION
STATIONS FOR EUROPEAN
FILM PROJECTS
A production volume of ECU 600
million per onnum results in a total
volume of ECU 3 billion for five
years.
If pre-sales controcts ore signed by
Europeon TV stotions for an
average 25% of the production
costs, this would omount to con"
tracts worth ECU 750 million.
If the Union wants to stimulote ac"
tivity by providing interim financ-
ing for these contracts, then 0 bor-
rowing charge of 5% and term of
30 months would result in 750 x
12.5%, i.e. ECU 93.75 million.
5. INTERIM FINANCING,
DELIVERY GUARANTEE AND
WORLD SALES GUARANTEE
For these services, an organiza-
tion like EMG would have to hove
a stort-up finance of approxim-
ately ECU 100 million over five
years for 0 production volume of
ECU 600 million per annum.
6. PREVIEWS FOR EXHIBITORS
Contributions to the costs: ECU
million per onnum, i.e. ECU
5 million over five years.
8.7. COMPUTER NETWORK
According to the Media Solles
yeorbook, there are approxi"
motely 10 600 screensin opproxi-
mately 10 300 cinemas in the
Union.
If we assume thot 2 500 cinemos
with approximately 4 000 screens
will toke port in the 'Stars of
Europe' campoign ond that the
cost of a terminal can be set at
ECU 3000, then we have 2500 x
ECU3 000, i.e. ECU 7.5 million
plus ECU 1 million for the soft-
wore, for the central computer in
the coordinotion office and for
possible interstations, e.g. in the
individual notional exhibitors
ossociations.
5 million ECU
0 million ECU
Toto I costs 8.5 million ECU
8. MODERNIZATION
CINEMAS
If we ossume thot opproximotely
2 500 cinemos with opproximote-
Iy 4 000 screens will take port in
the 'Stors of Europe' network and
thot 80% of these, i.e. 2 000
cinemas, will submit appJicotions
for credits of an overage ECU
80 000 to modernize their
buildings, 0 credit volume of ECU
160 million emerges.
The costs to be met here by the
European Union are:
(a) Interest discount
With credits over five years and 0
rate of interest at 6%, the total in-
terest would amount to ECU
14 400. If we work under the
assumption thot 90% of the bor-
rowers fulfil the criteria foro dis-
count in interest, this would mean
1 800 borrowers x ECU 14 400 in-
vestment discount, i.e. ECU 25.
million.
(b) Cancellation of the last credit
instalment of 20% from ECU
80 000, i.e. 16 000. If we ossume
that 75% ofthe borrowers fulfil the
criteria for the cancellation of the
last credit instalment, then we
reoch on amount of
1 500 borrowers x
ECU 16000 ECU 24.00 million
Totol costs for
these proposals ECU 25.92 million
ECU 24.00 million
ECU 49.92 million
+ 10% ad-
ministration
fee
Toto I costs
ECU 4.99 million
ECU 54.91 million9. NEW CONSTRUCTION
AND COMPLETE RENOVATION
OF CINEMAS
If we take an investment of ECU
500 million and borrowing .of 70%
of this sum, this gives a total bor-
rowing of ECU 350 million. If one
supposes that 75% of the bor-
rowers will fulfil the conditions
outlined in Section 3 for a reduc-
tion in interest, then this will give us
a total borrowing of ECU 262.
million. With a credit over 10 years
and reduction in interest of 4%,
the costs incurred would be ECU
57. million over five years for
these reductions in interest. In ad-
dition, there are administrative
costs of 10% so that the Union
would be faced with costs of:
ECU 57.60 million
+ 10% ad-
ministrative
costs
Total costs
ECU 5.76 million
ECU 63.36 million
10. CLUB CARD SYSTEM!
DISCOUNTS
If the cinema-goers see eight films
per programme card in a quarter
they will then receive a discount of,
on average, 30% for the next eight
films. If we base our calculations
on an average ticket price ofECU
5, then the cost, i.e. of discounts
for eight films will amount to:
eight films x ECU 1.5, i.e. ECU 12
The following costs would be in-
curred for the five years of the
campaign:
1st year:
system
setting up the
2nd year: 30 000 club
cards x ECU 12 = ECU 3.60 million
3rd year: 400 000 club
cards x ECU 12 = ECU 4.80 million
4th year: 50 000 club
cards x ECU 12 = ECU 6.00 million
5th year: 600 000 club
cards x ECU 12  = ECU 7.20 million
Total costs ECU 21.60 million
+ 10% ad-
ministrative
costs ECU 2.16 million
+ 10% materials!
chipcards  ECU 2.16 million
Total costs ECU 25.92 million
11. PROMOTION COSTS FOR
CINEMAS IN SMAll COM-
MUNITIES
Expenditure of ECU 4 million per
annum should be mode available
for this, i.e. over five years:
ECU 20 million
8.12. COSTS FOR THE REGISTRA-
TION AND INFORMATION
OFFICE AND PRESS SERVICE:
5 x ECU 800 000
ECU 4.00 million
Costs for ' Cinemagazine
12 x ECU 75 000
x five years  ECU 4.5 million
Total ECU 8.5 million
Total costs for the proposed
measures:
over a period of five years
ECU 841.94 million
plus
Costs for the extension of the Euro-
pean market to Central and
Eastern Europe over a period of
five years
ECU 260 million
(see Appendix 2)
Costs for the support of program-
mes for the new technologies over
a period of five years
ECU 300 million
(see Appendix 3)
Peter Fleischmann
Babe/sberg,  March  7994OTHER
MEASURES
1. ' CINEMAGAZINE'  - A
TELEVISION MAGAZINE ON
EUROPEAN CINEMA
The Babelsberg European
Audiovisual Centre suggested to
ARTE, ZDF and other European
film-makers the creation of a
television magazine on European
cinema with a view to:
(i) stimulating the interest of
viewers in European  cinemaj
(ii) making film events, artists
and directors of the various
countries better known in
neighbouring countriesj
(iii) helping to rediscover an
essential and glorious history
of cinema which is little known
by the younger generation 
as preparation for 1995,
when cinema will celebrate its
first 100 years;
(iv) and finally, to use this
magdzine to help win back
the European market for our
films.
At the Centre s initiative, a group
of European directors, brought
together by the FERA, discussed
this project for the firsttime during
meeting of film directors in
Viareggio from 1 to 3 October
1992.
On 2 and 3 October 1993, the
Centre invited European directors
and officials from ARTE and ZDF
to discuss the possibility of carry-
ing out this project as well as the
structure and content of such d
magazine.
The following people met at the
Babelsberg studios:
. Jean Rozard, Hans-Robert
Eisenhauer, ARTE
. Heinz Ungurcit, Hans Peter
Kochenrath, ZDF
. JOQO Correa, Jacques Deray,
Costas Ferris Peter Fleisch-
mann, Denis Granier-Deferre,
Robbe de Hert, Pavellungin, Et-
tore Scola, European directors
. Martin Blaney, Screen Interna-
tional.
Unanimous
reached on:
agreement was
(i) the need for such a maga-
zinej
(ii) its length: 60 minutesj
(iii) its periodicity: monthly;
(iv) its start-up date: 1 January
1995 (a pilot film and two
thematic films must be pro-
duced in 1994);
(v) its goal: to stimulate the
distribution of European films
in Europej
(vi) its content: to talk about
cinema in an enthusiastic
way, focusing, but not
exclusively, on European
cinema.
The following proposals were
made:
(a) the magazine should be dif-
ferent from other film magazine
programmes currently broadcast
by European channels which are
directly linked to the release of
new (mostly American)  filmsj
(b) the magazine should present
and make popular the work of ac-
tors and creative artists; it should
inform about current movements
and trends in European cinema
talk about one-off but significant
film events, and recall the
historical importance and richness
of European cinema which, half a
century ago, was the most impor-
tant in the world;
(c) the first year of the magazine
(1995) should be closely linked
with the commemoration of the
first 100 years of cinema;
(d) film directors and officials from
ARTE and ZDF should cooperate
closely on the making of each pro-
gramme;
(e) the programme should be
made on the .studio lot itself, in
order to generate a creative
framework around the meetings;
(f) under the direction of one ARTE
official, a different director or ac-
tor can take charge of each of the
programmes;
(g) those who have participated in
making the programme will pre.
sent the programme to viewers
themselves. They could be film-
makers, actors, producers, jour-
nalists, heads of film archives, or
members of comparable profes-
sions such as writers, painters,
scientists, etc. but all of them must
be fired by the same passion for
the cinema;
(h) to give the programme a more
direct and dynamic chdracter, it
would be good to have non-pro-
fessionals in the round-table
discussion. It was proposed to go
to European secondary schools
and select groups of pupils who
are particularly interested in
cinema and are prepared to
broaden their knowledge of Euro-
pean cinema. These groups could
be chosen through competitions
organized by the film and tele-
vision trade press;(i) the structure of each individual
programme should be simple
although thereoughtto be certain
permanent features to help
develop a recognizable image.
For example, one proposal from
John Crome was:
10 minutes: 'News' (What's new
in European cinema?)
20 minutes: 'Off the wall' (round-
table interviews and/or program-
mes on selected themes)
lS minutes: 'Profile' of a move-
ment, actor, film-maker, etc.
10 minutes: 'Cinema s first 100
years
S minutes: on film politics (distribu"
tion, finance, GATT, meetings)
2. EXTENSION OF THE
EUROPEAN MARKET TO
CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE
The Amerkan majors provide the
cinemas of Central and Eastern
Europe with their best products.
They pay for prints and advertis-
ing as well as the dubbing for
these films and offer the films at
greatly reduced minimum
guarantee.
There are hardly any large com"
panies in Europe that can make
similar offers. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Union should intervene with
support measures to get access to
the markets of Central and
Eastern Europe for European
films.
Funds needed: approximately
ECU 12 million per annum, i.
over a period of five years
ECU 60 million
The prerequisite for this is transpa"
rent accounts. Therefore, the
cinemas of Central and Eastern
Europe wonting to programme
European films should be linked
up to the European computer net-
work of the cinema coordination
office. The computer terminals
should be made available to these
cinemas at no charge.
Funds needed: approximately
ECU 10 million
Moreover, European companies
should receive support from the
Union if they embark on joint ven-
tures to become co-owners of
cinemas in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
As in Western Europe, the support
should be given in the form of
credits for the modernization of
the cinemas, with a reduction in in-
terestforthe years where a.certain
percentage of European films was
programmed. The same should
apply for the reconstruction of
cinemas by the joint ventures.
It is proposed that, as part of the
modernization the European
system lC Concept should be in-
troduced for the cinemas which
join the network of European
cinemas, as the sound systems 
these cinemas will have to 
renewed in any case and this
system allows the screening of
prints in different language ver-
sions. The versions could either be
produced in the country itself or at
one of the West European produc-
tion centres.
Funds needed for modernization
meaSures: approximately ECU 18
million per annum, i.e. over 
period of five years
ECU 90 million
It is proposed that a cooperation
programme for joint East-West
productions be established in
order to stimulate the growing
together of the film markets of
Western, Central and Eastern
Europe.
Funds amounting to approxim-
ately ECU 20 million per annum
should be made available for this
programme, i.e. over a period of
five years ECU 100 million.
3. NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The new audiovisual technologies
are on the advance. The few Euro-
pean hardware manufacturers in
this field are poorly equipped for
the impending economic competi-
tion, although they are, in part
the fore of technologkal develop-
ment with their prototypes. They
should be supported in their
efforts.
The production of programmes
for these new technologies has
been largely neglected in Europe
until now. The professional pro-
gramme manufacturers - largely
scattered and almost all, without
exception, having to cope with
economic difficulties - feel it is too
much for them to experiment in
this field. Smaller extremely
capable and highly motivated
high-tech programme manufac.
turers keep their heads above
water with contracts for industrial
advertising and are not financially
strong enough to carry out ex-
perimental productions. The
research ministers of most of the
European countries do not con-
sider themselves responsible for
the production of software.
It is, therefore, a matter of urgency
that the European Union should
provide funds to support the pro-
duction of experimental program-
mes for the new audiovisual
technologies.
According to our calculations, at
least ECU 60 million per annum
i.e. ECU 300 million, forthe period
of the next five years, should be
made available.Figure 1
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Monday 100
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Friday 100
Saturday 74.4 25.
Sunday 100
USA Europe France
Monday 88. 11.7
Tuesday 31.1 41.7 45.
Wednesday 19. 80.
Thursday 19. 80.
Friday
Saturday 74. 25.
Sunday 75. 24.4UNITED...I(INGDOM
BBC USA Europe
Monday 100
Tuesday 30. 69.
Wednesday 100
Thursday 100
Friday 33.4 66.
Saturday 31.5 68.
Sunday 30. 69.
BBC2 USA Europe
Monday 100
Tuesday
Wednesday 100
Thursday
Friday 100
Saturday 29.4 22. 47.
Sunday 24. 75.
ITV (Carlton) USA Europe
Monday 100
Tuesday 100
Wednesday 58. 41.7
Thursday 100
Friday 92.
Saturday 28. 71.1
Sunday 100
Channel USA Europe
Monday 23. 76.
Tuesday 36. 63.
Wednesday 14. 85.
Thursday 37. 62.
Friday 23. 76.4
Saturday 100
Sunday 35. 64.
BSkyB(Sky One) USA Europe
Monday 100
Tuesday
Wednesday 100
Thursday 80. 19.
Friday 89. 10.
Saturday 100
Sunday 65. 34.4SPAIN
TVE USA Europe Spain
Monday 22. 77.
Tuesday 24. 77.
Wednesday 19. 80.
Thursday
Friday 19. 80.
Saturday 100
Sunday 36. 63.
TVE2 USA Europe Spain
Monday 100
Tuesday 59. 40.
Wednesday
Thursday 53. 46.
Friday 29. 70.
Saturday
Sunday 100
Telemadrid USA Europe Spain
Monday 47. 52.4
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Wednesday 100
Thursday 100
Friday 43. 56.
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Tele USA Europe Spain
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Thursday
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Antena USA Europe Spain
Monday 100
Tuesday 100
Wednesday
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RAI2 USA Europe Italy
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Thursday
Friday 100
Saturday 79. 20.4
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RAI3 USA Europe Italy
Monday 100
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Thursday 100
Friday 41.2 58.
Saturday 58. 18. 23.
Sunday 66. 33.4
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Wednesday 100
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Friday 55. 44.
Saturday 88. 11.
Sunday 46.4 53.RETE 4 USA Europe Italy
Monday 100
Tuesday 100
Wednesday 100
Thursday 94.
Friday 100
Saturday 57. 42.
Sunday
ARD USA Europe Germany
Monday 100
Tuesday
Wednesday 100
Thursday 100
Friday 100
Saturday 28. 71.5
Sunday 100
ZDF USA Europe Germany
Monday 100
Tuesday 100
Wednesday 39.4 60.
Thursday 100
Friday 100
Saturday 100
Sunday 100
SAT USA Europe Germany
Monday 100
Tuesday 100
Wednesday 18. 81.9
Thursday 84. 15.
Friday 44. 55.
Saturday
Sunday 100
RTl USA Europe Germany
Monday 100
Tuesday 22. 77.
Wednesday 43. 56.
Thursday 57. 42.
Friday 100
Saturday
Sunday 100